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ABSTRACT
The COVID-19 pandemic introduced numerous unprecedented political, social, and
economic challenges that resulted in unprecedented responses by policy makers. As
result, existing inequalities and injustices rooted in a dense history of structural and
institutional violence were uncovered and exacerbated. As of June 2021, at least 398,627
people in prison tested positive for COVID-19 and at least 2,715 had died (The Marshall
Project 2021). In the United States, the inmate population is disproportionately made up
of poor, people of color. This is a pattern that is rooted in the country’s long history of
racism and white supremacy. This cycle continues as there have been no meaningful
changes to policing practices and no positive changes to policy that could reduce longer
prison sentences. Through process tracing and thematic analysis, this dissertation
investigates the COVID-19 policy changes under the Trump and Biden administrations
related to incarcerated people and measures the impact of these policies. This
investigation includes an analysis of state violence through policies directly related to
home confinement, vaccine rollouts, and the reduction in cost of communication and
medical co-pay in US federal and state prisons. This dissertation questions whether the
COVID-19 pandemic could provide the platform for the United States. to address mass
incarceration, human rights violations, and systematic violence occurring within the
criminal justice system through transitional justice. New attempts at justice would entail
listening to the voices and demands of the those targeted and harmed by the justice
system and dismantling the structural inequalities and discrimination that allow violations
to occur in the first place. A transitional justice approach requires “carrying out the
necessary reforms of state institutions, such as the judiciary, law enforcement agencies,
prisons, and education and health care systems, that reinforce and perpetuate such
discrimination” (Travesi, 2020). For the United States, this would be a direct recognition
of the ways in which oppression, racism, and discrimination have persisted for centuries
and offer new ways to address mass incarceration in the country.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
The Pandemic
On December 31, 2019, Wuhan, China reported a cluster of pneumonia cases that
required the intervention of the World Health Organization (WHO). Within days, as cases
continued to quickly rise, WHO reported the cases to social media and published their
first Disease Outbreak News, grabbing attention worldwide. On January 12, 2020, China
publicly shared that they had discovered the genetic sequence of COVID-19, a severe
acute respiratory virus derived from a coronavirus called SARS-CoV-2. Evidence
suggested that the new variant of coronavirus was associated with exposures in a Wuhan
seafood market—which was immediately closed—and Chinese authorities had no
evidence of human-to-human transmission. Therefore, authorities believed the new strain
of virus had been contained. The following day, the first recorded case outside of China
was confirmed. On January 30, 2020, WHO reported 7,818 confirmed cases worldwide,
with 82 cases reported in 18 countries outside of China. They declared the outbreak a
Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) and issued a Global Health
Emergency (WHO 2020). By March, COVID-19 was declared a pandemic and as 2020
ended, cases rose to 83,832,334 with 1,824,590 deaths globally—with over 20 million
cases and more than 346,000 deaths in the United States—with cases continuing to rise
(AJMC 2021).
The first confirmed case in the United States was on January 21, 2020, and on
March 13 the administration of US President Donald J. Trump declared COVID-19 a
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national emergency (AJMC 2021). Following the declaration, travel bans were put in
place for non-US citizens traveling from Europe, state mandated stay-at-home orders
with the exception of essential workers or for essential needs were issued, and emergency
financial relief packages were signed into law (see Figure 1.1 for a timeline of COVID19). By recommendations from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC),
social distancing measures—maintaining at least 6 feet between people—were put into
place, limiting the amount of people able to be in one area at a time (CDC 2019).
Restaurants, bars, nightclubs and theaters were either ordered to closed or required to
operate at a fraction of regular capacity, depending on state or city ordinances (Moreland
et al. 2020). Manufacturing and other industries where staff work in proximity were
scaled back or closed for safety concerns. These changes made the impact of COVID-19
reach beyond illness and loss of life to include devastating impacts on people’s
livelihoods. The challenges that COVID-19 brought to public health and the global
economy left millions of people in the United States without income or jobs (and
subsequently without health insurance coverage) or the means to afford necessities such
as food and living accommodations.
Since early 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic has been in global headlines and has
been the central focus of news, media, and policy. However, some populations were often
overlooked during the unfolding of policy responses and vaccine eligibility rollouts in the
federal government’s attempts to combat the spread of the virus. According to Amnesty
International, inmates around the world have been forgotten during the COVID-19
pandemic (Amnesty International 2021).
2

Figure 1.1 shows a timeline relevant to the overview of COVID-19 as it reflects
my thematic analysis and process tracing.
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With over 11 million people imprisoned around the globe, prisons are
overcrowded, leaving inmates more susceptible to contracting the virus (United Nations
2021). Additionally, inmates are often left without access to proper sanitation or personal
protective equipment (Amnesty International 2021). Furthermore, in the US, the inmate
population is disproportionately made up of poor people of color. This is a pattern that is
rooted in the country’s long history of racism and white supremacy (Marshall 2013;
Smith 2020). This pattern continues as there have been no meaningful changes to
policing practices and no positive changes to policy that could reduce long sentences
(Smith 2020).
For centuries, viral epidemics and disease have spread through carceral settings
like wildfire. Prisons are notorious for overcrowded spaces, limited healthcare, and poor
levels of cleanliness, making them hotbeds for disease (Strassle and Berkman 2021).
These conditions have been highlighted since at least the 18th century by prison reformers
such as John Howard, who visited prisons throughout Europe. In 1777, Howard reported
the prison cells as damp, dark, and airless and the prisons being “blighted by diseases
associated with filth and overcrowding including goal fever—or typhus—that…destroyed
more prisoners than were put to death in all the public executions” (Marland, Anderson
and Murphy 2020).
In San Quentin prison, half of the 1,900 inmates contracted influenza and sick
calls increased from 150 to 700 per day during the first wave of the Influenza Pandemic
of 1918 (Hawks, Woolhandler, and McCormick 2020). The California state prison was
struck by three waves of influenza in 1918, each similar to the “widespread visitations of
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the respiratory disease which ha(d) attacked the inhabitants of almost every part of the
world during the year” (Stanley 1919, 996). Through these waves of viral infections,
most inmates became so ill they should have been hospitalized, “but it was impossible to
put them there on account of lack of facilities” (Stanley 1919, 996). The first and second
waves broke out in the prison from a newly arriving inmate.
On the day the global influenza pandemic hit Eastern State Penitentiary in the fall
of 1918, Warden Robert McKenty closed the penitentiary to visitors, but the prison
continued functioning as a correctional institution. The prison continued to receive and
discharge people despite the pandemic. As a result, out of 1,350 incarcerated people, 63
contracted the virus and three died (Eastern State Penitentiary 2020). Eastern State
Penitentiary was then placed on a 6-week quarantine which aided in keeping the virus at
bay.
Policy makers and prison administration have acted as if the destruction caused by
the COVID-19 pandemic was new. Yet the Influenza Pandemic of 1918 stands as one of
the primary foci of infectious disease outbreaks in U.S. prisons. However, incarcerated
people in the U.S have shown higher rates of “bloodborne infections, sexually transmitted
infections, and airborne infections, including HIV, hepatitis B, hepatitis C, syphilis,
gonorrhea, chlamydia, influenza, varicella-zoster, MRSA, and tuberculosis” (Strassle and
Berkman 2020, 1088). So, the risk of acquiring an infectious disease while incarcerated
has always been dangerously high. As of June 2021, at least 398,627 people in prison
tested positive for COVID-19 and at least 2,715 had died (The Marshall Project 2021).
However, according to The New York Times, dozens of people died of COVID-like
5

symptoms, but were not included in official COVID-19 mortality tolls of jails where they
were housed (Turcotte, Sherman, Griesback, and Klein 2021).
This dissertation questions if a better attempt by the federal government to protect
inmates, a crowded population who were stripped of the opportunities to protect
themselves and address the spread of the COVID-19 within prisons, could have reduced
the detrimental outcome. Furthermore, could the COVID-19 crisis provide an opportunity
to address the root causes of mass incarceration and systematic state violence occurring
within the criminal justice system by adopting a move to transitional justice? What could
this move to transitional justice look like? New attempts at justice would entail listening
to the voices and demands of the those targeted and harmed by the justice system and
dismantling the structural inequalities and discrimination that allow violations to occur in
the first place. A transitional justice approach requires “carrying out the necessary
reforms of state institutions, such as the judiciary, law enforcement agencies, prisons, and
education and health care systems, that reinforce and perpetuate such discrimination”
(Travesi 2020). For the United States, this would be a direct recognition of the ways in
which oppression, racism, and discrimination have persisted for centuries.
Focusing on the rapid spread of COVID-19 in state and federally operated prisons
and the slow response by policy makers and administrators, there are three main
questions that drive this research:
1. What were the COVID-19 policies under the Trump administration related to
incarcerated people? What was the impact of these policies? To what extent do
these policies and their impacts constitute state violence?
6

2. What were the COVID-19 policies under the Biden administration related to
incarcerated people? What was the impact of these policies? To what extent do
these policies and their impacts constitute state violence?
3. Does the structure of the American government impact response and outcomes
during a state of emergency such as a global pandemic? Could COVID-19 offer a
platform for social change through transitional justice?
The motivation behind this research is to offer alternative ways to view mass
incarceration in the United States as a public health crisis through the implementation of
non-traditional mechanisms of transitional justice. The COVID-19 pandemic—and the
legal response that followed—is the catalyst to have such a project. This project brings
the much-needed questions centered around human rights abuses in US prisons to the
surface by first acknowledging the long history of state violence that has led to mass
incarceration in the country, followed by suggestions for reconciliation when
understanding mass incarceration as a public health crisis. In 2020, at the onset of the
COVID-19 pandemic, the American criminal justice system housed nearly 2.3 million
people in state and federal prisons, juvenile correctional facilities, local jails, immigration
detention facilities, and Indian Country jails (Sawyer and Wagner 2020). Specifically,
there are 1,833 state prisons and 110 federal prisons in the United States, which remain
the focus of this dissertation. The high number of people incarcerated, and the high
number of facilities which house them, alludes to the notion that the United States relies
on a punitive, punishment approach to social problems in the country. The United States
uses prison as a catch-all solution to crime. The American criminal justice system’s
7

approach to punishment disproportionately affects marginalized groups by inflicting
harsh sentencing for legal infractions that are rooted in social problems, particularly in
poor communities of color.
Mass Incarceration as A Public Health Crisis
Of the nearly 11 million people held in jails and prisons around the world, more than
2 million are in the United States. The second highest prison population is in China with
1.69 million, followed by Brazil with 811,000, India 478,000, and 309,000 in Russia
(Fair and Walmsley 2021). The United States also drastically leads in the highest prison
population rate—the number of inmates per 100,000 people in the population—with 629
per 100,000 people, followed by Rwanda with 580 (Fair and Walmsley 2021). This high
prison population in the United States disproportionately affects people of color,
specifically in communities with higher rates of poverty. Black Americans make up 38%
of the incarcerated population but represent only 12% of the US population (Fair and
Walmsley 2021). Black Americans are incarcerated in state prisons at a rate of five times
the rate of white Americans (Nellis, 2021). Further, Latinx people are 1.3 times more
likely to be incarcerated in the United States than non-Latinx white people (Nellis, 2021).
The disproportionately high numbers of people incarcerated in the United States is
only the beginning of the mass incarceration story. In an interview with Michelle
Alexander, a well-known civil-rights advocate and legal scholar known for her
bestselling book The New Jim Crow, she defines mass incarceration as a system of racial
and social control. Alexander (2014) claims that mass incarceration is a process in
which…
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…people are swept into the criminal justice system, branded criminals and felons,
locked up for longer periods of time than most other countries in the world…, and then
released into a permanent second-class status in which they are stripped of basic civil
and human rights, like the right to vote, the right to serve on juries, and the right to be
free of legal discrimination in employment, housing, access to public benefits.

The history of mass incarceration can be traced to the policy implementation and
political campaigns of the 1970s forward, beginning with President Nixon’s “war on
drugs” and “tough on crime” era to show the trajectory of harmful policies that has led to
the high number of marginalized people incarcerated in the United States. The punitive
approach to drug charges related to marijuana, heroin, and crack cocaine—drugs
associated with Black people during the 1960s—involved targeting poor communities of
color and increasing policing and mandatory sentencing which led to a dramatic increase
in arrests that led to prison sentences. The number of people incarcerated for nonviolent
drug laws in the United States increased from 50,000 in 1980 to over 400,000 by 1997
(Hodge 2021). Still, police make over one million drug possession arrests each year,
primarily in over-policed communities—communities of low-income people of color
(Sawyer and Wagner 2022).
However, mass incarceration in America is not solely linked to the war on drugs. In
fact, ending the war on drugs can be an important step in reducing the number of people
incarcerated for drug offenses, but it alone will not end mass incarceration (Sawyer and
Wagner 2022). The war on drugs created this unprecedented penal system by drawing
from the rhetoric of law and order that evolved from racial segregation in the United
States. This rhetoric, riddled with racial overtones, has been the driving force of legal
decision- making for decades (Barkow 2019). The tough on crime campaigns push
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narratives that poor communities of color have higher rates of drug users, violent gangs,
and “illegal” immigrants roaming the streets and harming innocent people (Barkow
2019). This misleading rhetoric pushes public fear emotional responses that drive
decision-making about public safety and crime control, therefore leading to high rates of
arrests of poor people of color and increased prison sentencing. The war on drugs stands
as a primary example in which the way we respond to crime and/or social problems—in
this case drug use—often utilizes the justice system in racist ways as a means to control
non-white populations.
Implementing laws to address social problems that stem from the social stratification
of the United States and the racialized, punitive prison sentences that follow
disproportionately affect not only those who are being housed behind bars, but those in
the community as well. This dissertation provides a bridge that connects the lives behind
bars to the lives outside of those walls, and therefore looks at mass incarceration as a
public health concern. Researchers show that experiences of mass incarceration vary by
race which, in turn, implies that the impacts of mass incarceration impact health and wellbeing in ways that vary by race (Blankenship, Gonzalez, Keene, Groves, and Rosenberg
2018). Black people are more likely to report long-term impacts of incarceration on
education, employment, and family, and are more likely than white people to avoid
getting health and social services for fear of arrest (Blankenship et al.). Overall,
incarceration has larger impacts on the health and well-being of people of color.
The effects of mass incarceration become even more detrimental during the COVID19 pandemic. Incarcerated people in US prisons are made up of an already marginalized
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population (Franco-Paredes et. al 2020:1). During the pandemic, this population was
stripped of their ability to control exposure and were at the mercy of the state for
protection. According to The Marshall Project (2021), as of March 30, 2021, one year
into the pandemic, at least 391,782 people in US prisons tested positive for COVID-19.
Several environmental conditions of carceral settings—such as overcrowding,
insufficient sanitation, poor ventilation, and inadequate healthcare—have contributed to
such facilities becoming breeding grounds for COVID-19 outbreaks (Franco-Paredes et.
al 2020). While in these facilities, the luxury of social distancing is removed and access
to protective equipment such as masks are limited. Investigating the policy implications
on this population addresses questions of human rights.
The COVID-19 pandemic quickly became a problem in prisons everywhere, but it
was an especially dangerous problem in the United States because of mass incarceration.
By late March 2020, within weeks of the World Health Organization’s declaration of a
pandemic, prisons around the world began to take measures to reduce the spread of
COVID-19 behind bars (Heard 2021). Many countries such as South Africa, India, Iran,
Thailand, England and Wales quickly began to suspend social and family visitation, stop
temporary leave—such as work release—for inmates, and reduce the amount of daily
movement within the prison (Heard 2021). While similar policies were implemented for a
short time in US prisons, such policies weren’t enough to deal with the sheer amount of
people incarcerated following decades of mass incarceration. The history of mass
incarceration that led to the densely packed prisons exacerbated the dangers for
transmission of COVID-19 (Herring and Sharma 2021). Nearly two years after COVID11

19 was declared a pandemic, most state departments of corrections, and the Bureau of
Prisons (BOP) still fails to protect inmates and successfully reduce infection rates behind
bars, and most of the legal system has returned to the same operation standards prior to
the pandemic causing the prison population to rise to pre-pandemic levels (Herring and
Sharma 2021; Sawyer and Wagner 2022).
Transitional Justice
Transitional justice is a framework that is most often associated with international
criminal courts and tribunals (Rowen 2017). Transitional justice work is most recognized
in societies shaped by widespread violence, polarized politics, and weak institutions. This
usually refers to societies well-known globally for atrocities such as mass killings, forced
disappearances, genocide, and massive displacement. I question why there seems to be
limited transitional justice literature and transitional justice attempts in post-conflict
United States, specifically as it relates to Black people and the long history of state
violence through slavery, Jim Crow laws, and mass incarceration.
Brants suggests that “transitional justice is concerned with both settling accounts
after violent conflict and/or repression and coming to terms with the traumatic damage
inflicted on individuals and society” (2013: 1). The latter point of this definition is
particularly important in the context of inequality, both in the United States and globally.
By coming to terms with the damage inflicted, we may shed light on the social structures
and institutions that inequality is rooted in and, therefore, find an avenue for change. One
of the main goals of transitional justice is the transition from a society divided by
illegality and injustices and to one that offers stability through democracy and rule of
12

law. Historically in the United States, laws have been written in a manner that utilizes the
criminal justice system as a tool to ostracize or criminalize groups of people (Hodge
2021).
Many definitions of transitional justice include the transition from an authoritarian
state or from armed conflict. However, I argue that we don’t have to be in or have
recently gone through a transition such as those for transitional justice to be seen; rather
transitional justice can be utilized as the platform to create a transition towards social
change. This platform can offer ways to make changes to the structures in place that
maintain hegemony and uphold the white power often found democratic societies. These
structures—in the context of the United States—include the implementation of policy
that has the potential to support the needs of the common good to include the
marginalized that are often excluded from the protection of the state. This dissertation
urges for change in structure rather than overthrowing a system as a whole.
Widening the concept of transition also widens the concept of justice and the
function of law. This relates to homo sacer as the ways in which law functions is key for
defining bare life and the state of exception. The platform laid by transitional justice
could bring the mistreatment of law to the forefront and bring focus on reforms to the
justice sector of the United States. I, therefore, use transitional justice to question, what
does law offer in the United States and what can law offer in the United States? Are we
moving into the direction of new possibilities of law as a tool of aid as opposed to a
mechanism of state violence?
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I rely on Sarah Kihiki’s (2012) definition that transitional justice is “confronting
the legacies of past human rights abuses and atrocities to build stable, peaceful, and
democratic futures” combined with Jamie Rowen’s constructive approach that
transitional justice “is better understood as an idea—meaning a thought, a plan or
suggestion—about how to redress mass, often state-sponsored violence, and ensure
democratic and social change” (2017:3). This dissertation changes the ethos of
transitional justice by suggesting that politics do not have to rely on official transitional
justice mechanisms, but rather can create their own understandings of social and political
change driven by the theoretical underpinnings and ideas that transitional justice has to
offer.
Chapter Summary
This chapter introduces the study by elucidating the detrimental effects of mass
incarceration on marginalized populations in the United States, particularly during the
COVID-19 pandemic, and potential for alternative forms of justice in which the
pandemic could have been a catalyst for. Chapters 2 and 3 outline the theoretical
frameworks which serve as the foundation for this research. Chapter 2 theoretically
situates the incarcerated population as a population that can be considered as taking on
the life of the homo sacer, a life that is deprived of citizenship and rights and a life that
can be—legally speaking—allowed to let die. Chapter 3 offers a detailed understanding
of the history and implementation of transitional justice and the ways in which I shift
away from the typical understanding of transitional justice mechanisms to apply its goals
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to addressing the violence perpetrated against the people incarcerated in the United
States, particularly during COVID-19.
Chapter 4 provides an overview of law and governance in the United States. The
United States operates under a model of federalism in which there is a separation of
political power between federal and state politics. In the absence of a coordinated
national response to the COVID-19 pandemic, state officials were pressured to adopt
policies to protect inmates incarcerated in their state operated system. Mapping the
differences in legal response and protection—or lack thereof—between state and
federally operated prisons further solidifies the need for transitional justice mechanisms
to identify the unequal treatment among incarcerated peoples. In chapter 5, I outline the
methodology behind this project to include a description of process tracing and thematic
analysis, which were used to identify key snapshot moments of the COVID-19 pandemic
that related to incarcerated peoples.
Chapters 6-8 offer three topics used to analyze the harmful ways in which delayed
response to the COVID-19 pandemic had detrimental outcomes for people incarcerated in
federal and state prisons across the U.S. Chapter 6 provides an overview of the nuanced
ways in which the CARES Act and home confinement policies were used in an attempt to
reduce the number of inmates in overcrowded facilities. With the sheer number of people
housed within overcrowded living spaces, COVID-19 precautions recommended by the
CDC such as social distancing and mask wearing were nearly impossible. However,
attempts to reduce the number of people incarcerated did not prove to offer enough
refuge from the disease. Chapter 7 addresses the vaccine rollout phases implemented to
15

combat the spread of the COVID-19 virus and identifies where inmates fell on the level
of priority to receive the vaccine. Further, this chapter highlights the lack of cooperation
by prison officers and staff to receive the vaccine, which only exacerbated the spread of
the virus within prisons. Rather than protecting the inmates, who could not protect
themselves, officers and staff played a part in spreading the virus both into and out of the
prison. Chapter 8 illuminates the harmful impacts of the high cost of communication and
medical copayments for incarcerated peoples and families. The high cost of being
incarcerated has been a harmful hurdle for decades, but was brought to light by family
and media during the pandemic. What these three chapters have in common is that the
narratives—policies around home confinement for elderly or medically fragile inmates,
safety and protection protocols for communicable diseases or viruses within prisons, and
the call for reduced fines and fees to be housed in state and federal prisons—displayed in
this dissertation are not new. The problems laid out in this dissertation are not unique
during this pandemic, but the pandemic offers a new way to identify them and address
them.
Finally, chapter 9 concludes the dissertation by positioning my work within a
larger conversation about transitional justice and mass incarceration as it relates to public
health in the United States. With insight into the process of implementing transitional
justice mechanisms, I argue that COVID-19 could offer a platform for social change
through a transitional justice lens.
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CHAPTER TWO
HOMO SACER AND THE STATE OF EXCEPTION
According to Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben (1995), a key mark of modern
democracy is the integration between sovereignty and the biopolitical body brought into
being by state power. Agamben distinguishes between two types of life in biopolitics:
qualified life (bios) and bare life (zoe). The qualified life is the life of the citizen, a life in
which people’s allegiance to the state offers rights and protection, by the state. The bare
life is the life of the homo sacer (sacrificed man), a life deprived of rights and deprived of
protection. In the bare life the biological life is given precedence over the way of life as
defined by citizenship. The person’s political existence has been removed by those who
have power to define who is included and who is excluded as worthy human beings.
The distinction between bios and zoe is made by those with judicial power—in
the United States this would include all three branches of government—through the state
of exception. The state of exception is based on the sovereign’s (or government’s) ability
to go beyond the confinements of the rule of law to protect the public good, or to protect
those of the qualified life. At the extreme, for example, a leader can impose martial law.
In extraordinary times, the law is suspended by the sovereign and this suspension
becomes the norm. In a condition he refers to as abandonment the law may technically be
in force, but it no longer holds substantive meaning or significance.
Building off Carl Schmitt’s concept of the state of exception (Agamben 2005),
Agamben’s idea of homo sacer highlights the government’s ability to transcend the rule of
law. To best see how law can surpass its limits to have control over life—and subsequently
17

death—and define who holds what amount of agency in society and who has the full benefit
of citizenship, we must map the theoretical trajectory that led to Agamben’s development
of homo sacer. This includes readings from Hannah Arendt (1951;1958) and Michel
Foucault (1976). Through these readings we see just how power dynamics control life by
not only identifying ways in which law categorizes who is considered a citizen or what is
considered citizenship, but how law holds power over life and death and survivability.
Agamben builds from Foucault’s concept of the condition of biopolitics, a power that is
exerted over a population as a whole. Foucault argues that modern power is characterized
differently than sovereign power; sovereign power, for Foucault, is characterized by a right
over life and death—or making live or letting die—where modern power is charactered by
a productive relation to life. Agamben argues that sovereign and modern power coincide
and are fundamentally integrated. Arendt, although writing before Foucault and Agamben,
critiques the idea that the rights that empower the role of the nation and the people give us
notions of bare life and nothing about the human, which reduces humans to merely human
with no exceptional qualities. It is within the qualities that define human, that define
citizenship, that this research lies.
Arendt
In her discussion of the emergence of the nation of minorities and the stateless
people, Arendt argues that WWI brought inflation, unemployment, civil wars, and
migration of groups who were not able to assimilate anywhere (1951). This shift in the idea
of nation was described as proliferation of wars between two nations and the division of
political communities into four elements: state people, equal partners, minorities, and
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stateless people. The Rights of Man meant that (a Christian) God’s command and/or
customs of history were no longer the source of law, but man was. Before, the source of
rights derived from outside of politics and from “social, spiritual, and religious forces”
(Arendt, 1951:291). Rights of man had been defined as inalienable because they were
supposed to be independent of all governments, “but it turned out that the moment human
beings lacked their own government and had to fall back upon their minimum rights, no
authority was left to protect them and no institution was willing to guarantee them”
(Arendt, 1951: 292). Without a government, these rights became unenforceable, regardless
of the idea that they are inalienable. The rights that empower the role of the nation and the
people give us notions of bare life and nothing about the qualified life about which Arendt
is critical. She offers the critique of reducing human beings to merely just a human being
with no exceptional qualities.
Foucault
In a 1976 lecture, Michel Foucault lays out two theoretical notions of power:
disciplinary power and biopower. He identifies the shift between the two paradigms
historically through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; this was a shift from a
disciplinary to a nondisciplinary technology of power. The two are integrated to include
man as a human, as part of a population rather than an individual. He uses the two
notions of power to discuss the discourse of race and wars. Foucault argues that the
modern state must at some point become racist in order for the state to function in a
biopolitical mode (1976). This justifies killing, not merely murder but also indirect
murder, of those that are a threat to the population. Indirect murder, to Foucault, includes
19

“the fact of exposing someone to death, increasing the risk of death for some people, or
quite simply, political death, expulsion, rejection, and so on” (1976:256). Foucault refers
to Nazism and the socialism of the Soviet Union as historical examples of this. Foucault
uses the term biopower as the domain of life in which power has asserted control. The
power is that of the sovereign, and to exercise that power is to “exert one’s control over
mortality and to define life as the deployment and manifestation of power” (Mbembe
2019: 66). Sovereignty thus holds the power and capacity to dictate who is able to live
and who society should let die.
Agamben
Agamben pulls in work from Foucault and Arendt as the foundation for his
analysis on the politicization of life, biopower and the Rights of Man. Agamben argues
that Foucault never brought his insights to bear on the politics of the great totalitarian
states of the 20th century as “the inquiry that began with a reconstruction of the grand
enfermement in hospitals and prisons did not end with an analysis of the concentration
camp” (119). Foucault could have extended his investigation on the process of
subjectivity to provide helpful analysis of modern biopolitics. Further, Agamben refers to
Arendt’s writings dedicated to the structure of totalitarian states in the postwar period and
suggest that they are limited because of the absence of a biopolitical perspective. He uses
the concept of bare life and sacred life as the lens through which we can intersect
Foucault and Arendt. He writes, “along with the emergence of biopolitics, we can
observe a displacement and gradual expansion beyond the limits of the decision on bare
life, in the state of exception, in which sovereignty consisted” (122).
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The theory of sovereign power is based on the state of exception and the bare life.
Sovereign power establishes itself through political order based on the exclusion of bare
life by the enactment of the exception in which the law is suspended from the human
being who is stripped of legal status and transformed into a bare life, a life without rights.
The sovereign exception gives rise to juridical order as “the rule, suspending itself gives
rise to the exception and, maintaining itself in relation to the exception, first constitutes
itself as a rule” (18).
According to Agamben, all law is situational law that the sovereign can
monopolize. The sovereign “creates and guarantees the situation as a whole in its totality”
(1998:16). This is where the essence of state sovereignty lies. During a state of
emergency, the state creates and guarantees the situation that the law needs for its own
validity. In his discussion of European refugees and stateless persons following the First
World War, Agamben illustrates this validity by expressing that “the very rights of man
that once made sense as the presupposition of the rights of the citizen are now
progressively separated from and used outside the context of citizenship, for the sake of
the supposed representation and protection of a bare life that is more and more driven to
the margins of the nation-states, ultimately to be recodified into a new national identity”
(1998:132). This same logic can be seen in modern nation-states attempt to maintain
national identity by, for example, violating their own laws and treaties to exclude
refugees who are Muslim or Black.
The political response to COVID-19 in the United States brought changes in
policy which labeled some sectors of the population as essential workers, restricted
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asylum rights to immigrants, and reduced rights to safety and protection for prison
inmates. These policy changes reduced these populations to the bare life under the guise
of protecting “the nation.” The separation of these marginalized populations highlights
the separation between humanitarianism and politics, which Agamben describes as the
extreme phase of the separation of the rights of man from the rights of the citizen. In the
United States, the political response to COVID-19 which removed protections from
“essential” workers, restricted asylum, and reduced inmate safety may not have been a
blatant sacrifice of marginalized bodies in that the government did not actively kill these
people, but these bodies were allowed to die from lack of protection and justified
exposure.
Mbembe
Mbembe’s necropolitics refers to the contemporary forms of subjugating life to
the power of death. In response to Foucault, he argues that the notion of biopower is
insufficient to this subjugation. Necropolitics, or necropower, considers new ways in
which “weapons are deployed in the interest of maximally destroying persons and
creating death-worlds,” or new forms of social existence. Within these new forms of
social existence, populations are subjected to living conditions equitable to the status of
“the living dead” (2019:92). This research highlights ways in which laws and policy in
response to the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States acted as contemporary weapon
deployed to create death-worlds. Following the trajectory of Arendt, Foucault, and
Agamben, Mbembe adds to the contemporary analysis of the power to dictate who may
live and who must die in a state of emergency. He raises important questions that
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investigate under what conditions the right to kill, to allow to live, or expose to death is
exercised.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, marginalized populations were designated as
homo sacer—as groups that must die to let others live. Defining vast populations as
essential workers granted the right to expose them to death in an attempt to keep a society
based on continuing economic expansion functioning. These populations were sacrificed
to sustain “life” for others. It is both ironic and important to note that those deemed
“essential” were already historically marginalized. Their vulnerabilities are what made
them more susceptible to be deemed expendable by labeling them as indispensable. The
United States has been impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic in ways that reflect past
and ongoing social injustices and inequalities related to public health. While the virus
was labeled “the great equalizer” that impacted all people, that commonality masked the
“underlying social and economic inequalities that make some populations more
vulnerable to the disease than others” (Jane Addams College of Social Work 2020). The
steps taken in response to COVID-19 such as social distancing measures have showcased
inequities in work-related and economic factors resulting in unequal access to decent
work and healthcare (Kantamneni 2020). Since the state determines who is deemed an
essential worker, who receives aide, and who is neglected during this time of crisis, the
outcomes have been lethal for many, but especially for the most marginalized (Robert
Wood Johnson Foundation 2020). The COVID-19 crisis has not only exposed the sheer
number of human rights violations perpetrated by the US government against
marginalized groups but has also exacerbated state crimes of structural violence and
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negligence. Mbembe’s necropolitics offers a framework to investigate how the pandemic
has produced the conditions for dying.
Mbembe draws upon the state of exception to uphold necropolitics during a time
of emergency. However, the necropolitics of global health inequality is driven “not by a
perpetual state of emergency, but by a state of chronic acceptance that some have poorer
health than others” (Sandset 2021: 1411). Mbembe allows us to see that COVID-19 is
more than a health crisis, it is a crisis of sovereignty. The processes of privatization,
neoliberalism, and capitalism have created conditions in which minorities—who may be
already in poorer health than others—have taken the brunt of the pandemic in the frantic
attempt to return to normalcy as quickly as possible. Following the words of Foucault,
Agamben, and Mbembe, the sovereign is exercising its power to ‘let die’ through the
exposure to conditions that are detrimental to their health and survivability.
COVID-19 And a State of Emergency
During a state of emergency, the state of exception allows for an increase of
power by government to overlook constitutional rights to extend their control. This
process has become apparent in the United States, especially in the face of the COVID-19
outbreak. In an attempt to control the spread of the virus, the US government relied on
changes to policy—which often meant the suspension of policy—in search of herd
immunity in which the majority of the population would become protected from COVID19. This protection, however, came at a cost. Through a state of exception, policy in the
United States was used as a mechanism to define who is seen as expendable and capable
of being sacrificed (i.e., who would take on the life of the homo sacer).
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Arendt and Foucault refer to the division of the population into subgroups, which
categorizes people as taking on bare life and permits the exercise of biopower. Racial
thinking has been prominent in Western political thought and practice, “especially when
the point was to contrive the inhumanity of foreign peoples and the sort of domination to
be exercised over them” (Mbembe 2019: 71). Arendt’s focus on othering through
different subgroups suggests that the politics of race are inherently linked to biopolitics of
death. To Foucault, racism is a mechanism through which the sovereign can exercise
biopower. Further, he suggests that the modern state can hardly function without
becoming involved within racism at some point. Foucault argues that “the death of the
bad race, of the inferior race (or the degenerate, or the abnormal) is something that will
make life in general healthier” (1976: 255). Killing or letting die, thus, results in the
elimination of the biological threat, in this case the threat of the spread of COVID-19 and
the goal to reach herd immunity.
Racial and ethnic minority groups are at increased risk of contracting and dying
from COVID-19. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC),
non-Latinx American Indian or Alaskan Native people have an age-adjusted COVID-19
hospitalization rate around 5.3 times that of non-Latinx White people and hospitalization
rates among Black and Latinx people are about 4.7 times the rate of White people.
Minoritized people are subject to adverse social determinants of health that have
“historically prevented them from having fair opportunities for economic, physical, and
emotional health” (CDC 2019). Some inequities in social determinants of health include
healthcare access and utilization, occupation, education, income and wealth gaps, and
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housing opportunities. The conditions of the places where people live, learn, work and
play can greatly affect health outcomes (CDC 2021). The partiality in social determinants
of health such as poverty and healthcare access greatly influence quality-of-life
outcomes, which is why it is imperative to understand the ways in which transitions from
one presidential administration to another amidst COVID-19 brought changes in policies
related to public health and equity. Although this dissertation is not directly focused on
race, it is worth noting that the three groups of interest—meat industry workers,
immigrants, and prison inmates—are disproportionately comprised of racialized minority
groups.
Arendt (1958) describes how major events permanently alter society—in which
there is no going back—as a “chain reaction.” In her accounts of post-WW1 European
refugees, this chain reaction led to the emergence of stateless minorities that did not have
a government to represent or protect them, forcing them to live under a law of exception.
This imperialism worked to uphold the status quo. However, the status quo could not be
preserved because Europe had been ruled by a system that never considered the needs of
at least 25 percent of the population, the roughly 100 million inhabitants that were
officially recognized as exceptions. People without their own national government were
deprived of human rights. Trying to define many groups of people led to people falling
between the cracks of recognition.
Similarly, the attempt to define so many groups in the United States. as essential
and inessential—particularly during COVID-19—has led to people falling between the
cracks of recognition and becoming like the stateless minorities in which, they did not
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have a government to represent or protect them. Mbembe points to the ways in which
power not only continuously “refers and appeals to the exception, emergency, and a
fictionalized notion of the enemy,” but also produces these same exceptions,
emergencies, and enemies” (2019:70). This brings to question the relationship between
politics and death within systems that operate through a state of emergency. It is within
these political systems that operate in response of COVID-19 where Foucault’s biopower
appears as a function to define people by who must live and who is justified to let die.
The State of Exception
The state of exception investigates the increase of power by governments
employed in times of crisis. In a state of emergency, states of exception occur when
constitutional rights can be diminished, superseded, and rejected in the process of
claiming this extension of power by a government for the “good” of its people. The state
of exception highlights the sovereign’s ability to transcend the rule of law in the name of
the public good, in this case the protection from the global threat that is COVID-19.
It is important to note that the state of exception is not a special or specific type of
law, but “as a suspension of the juridical order itself, it defines law’s threshold or limit
concept” (Agamben 2005:4). Agamben uses the expression full powers to characterize
the state of exception and refers to it as “the expansion of the powers of the government”
(2005:5). This expansion of power removes the distinction between different powers held
by the judicial, legislative, and executive branches of government, and a broad regulatory
power is granted to the executive. We see this, for example, in the President’s ability to
issue orders that temporarily suspend laws enacted by Congress. The permitted power
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under the state of exception provides the grounds for a totalitarian approach to
governance in which power is centralized. This centralized power permits the rule of law
to be expended and for the distinction to be made between the qualified and bare life.
Modern totalitarianism, by means of the state of exception, acts as a legal civil
war that “allows for the physical elimination not only of political adversaries but of entire
categories of citizens who for some reason cannot be integrated into the political system”
(Agamben 2005:2). During this political war the voluntary creation of a permanent state
of emergency, and therefore state of exception, can become an essential practice of
modern states (Agamben 2005). Agamben speaks of unstoppable progression as global
civil war in which the state of exception appears as a dominant paradigm of government.
I question how this relates to the global politics of a worldwide pandemic that carries that
magnitude of force as the COVID-19 outbreak. Has the global pandemic created a
permanent state of emergency and, furthermore, a new norm in politics? Agamben
suggests that the state of exception appears “as an ‘illegal’ but perfectly ‘juridical and
constitutional’ measure that is realized in the production of new norms (or of a new
juridical order),” in which new juridical order justifiably can be creating through
historical eras (2005:28).
Throughout US history, there were moments of politics and jurisprudence that
followed a timeline of state of exception proclamations. On September 22, 1862,
President Abraham Lincoln proclaimed the emancipation of slaves on his authority alone,
ignoring Congress entirely, making the President the sovereign power over the state of
exception. During World War One, Congress granted President Wilson complete control
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over the administration through the Espionage Act of June 1917 and the Overman Act of
May 1918, again, making the President of the United States the sovereign power
(Agamben 2005). Because the metaphor for war became part of presidential political
vocabulary—War on Drugs, War on Crime, War on Terror—granting full sovereign
powers became a normal part of politics. Following the attacks on the United States on
September 11, 2001, President Bush made the decision to refer to himself as the
Commander in Chief of the Army, attempting to give himself the sovereign powers in a
state of emergency. Therefore, the emergency becomes the rule (Agamben 2005) which
resulted in the longest war in US history. These moments in history occur as the President
defines his own understanding of what is necessary for the safety and protection of the
county. Therefore, “necessity acts here to justify a single, specific case of transgression
by means of an exception.” During times of threat, governments can use this argument of
necessity as legitimation to make exceptions and create these new norms. This
dissertation raises the question of how COVID-19 was leveraged as a state of exception
to solidify political power under two US Presidents.
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CHAPTER THREE
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
Transitional justice is often defined as a set of practices implemented to address
and redress mass harm and violations of widespread human rights. It is used to raise the
question of “punishment or impunity,” (Kritz 1995; Teitel 2000) or “vengeance or
forgiveness,” (Minow 1998) following conflict and mass atrocity. For the purpose of my
dissertation, I rely on Kihika’s (2012) definition that transitional justice is “confronting
the legacies of past human rights abuses and atrocities to build stable, peaceful, and
democratic futures” combined with Rowen’s constructive approach that transitional
justice “is better understood as an idea—meaning a thought, a plan or suggestion—about
how to redress mass, often state-sponsored violence, and ensure democratic and social
change” (2017:3). Together, these definitions convey the sentiment that transitional
justice is about the recognition of past harm and injustice and working toward righting
those wrongs.
The suggestions made by a transitional justice model offer a particular vocabulary
unique to transitional justice including truth and reconciliation, tribunals, truth
commissions, and reparations programs. These terms address the alternative forms of
justice that push goals of “ensuring accountability, improving survivor well-being, and
preventing future violence” rather than the traditional model of crime and punishment
(Rowen 2017: 3). By defining transitional justice as a set of ideas, plans or suggestions
we can also see how it can be defined as a process that is continuously evolving to fit the
need of social and political dynamics in a particular time and space.
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Emerging in the early 1990s, transitional justice was developed when scholars,
policy makers, and advocates were investigating how countries “moving from
authoritarianism or armed conflict toward democratic regimes were using law to address
human rights abuses under former regimes (Rowen 2017; Arthur 2009). Law professor,
Ruti Teitel, coined the phrase in 1991 in her advisory memorandum to the Council on
Foreign Relations on challenges facing newly democratized societies (Teitel 2008). She
thought of justice in relation to criminal law and, therefore, in relation to crime and
punishment. For Teitel, transitional justice was a way of questioning punishment as well
as the role of the court and the liberal values associated with due process. Traditional
forms of justice that relate to criminal law, which largely relies on punishment, do not
address the deep lasting social scars left on a society. Punitive forms of justice, like seen
in the United States, puts more emphasis on crime and punishment and less on
restoration. Transitional justice is concerned with how to hold societies, and individuals
within those societies, accountable for their actions while implementing ways to rebuild
societies in the period following human rights violations (Quinn 2016). In doing so,
transitional justice focuses on “reforms to the justice sector, working towards reestablishment of the rule of law and assisting in the rebuilding of the system of courts that
is required in a functioning, democratic society” (Quinn 2016: 390).
Often transitional justice practices occur after the transition from an authoritarian
state or from armed conflict to the aspirational goals of democracy. However, my
dissertation aims to illustrate that we don’t have to be in or have recently gone through
such a transition for transitional justice to be seen—it is enough to acknowledge
31

historical and ongoing harm and injustice, and to use that recognition as a turning-point
for change; and transitional justice can be utilized as the platform to create a transition
towards radical social change. This platform can offer ways to make changes to the
structures in place that maintain hegemony and uphold the white, male power often found
in democratic societies. These structures—in the context of the US and other developed
and established democracies (McAuliffe 2017; Winter 2014)—include the
implementation of policy that has the potential to support the needs of the common good
to include the marginalized that are often excluded from the protection of the state
through the rule of law.
While conventional transitional justice scholarship focused on establishing new
regimes after an abusive one had been overthrown (see for example Arthur 2009), I argue
that changing the structure of an abusive state may provide the same benefits as
establishing a new system altogether. Widening the concept of transition to include newly
imposed transitions made possible by transitional justice also widens the concept of
justice and the function of law. The platform laid by transitional justice could bring the
mistreatment of law to the forefront and bring focus to reforms to the justice sector of the
US. I, therefore, use the ideas that prevail in transitional justice scholarship to question
what law offers in the US and whether we are moving into the direction of new
possibilities of law as a tool of aid as opposed to a mechanism of state violence. This
dissertation addresses the ethos of transitional justice by suggesting that politics do not
have to rely on official transitional justice mechanisms, but rather can create their own
understandings of social and political change driven by the theoretical underpinnings and
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ideas that transitional justice has to offer (El-Masri et al. 2020). Conventional methods of
transitional justice often fall short in discussing long-term solutions to transforming
social and political institutions. Therefore, I include transformative justice practices that
are used to respond to violence without creating more violence. I rely on transformative
justice policies to identify ways structural and systematic institutions create further
criminality and address avenues for institutional change.
History of Transitional Justice
The development of transitional justice as a concept and practice occurred in three
phases: the first phase considered what are now foundations of international law, the
second phase introduced restorative practices such as truth commissions and tribunals,
and the third phase broadened the definition of transitional justice to include anything a
society implements to deal with a legacy of conflict (Teitel 2003). Transitional justice
became understood as international after 1945 in the post-World War II period. This
phase narrowly focused on tribunals in Nuremberg, which are now considered the
foundation of international law. The aim of transitional justice in this phase was
accountability. The tribunal in Nuremberg sought justice through punishing those held
accountable for war crimes, reaching for “a vision of world order and international
justice, characterizing mass violence as crimes of war and crimes against humanity”
(Minow 2000:235). However, the development of this phase was not enduring as the
political conditions of postwar Germany were unique and would not translate or recur in
the same manner transnationally. Nevertheless, the legacy of the postwar trials and
sanctions seen in Nuremberg is an important historical precedent that formed the basis of
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modern human rights law and jumpstarted the transitional justice movement. Phase one
raised two key points that are critical for the following two phases. First, international
justice displaced national justice. Prior to Nuremberg, individual states prosecuted their
own citizens, but now an international “gold standard” for public response to mass
violence is upheld (Minow 2000). However, the national trials following World War I
were not successful at deterring future conflict. This leads to the second key point:
previous responses to transition not only failed—as shown by the occurrence of the
second World War—but “were the sense of economic frustration and resentment that
fueled Germany’s role in World War II” (Teitel 2003: 73). This detrimental history laid
the groundwork for alternative forms of justice and the further development of the
transitional justice movement. This first phase runs through the Cold War, which ends the
internationalism of this first, postwar, phase of transitional justice (Teitel 2003).
The second, or post-Cold War, phase began in 1989 with the wave of democratic
transitions and modernization. This phase is associated with a period of accelerated
democratization and political fragmentation that followed the fall of the Soviet Union,
spanning the last quarter of the twentieth century (Teitel 2003). The shift into a new
phase of transitional justice came in the 1980s when new democracies emerged in South
America. After the collapse of repressive military regimes it was unclear if the same
model of justice that was seen in Nuremberg that focused on punishing those responsible
for atrocities would be successfully implemented in South America. The Phase 2 model
relies on a more diverse rule of law understanding that is tied to particular local
conditions as opposed to the international forms of transitional justice seen in phase one.
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Modernization and the rule of law were equated with trials and tribunals by the nationstate to support growth and stability in nation-building. In this phase, transitional justice
“embodies a liberal vision of history as progress…in which the harms of the past may be
repaired in order to produce a future characterized by the nonrecurrence of violence, the
rule of law, and culture of human right” (Shaw et. al 2010: 3).
However, it is important to remember that transitional justice is not a field of
practice or inquiry, but rather “a label or cloak that aims to rationalize a set of diverse
bargains in relation to the past as an integrated endeavor” (Bell 2009: 6). Transitional
justice is a suggestion, it is part of an ever-changing global movement. And it is
interwoven with political trade-offs that are made to ensure that justice is secured. Where
the Nuremberg model of transitional justice defined the rule of law in universalizing
terms, it became the standard by which all subsequent transitional justice debates are
framed. Therefore, Phase 1 laid the foundation for phase two to debate the tension
between punishment and amnesty, challenging the ideal rule of law and raising new
conceptions of justice.
Phase 2’s form of justice looked beyond accountability and questioned how to
heal a society and incorporate values such as reconciliation. The second phase focused on
justice through truth commissions, apologies, and reparations and tribunals such as the
International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The goal was to
introduce a form of justice where justice at local levels had not been present for long
periods of time. The forms of justice introduced were aimed toward building peace and
reconciliation by offering a space for dialogue between victims and perpetrators. This
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was necessary because in these countries, perpetrators and victims would have to live
together and learn to co-exist to keep society functioning. Ultimately, the goal was to
“reconceive the social meaning of past conflicts, particularly defeats, in an attempt to
reconstruct their present and future effects” (Teitel 2003: 87). This goal can be achieved
by using “law and state power to address and redress episodes of collective violence”
through prosecutions, reparations and truth commissions; only then can we “locate the
violations on maps of human comprehensibility, deter future violations of human dignity,
and ensure that the ambitions of the agents of violence do not succeed” (Minow 2000:
235).
The third phase, or the “steady-state” phase of transitional justice is associated
with contemporary conditions of persistent conflict which lay the foundation for a
normalized law of violence (Teitel 2003: 70). This current phase is broader and “involves
anything that a society devises to deal with a legacy of conflict and/or widespread human
rights violations, from changes in the criminal code…to tackling the distributional
inequalities that underlie conflict” (Roht-Arriaza 2006: 2). While Phase 3 shows some
similarities to Phase 1 in the form of international justice, internationalism has been
transformed by the developments of globalization and “typified by conditions of
heightened political instability and violence” (Teitel 2003: 71). Transitional justice has
now moved from the exception to the norm to becoming a paradigm of rule of law (UN
Secretary General 2011). Phase 3 suggests that contemporary political conditions are
characterized by steady and on-going conflict. In other words, conflict is the new normal.
Therefore, transitional justice should then be normalized—and it has been; the Secretary
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General (2011) indicated that transitional justice is required to remediate all types of
conflicts in all cases. The most recognized symbol of the normalization of transitional
justice is through the increased use of human rights law that brings the justice and peace
debates to the surface. Human rights laws tie together Phase 1’s emphasis on
international justice through the implementation of the International Criminal Court and
the localized justice models of Phase 2. Phase 3 of transitional justice bridges the
previous models and applies human rights policy that attempts to provide the most
meaningful justice possible in the political conditions of that time.
In its most current state, transitional justice has become highly malleable which
makes its utility aspirational in relation to bridging social and political divides, but also
ambiguous for adaptation worldwide in many different scenarios that requires a response
to mass violence. Therefore, Rowen (2017) argues that transitional justice may be
appealing, but what makes it appealing also makes it problematic. Having a quasijudicial, and even non-judicial, strategy distinguishes transitional justice from related
ideas of rule of law and human rights as “its focus was the contextual nature of justice
and the importance of creating laws that would offer more than retributive justice”
(Rowen 2017: 26).
Brants describes transitional justice as “a theatre of imagery and memory” in
which transitional justice is “concerned with both settling accounts after violence conflict
and/or repression and coming to terms with the traumatic damage inflicted on individuals
in society” (2013: 1). Transitional justice is bound up with history-telling and attempts to
develop shared collective memories that look towards a future made by making sense of
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past events. Brants, Hol and Siegel (2013) would argue that transitional justice is needed
because “dealing with atrocity within the (narrow) limits of legal discourse implies a
reduction of the human experience that can never fully address the multitude of
complexity of issues involved in justice—the very meaning and significance of which
depend on the historical, social and political conditions in which it functions” (2). Justice
itself is more than a legally established procedure, it is a process of remembering and of
coming to terms with imageries and histories to set the narrative for a just, post-conflict,
future.
Forms of transitional justice are ultimately aimed at the transition from a society
divided by chaos, illegality, and injustices to one in which the rule of law provides human
rights and binding principles of stability. While Brants and colleagues (2013) focuses on
the history-telling and shared collective memories, transitional justice not only operates
in truth-finding and bringing justice but is about doing justice. These forms of “doing
justice” occur in three forms: retributive justice, restorative justice, and reparative justice
(Quinn 2016). Transitional justice does justice by recognizing the broad scope of harm
and degradation, the need for rectification, and alternative methods to achieving redress
rather than merely practicing law as “too much law, it has been said, skews the truth and
brings too little justice” (Brants et al. 2013: 4).
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“Doing” Justice
There are three primary approaches to “doing” justice in transitional justice:
retributive justice, restorative justice, reparative justice (Quinn 2016). These approaches
have been characterized as distinct paradigms, or philosophical or theoretical
frameworks, that are useful in explaining and understanding the different ways of
approaching alternative forms of justice (Minow 1998). Retributive justice is the kind of
justice that people in the West are most accustomed to. Here, justice equates with legal
prosecutions and the rule of law. The goal of retributive justice is to correct the
perpetrator by means of prosecution and punishment. This is usually accomplished
through criminal trials and tribunals. An example of retributive justice can be seen in
Cambodia’s Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia established in 2001 to
try crimes committed during the Khmer Rouge regime in the mid- to late-1970s (Quinn
2016).
Restorative justice is intended to restore the dignity of the victim and reintegrate
the perpetrator back into society, restoring the harmony between them (Krog 2000). The
goal is to empower victims. One of the most popularized ways this is accomplished is
through the use of truth commissions. Truth commission policies offer alternative judicial
sanctions to address cases of mass harm. These bodies are established to look at
widespread human rights violations with a much broader focus than trials by offering an
inquiry that includes details from victims and a public report that contains a detailed
summary that accounts exactly what has taken place (Quinn 2016). Truth commissions
have become more popular around the world as they offer recommendations for social
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and political change by focusing on the creation of historical records of violence. The
appeal of truth commissions lies in the fact that they focus on creating a platform for
change rather than prioritizing punishment for perpetrators, as punishing perpetrators
through court processes, in theory, could foment divisions (Minow 1998; Rowen 2017).
Minow states, “know the truth and it will set you free, expose the terrible secrets of a sick
society and heal that society” (2000: 243).
Truth commissions help people who were harmed by violence to locate their
experiences within the larger setting of political violence. This process builds autonomy.
It can help restore trust in institutions because a commission can enable public
acknowledgement of the violence. This acknowledgement, in turn, is a precondition to
healing and reestablishing trust in people and trust in the government. With the
popularization of this shift through the South Africa Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (TRC) and the creation of the International Center for Transitional Justice,
truth commissions have become a signature procedure of transitional justice (Teitel 2003;
Gready 2010).
While restorative justice focuses on restoring the victim and the perpetrator,
the reparative justice paradigm is concerned with making right the things that went
wrong. It is intended to repair. Reparative justice is implemented in one of two ways or in
a mixture of both: apology and compensation or restitution. An apology can be given by
the perpetrator him/herself, or a representative of the perpetrator if the perpetrator is no
longer able to apologize, or the perpetrator is a larger entity and not an individual.
Apologies provide symbolic acknowledgement of the wrong that the victim(s) suffered
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that then allows the victim to move forward in the healing process and lessens the
feelings of anger and retaliation felt by the victim (Quinn 2016). The second method of
repair—restitution—can be defined as a token paid in compensation for loss or injury.
This form of repair attempts to compensate for the wrongdoings. No amount of money
can ever fully compensate for the loss and damage suffered, so the “idea of compensation
is not completely adequate” (Quinn 2016: 397).
These three paradigms represent different visions of how a society can rebuild in
a period of transition. Often, arguments regarding transitions are centered on different
conceptions of justice, not simply between justice and redress. Justice itself is a complex
and contested concept. In many transitions there are multiple forms of justice at issue that
include forms that are retrospective, prospective and “the adjustment of contending legal
and political orders” (Webber 2012:99). Debates within the transitional justice literature
discuss the tensions between these forms of justice, but those debates often focus on
retrospective justice—backward-looking justice as opposed to forward-looking—as the
sole form of justice. However, tensions between the range of practices and goals that
transitional justice incorporates are also obscured by the interdisciplinary scholarship
approach it has grown into (Bell 2009).
I argue that transitional justice is limited if multiple forms of justice are not
considered. By considering the examples below, there are benefits and limitations of each
approach, and they each serve different purposes for different countries. For transitional
justice to be most effective, the interventions should implement a combination of these
three paradigms. By utilizing some combination of the three different paradigms,
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multiple objectives can be met to push forward the healing process. In some cases, one
intervention—such as a truth commission—may fulfill more than one of these objectives
on its own. Through three cases studies of transitional justice—South Africa, Peru, and
Rwanda—we can see how combinations of the three paradigms are implemented.
Transformative Justice
While these measures are intended to address bodily integrity crimes and civil and
political harms, there is a body of literature that calls for transitional justice to go further.
In doing so, their argument is that there are other levels of criminality that devolve from
the structural and systematic institutions that remain in place. This is as true in postconflict contexts as it is in established democracies. The practice of transitional justice to
address institutional and structural change has often been disappointing and enigmatic at
best. State-led practices that operate under transitional justice such as trials, truth
commissions, and reparations attempts have functioned in a way to treat the symptoms
rather than the causes of conflict, suggesting the need for a new agenda. This new
approach to conflict resolution allows the platform created by transitional justice to
become more transformative. Transitional justice provides a platform for transformative
change that prioritizes the process rather than the preconceived outcomes often seen in
the implementation of traditional transitional justice mechanisms (Gready and Robins
2014). Transformative justice is not intended to replace transitional justice, but rather
works in conjunction to shift the focus from the state to the social and political
institutions that address everyday concerns. In other words, by making transitional justice
more transformative, a more bottom-up analysis of the harm and impact on the lives of
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the marginalized populations can be taken, without the restrictions of trials, truth
commissions, and other traditional transitional justice mechanisms.
The move from traditional transitional justice mechanisms to a transformative
form of justice is rooted in literature that focuses on peacebuilding. Rama Mani (2002)
proposes that peacebuilding is a dynamic process that is essentially a political task, but
also “a social and associative process that rebuilds fractured relationships between
people” (15). This theory suggests that peacebuilding can be transformative, in which
Lambourne (2013) extends to a proposed reconceptualization of transitional justice as
transformative justice incorporating political, economic, psychosocial, and legal
dimensions. She focuses on peacebuilding as a vital component of conflict reconciliation.
She argues that it has short-term and long-term objectives “aimed at ensuring
sustainability in the security, political, economic and justice spheres” (21). This includes
the promotion of democracy and accountable governance, but also the eradication of
poverty and sustainable development, and respect for human rights and the rule of law
(Lambourne 2013; Jeong 2005). Therefore, justice must be seen as more than merely
transitional and must set up structures, institutions, and relationships to promote
sustainability.
Transformative justice assists in reframing the traditional goals of transitional
justice to include the need to include critiques of current and ongoing attempts at real
change and providing a platform for debate about the meaning of justice and redress.
Gready and Robins illustrate that drawing a line under the past, which is core goal of
transitional justice, “often amounts to drawing a line under resistance and struggle,”
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while drawing a line between the past and the present, which is a core goal of
transformative justice, “requires the identification of ongoing channels for resistance in a
new dispensation, and discourses of resistance beyond narrow, ‘neutral’ human rights and
transitional justice” (2014: 356). Transformative justice allows for a more holistic, big
picture approach to change in the social, political, and economic structures that impact
those often marginalized. Transitional justice can become more transformative with a
critical approach to the reframing of the problem it seeks to address and the responses
and interventions that follow. This dissertation relies on transformative justice to offer
various alternative forms of justice in the United States that offer restitution or reparation
for past violations or crimes (historical justice) and distributive or socioeconomic justice
in the future (prospective justice) to ensure that structural violence is minimized
(Lambourne 2004; Mani 2002).
Many models of transitional justice focus on historical reparations, but when
considering the need for future social, political, and economic justice as structural
violence preventive measures often fall short. Making transitional justice more
transformative fosters ways to address social and economic justice as well as political and
legal justice. Political and legal justice are necessary to ensure that institutional and
structural reform are implemented in a manner that include all persons, particularly those
that often fall outside of the protection of the rule of law
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Three Examples
The End to South African Apartheid
Apartheid, or systematic state-sponsored racial segregation, was practiced from
1948 through the early 1990s in South Africa (Fletcher, Weinstein, and Rowen 2009).
The system of institutionalized racial segregation ensured that the political, social, and
economic structures of South Africa were dominated by the nation’s minority white
population; it was “deeply rooted in the colonial model of governance.” (Fletcher et al.
2009). This white dominant model of governance created conditions that legalized racial
discrimination in which Blacks could not vote, were denied access to jobs, could not
marry whites, and needed permission from the government to enter parts of the country
(Rowen 2017). The Black majority were second class citizens. The courts were used to
maintain this oppressive political order, imprisoning, and ordering the death of groups of
people believed to be involved in organized opposition to apartheid. Between 1960 and
1990, it is estimated that 135 political prisoners were killed, 21,000 died as a result of
political violence, and hundreds more were disappeared (Rowen 2017).
In 1990 newly elected South African President F.W. de Klerk freed long-held
political prisoner Nelson Mandela, founder of an armed wing of the resistance movement
African National Congress (ANC) to avoid an impending civil war and as part of broad,
sweeping liberal reforms. Together they planned for the political future of South Africa
that included the development of a new constitution that “would allow equal participate
in the political system” and introduce ways to redress the violence and deal with the
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perpetrators of violence during the apartheid. Part of their plan was the establishment of
the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 1996.
The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was charged
with not only obtaining the facts of what happened during the apartheid, but also with
working to overcome ignorance or denial among the general community and among
government officials. The biggest objectives were “to express government
acknowledgement of the past, to enhance the legitimacy of the current regime, and to
promote a climate conducive to human rights and democratic processes” (Minow 1998:
59). With the main goal of gaining public acknowledgement for harms done, the
accountability and prosecutorial means of a criminal trial process was an imperfect
solution. A better suited solution was the creation of a truth commission that was
authorized by and influential with the government which was able to produce a public
report. This publicly distributed report highlights what went wrong by helping to frame
the events in a new national narrative of acknowledgement, accountability, and civic
values, exposing the causes and conditions contributing to the violence (Minow 1998).
The TRC comprised three committees—gross violations of human rights,
amnesty, and reparations—reflecting the TRC’s goals (Quinn 2016). To meet their first
goal, the commission invited witnesses—both those identified as victims of gross human
rights violations and perpetrators—to give statements about their experiences during
apartheid. This aided in a more accurate attempt at a shared narrative and allowed the
TRC to meet their other goals of offering reparation and rehabilitation to victims and
allowing perpetrators to request amnesty from civil and criminal prosecution. The TRC
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emphasized reconciliation which was drastically different than what was seen in the
Nuremberg Trials. The TRC by design proposed “specific economic reparations and to
also assist the development of a society stable enough to pursue land reform, redesign of
medical and educational systems, and other reforms to redress the massive economic
imbalances in the country,” which has been deemed a successful approach to dealing with
human-rights violations after political change (Minow 1998: 83). The final report
recommended that the government accelerate closing the gap between the advantaged
and disadvantaged by “giving more attention to the transformation of education, the
provision of shelter, access to clean water and health services and the creation of job
opportunities” (Duthie 2008: 301). Consequently, countries around the world such as
Peru and Rwanda have instituted transitional justice based on the South African model.
The Aftermath of the People’s War in Peru
From 1980 to 2000, Peru was embroiled in one of Latin America’s deadliest civil
wars. Armed conflict began when the Communist Party of Peru --more commonly
known as the Shining Path (from the Spanish sendero luminoso indicating that MarxismLeninism is a shining path to revolution)--burned ballot boxes in rejection of Peru’s
democratic election. This band of revolutionaries “positioned themselves as the vanguard
in a revolution to guide the nation toward an imminent communist utopia” drawing upon
Maoist theories of guerilla warfare for their tactics to execute a top-down revolution
(Theidon 2012: 3). The Peruvian People’s War was fought between the Shining Path and
the Peruvian armed forces, with the peasants trapped between the warring factions.
(Other guerrilla groups were also operating in Peru during this time, but they played a
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more minor role.) As the Shining Path gained control of rural highland areas, they
enacted brutal forms of “justice” in the villages. The Peruvian armed forces, in turn,
attempted to stop the guerrilla conflict by arresting, interrogating, and torturing scores of
innocent peasants. They also organized peasants into anti-guerilla militias (called
rondas) that also engaged in grotesque acts of violence.
The Shining Path’s attempt to topple the Peruvian government subsided rapidly
after 1992 when nearly all of the top leadership were found hiding in a safe house and
arrested. However, President Alberto Fujimore’s administration that ended Shining
Path’s guerilla movement practiced authoritarian tendencies to remain in power,
including arming and giving extensive power to the rondas. In 2000, Fujimori fled the
country and faxed his resignation from Japan (Theidon 2012). About that same time, the
new leader of the Shining Path was captured, and the group further splintered, losing
much of its power and ceding its territory.
Following the years of violent conflict and authoritarian rule, Peru established
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Comision de la Verdad y Reconciliacion-CVR) in 2001 as part of a reconstruction of democratic institutions. It was designed to
investigate human rights abuses—including but not limited to assassinations, torture,
disappearances, and displacement—committed by guerillas, agents of the state, rondas
and other groups during the violent conflict in Peru through the 1980s and 1990s. These
investigations raised expectations for future transitional justice attempts. The purpose
was to determine the causes of violence, identify the scale of victimization, assess
responsibility between terrorist groups and the State, and make recommendations for
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necessary reparations and reforms for preventing future violence. Like South Africa’s
TRC, the CVR steered a public process. It organized public hearings where victims could
share their experiences publicly and it conducted a highly transparent “set of activities
aimed at winning public support for the prosecution of those persons who allegedly
perpetrated the worst crimes” (Cueva 2006: 70).
One of the main goals of truth commissions is “writing new national narratives
that are more inclusive of groups that have been historically marginalized within the
nation-state” (Theidon 2012: 105). Commissions are considered victim-centered because
they offer an empathetic ear to the victim’s stories. However, in Peru, many victims were
forgotten such as the Indigenous Mayan people who make up nearly 47% of the overall
population. Truth commissions have often ignored Indigenous people because of their
obscure lines of citizenship (Corntassell and Holder 2008). Mandates of the commissions
both facilitated national unity and compromised the potential for indigenous justice.
Therefore, because the implementation of a truth commission often focuses on
reconciling perpetrators and victims, the Peruvian truth commission can be contested on
terms of what Theidon calls “narrative capital”. Narrative capital refers to process in
which one’s narrative practices is capitalized on by another, more powerful, position.
Ignoring the voices of the Indigenous people altered the narrative, silenced their story,
creating a different understanding of the past.
Although these strategies fell short of offering avenues for rectifying ongoing
injustices, the efforts were worthwhile and important for the overall transitional justice
movement. Apologies and commissions can—at the very least—begin the process of
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healing and jumpstart avenues for change. In the case of Peru, the failure to address
problems specific to state-dominated reconciliation for Indigenous communities led
researchers examining transitional justice methods such as truth commissions to deemphasize and even overlook larger policy implications for indigenous communities.
This fails to promote a necessary balance between the realistic implications between
restitution and reconciliation strategies and indigenous populations. This realization is
important to the transitional justice movement as another tool can be added: efficiency in
addressing the history and ongoing injustices committed against indigenous peoples.
Aftermath of the Rwandan Genocide (1994)
Following the genocide of 1994 that killed nearly a million Tutsi and Twa people,
along with some moderate Hutu, Rwanda implemented a variety of programs to promote
reconciliation, combat impunity, and prevent future communal violence (Longman 2006).
By incorporating Gacaca procedures for social healing and community building, the state
uses reconciliation as an attempt to rebuild social cohesion and promote unity. On an
international level, the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
ultimately led to the conviction of the highest-ranking officials in Rwanda.
Gacaca Community Justice
In an attempt for reconciliation, the government implemented an ad hoc court to
try those accused of participating in the genocide. The conventional legal system—local
and international—was not capable of prosecuting the hundreds of thousands of people
involved in a timely and affordable manner. Rather than putting suspects in front of the
statutory-law courts that existed in Rwanda, the government established 11,000 elected
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tribunals charged with the task of investigating and trying the crimes that occurred within
their jurisdiction. These tribunals were known as Gacaca. The term gacaca derived from
the Kinyarwanda word meaning grass, and drew on a by-then extinct traditional practice
of community members sitting together to wrestle with injustices and harms that had
taken place and determine a path forward. Here—literally on the grass—is where, as
President Kagame puts it, an “African solution to African problems” takes place (HRW
2011). Gacaca community justice is said to be “one of the most ambitious transitional
justice experiments in history, blending local conflict-resolution traditions with a modern
punitive legal system” (HRW 2011). In this localized court system, judges are ordinary
people of the community with no formal legal education. The system was designed to be
a platform of reconciliation that encouraged confessions and apologies for a more
restorative approach (Waldorf 2006).
Rwanda is an important case study to show how both local, grassroot, attempts at
justice can be mixed with contemporary legal responses of the international community.
For example following the genocide, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was
established by the United Nations Security Council in 1994 to prosecute persons deemed
responsible for the genocide. The international community recognized the “need to
strengthen the rule of law” and the opportunity to “show other leaders around the world
that they could not get away with such crimes” (Quinn 2016: 394). This ad hoc
international tribunal led to the conviction of the highest-ranking government officials of
Rwanda, something domestic justice attempts could not accomplish (Minow 1998).
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Transitional Justice and Law in Democratic Countries
Debates about transitional justice are “framed by the normative proposition that
various legal responses should be evaluated on the basis of their prospects for
democracy” (Teitel 2000: 3). Transitional justice offers a conversation between the
relation of law and justice to liberalization and democratic development, along with
respect for human rights and the restoration of dignity. Teitel suggests moving “away
from defining transitions purely in terms of democratic procedures” and toward “a
broader inquiry into other practices signifying acceptance of liberal democracy and the
rule-of-law” (2000:5).
Teitel (2000; 2005) divides transitional justice into five categories: punitive
justice of criminal trials; historical justice of acknowledgment of wrongdoings and
reconstruction of narratives through truth commissions; reparatory justice that offers
compensation; administrative justice that restructures state institutions; and constitutional
justice that redefines the juridical foundations of the state. For state redress in democratic
states historical justice, administrative justice, and restorative justice frameworks stand
out as most prevalent. The reification of administrative justice describes change to the
operation of state institutions, therefore, administrative redress “captures a broad sweep
of activities, ranging from mega-constitutional politics to low-level changes in the
staffing and operations of local bodies” (Winter 2014).
Similarly, the International Center for Transitional Justice’s four-part taxonomy
of transitional justice includes institutional reform which is defined as “the process of
reviewing and restructuring state institutions so that they respect human rights, preserve
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the rule of law, and are accountable to their constituents’ (United Nations General
Assembly 2006). Institutional reform is a way of rectifying injustices and when paired
with Teitel’s notion of historical justice, which pinpoints the areas needing rectification
the most, restorative justice will fall into place. In the United States this would be mostly
accomplished through changes in legislation.
Because the United States has not recently undergone a transition of political
power from one group or another, the idea of “transitional” justice seems perhaps
inapplicable. Therefore, the transitional justice practices discussed previously have not
been thought possible. Most examples of transitional justice occur in countries
transitioning between regimes, often through violence.
A common argument for refuting transitional justice practices in established
democracies is that if democratic states practice transitional justice and they are not in
transition, there can be nothing distinctive about transitional justice. Furthermore, there is
no reason to think transitional justice is a special kind of justice or an alternative for
traditional forms of justice (Winter 2014). However, I argue that democratic states often
go through moments of political transition. Further, these states go through moments
where they must strive to maintain political legitimacy.
And of course, there remain historical and on-going abuses and harms to be
addressed. Winter argues that “the established settler democracies are clearly using
institutions and language shaped by the experiences of paradigmatic transitional practice”
(2014: 5). And since paradigmatic political transitions involve the transfer of political
power from one group to another (Ní Aolaín and Campbell 2005), by using the
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conceptional tools of transitional justice—truth commissions, apologies, reparations,
etc.—to describe redress politics in established democracies, especially established settler
polities (e.g. United States, Australia, New Zealand, Canada), seems possible. Scholars
addressing transitional justice in the United States and elsewhere have instead begun to
use the term “historical” justice (Murphy and Zvobgo 2021).
Maintaining political legitimacy, or maintaining political authority and power in
the state, allows the state to continue to hold the power to render otherwise wrongful acts
permissible. As mentioned previously, the state holds a monopoly position of power to
define legal statuses of violence. Consequently, the state holds the power to harm citizens
including by removal of rights—such as through incarceration, uneven distribution of
resources, or disenfranchisement—and through the creation of unjust laws and policies.
This reliance upon law and policy-making as a tool for harm is a prominent way we can
see the relationship between transitional justice and law. Transitional justice is the
attempt to address the mechanism of harm.
Ndulu and Duthie describe judicial systems in post conflict states as limited
because “access to justice in postconflict societies is notoriously hampered by delays in
all stages of proceedings in the law courts” (2009: 256). Furthermore, the poor and
marginalized groups in society have generally received poor protection from the law and
“corruption and economic status play a major role in one’s ability to access justice”
(Ndulu and Duthie 2009: 256). Similar problems can be seen in the contemporary United
States. These inequalities in the justice system undermine the public’s confidence in the
court to uphold justice while challenging the political legitimacy of the criminal justice
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system. The mere fact that the court system is unable to adequately serve and protect
marginalized populations in the United States is a human rights violation. Without proper
knowledge of the workings of the institution, understanding of the laws, and adequate
legal representation, marginalized people do not share equal rights to the judicial system.
Access to justice means that “justice should be affordable to all, and those who cannot
afford it should be provided the means through legal aid assistance” (Ndulu and Duthie
2009: 256). While this requirement of the American criminal justice system is seen
through the Sixth Amendment rights of criminal defendants, the execution often falls
short.
The making and preserving of law was founded on “exercise of authorized force
and administrative oversight, securing private and public property, naturalizing
distinctions of race, class, culture, and gender, and delegitimating political rivalry”
(Comaroff and Comaroff 2016:10). Law and crime were thus created in the interest of the
state, not the people, as a means of control. Today, law and crime are still used to not
only protect, but to fund the state. Policing today is primarily dedicated to the
preservation of social order with emphasis on the containment of those who are deemed
undesirable, or those said to threaten the public tranquility of a community. To address
the unequal defining factors of law is to implement a transitional justice paradigm at a
new attempt of justice. Alternative forms of justice can acknowledge the inequalities of
judicial representation based on socioeconomic statuses.
Transitional justice can help us understand how legal ideas influence politics and
how politics influence legal ideas. The circulation of legal ideas is imperative because if
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we understand how legal ideas travel, we can better understand how political actors
utilize these ideas for specific means. This concept suggests that “rather than focusing on
the conceptualization of transitional justice, scholars should redirect their attention
toward its instrumentalization” (Rowen 2017:625). Scholars refer to the circulation of
legal ideas as vernacularization and focus on how key players mediate the spread of new
ideas related to law (Merry 2006b; Merry and Stern 2005). In vernacularization, legal
ideas become “decontextualized and recontextualized” in ways that reflect current social
structures (Clarke and Goodale 2009, 7). I wonder whether transitional justice can help in
framing new ideas of legal intervention in which law recognizes all people rather than
prioritizing those who have the greatest economic means to access the legal system, thus
opening new ways to think about laws. By looking at the circulation of legal ideas, we
can see the power dynamics that influence the meaning-making process, and why certain
ideas—and legitimation—of laws and polices take hold. This raises the question of how
the idea of justice has been appropriated in the United States. Transitional justice refers to
specific processes and unspecific goals about what law offers countries that have
experienced mass violence (Arthur 2009; Iverson 2013).
Recovering From State Violence Through Historical and Transitional Justice
In examining how transitional justice has been implemented worldwide, we find a
common thread that runs through each case: the occurrence of state violence or violence
committed by the government including, but not limited to, “actions by police and
military forces, or… all forms of politically authorized violence” (Iadicola and Shupe
2013: 313). Weber (1958) characterized the modern state by three dimensions:
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territoriality, legitimacy, and violence. In this definition of the state, violence is
understood as necessary and taken for granted. This is possible because only the state has
a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, which raises the question of how we
distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate use of violence.
In this dissertation, I define the United States as a liberal democratic state rooted
in a history of settler colonialism and racism. American culture emphasizes
individualism, liberty, private property, and freedom from the state. However, these
ideals are not distributed equally. While liberal democracy focuses on the separation of
powers and a system of checks and balances between branches of government, there
appears to be little accountability when the government fails to uphold the principle of
rule of law equally to all peoples. A large part of this paradox is a two-party system
dominated by the Republican and Democratic parties, who seems to agree on some things
but not others. Part of the contested topics stem from differing economic, social, and
cultural ideas and government regulation. The Democratic Party typically emphasizes
community and social responsibility while the Republican Party is more focused on
individual rights and justice. These philosophies shape their stance on the economy,
military spending, taxes, government regulation, healthcare policy, immigration, criminal
justice, and other policies. Democrats, in recent years, have been more willing to embrace
an expansion of the state, within some limits. This can be seen, for example, with the
logistics of expanding Medicaid in states where GOP officials have refused to do so for
several years while grappling with the cost and the how to prevent states from dropping
coverage.
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The legitimacy of violence is defined by the state, therefore all violence
committed by the state—whether legitimate or illegitimate—is deemed legal and
justified. The state holds “a monopoly position of power to define legal status of the
violence” which, consequently, only labels violence illegal if the act threatens social
order and/or the state falls victim (Iadicola and Shupe 2013: 313). If the state is unlikely
to define its own acts of violence as illegitimate or illegal, then who will hold them
accountable? How will forms of structural and systematic violence be addressed?
Transitional justice has much to offer in the way of solutions.
In the pursuit of justice in countries experiencing mass human rights violations
through forms of structural and systematic violence, truth commissions could be used for
the purpose of restoration. Quinn defines truth commissions as “bodies established to
look at widespread human rights violations that took place during a specified period of
time…by the state...” that are instructional (2016: 394). Whether abuses are perpetrated
by a small group of people representing the state, or the state is committing harm through
extralegal forms, the state needs to be investigated. Truth commissions could be
implemented by local NGOs, international institutions such as the International Criminal
Court, or ad hoc committees if the state is the alleged perpetrator in the case. The
instructional effect of putting the state on trial and offering broadcasting of public
hearings and testimony or publication and dissemination of a final report is the first step
to harm reduction and addressing damage inflicted on the society.
Brants suggests that “transitional justice is concerned with both settling accounts
after violent conflict and/or repression and coming to terms with the traumatic damage
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inflicted on individuals and society” (2013: 1). The latter point of this definition is
particularly important in the context of inequality, both in the United States and globally.
There is a significant gap in the transitional justice literature and transitional justice
attempts in post-conflict United States. By coming to terms with the damage inflicted, we
may shed light on the social structures and institutions rooted in inequality and, therefore,
find an avenue for change. Transitional justice can be seen as a toolbox; it is full of
different tools that can be used to fit different needs centered around impunity,
reconciliation, restoration, and repair. As previously mentioned, one of the main goals of
transitional justice is the transition from a society divided by illegality and injustices and
to one that offers stability through democracy and rule of law. Historically in the United
States, laws have been written in a manner that utilizes the criminal justice system as a
tool to ostracize or criminalize entire groups of people such as young, Black men. Using
a transitional justice framework, it becomes clearer that justice is not only a matter of
law, but of recognition, acceptance, and reconciliation.
Not only does the state have the power to control what is deemed illegitimate
violence, but it also controls the narrative around its occurrence. Extralegal forms of state
violence, or “the use of violence without justification or legitimization by the laws of the
state that is conducting the violence,” are difficult to address because they rely on data
that is collected by the very institutions of the state that are conducting the violence
(Iadicola and Shupe 2013: 318). For example, deaths at the hands of police in the United
States are limited to voluntary reporting and give law enforcement broad powers to
interpret what should be reported. The creation of local commissions or tribunals would
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allow for a formal investigation that will publicly present a new narrative that points to
the historic use of violence conducted by the state that may not be as obvious as mass
killings or forced migrations.
Following mass violence such as genocide, mass killings, forced disappearances,
and forced migration, countries may rely on international organizations such as the
United Nations or private groups such as Amnesty International or the Human Rights
Campaign to investigate state violence. Unfortunately, how much power they can bear on
states that engage in illegitimate violence is “determined by the distribution of power
within the world system” (Iadicola and Shupe 2013: 313). States with the greatest amount
of power in the world system have the greatest amount of power to define legitimate and
illegitimate violence. One of the strongest international forces that could hold the power
to investigate and prosecute state violence globally is the International Criminal Court
(ICC).
The ICC was established specifically to intercede following times of conflict to
try and convict those responsible for state violence and hold states accountable for
providing basic civil, political, economic, and social and cultural rights to all peoples.
However, to allow the ICC to step-in, the country must have signed and ratified the
International Criminal Court treaty. The United States government—the most powerful
state in the world—has not ratified the treaty. Furthermore, Congress passed the
American Servicemembers’ Protection Act of 2001 that legally prohibits US cooperation
with the International Criminal Court. Specifically, legislation restricts “(1) participation
by covered U.S. persons in the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping and peace
60

enforcement operations; (2) transfer to the Court of U.S. classified national security and
law enforcement information; and (3) the provision of U.S. military assistance, with
specified exceptions, to the government of a country that is a party of the Court” (107th
Congress 2001). In other words, the US government has taken additional legal measures
that exempts government personnel from prosecution and denies military aid to nonNATO signatories of the treaty. Therefore, the United States does not fall within the
jurisdiction of International Criminal Court systems and cannot be investigated and/or
held accountable for violence it commits by entities outside of the United States.
A Model for Transitional Justice in the United States
Transitional justice is conventionally implemented following regime change.
However, as I have argued above, it could be used in the context of other, arguably less
foundational, societal change. In the United States there is no regime change, but there
have been atrocities such as during the Civil War and during Jim Crow that then led to
changes in socio-political foundations. While the implementation of a new platform that
aims to create possibilities of social and political changes in the United States can offer a
new narrative of violence and offer redress for victims, it can also become a way to
restore public confidence in the institutions of government (Kritz 1995).
These transitions brought new forms of violence, harming targeted groups in
complex and systematic ways. These oppressed people are now experiencing the pain of
slow death through structural violence by the hands of the very institutions that claim to
aid them such as the criminal justice and the welfare system. If these continuous cycles of
harm could be addressed and acknowledged, the state could begin to imagine pathways to
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compensation, including compensation. According to Kritz (1995), compensation serves
three main functions in the process of reconciliation: aiding victims in managing the
material aspect of their loss, officially acknowledging victim’s pain by the nation, and
bringing the possibility of deterring the state from future abuses by imposing a financial
cost to such misdeeds. The first two facilitate the societal reintegration of people who
have long been made to suffer in silence. Compensation can bring voices to the victims to
not only be heard, but to find solidarity. This solidarity is important in the United States
as we are a country divided, a country that admires individualism. The silence of those
trapped in continuous suffering as result of poverty, hunger, poor living conditions, drug
addiction, lack of access to healthcare, unemployment, racial classification and so forth
become normalized. While transitional justice can be used to address the public health
concerns of social inequality, it is important to remember that it is not intended to
function as the end-all solution.
In her discussion on torture during the “war on terror,” Rowen discusses problems
with taking a transitional justice approach in the United States (2017). She states that
“whereas actors in other countries were able to use the ambiguity of the concept of a truth
commission, particularly with regard to judicial accountability, to their advantage, that
same ambiguity was a liability in the United States, as individuals who were unfamiliar
with truth commissions were worried that promoting one was promoting amnesty, or that
calling for a truth commission would make an implicit comparison between the United
States and places where truth commissions had been created for much more extreme
violence” (Rowen 2017:125). She argues that for many US advocates for a truth
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commission, the idea was not only a foreign idea, but something that was developed for
people and places where “real justice” (i.e., criminal justice) is not possible. This idea,
however, ignores the flaws in the US criminal justice and judicial system.
While it may not seem like a transitional justice attempt fits, there are people
applying it. Attempts at transitional justice in the United States may be limited, there
have been attempts. For decades the United States often failed to acknowledge and
address the transitions our country took following the genocide and land removal of
Native Americans, the abolishment of slavery and the Jim Crow era, and the cultural and
structural harms that followed the rise of the neoliberal carceral state during the War on
Drugs era that included increased surveillance and patrol of Black communities and
routine police killings, beatings and daily harassment in the form of stop and frisk.
However, as the United States is in need for new approaches to justice, it is important to
acknowledge the attempts of transitional justice work that have been carried out.
(Magarrell and Wesley 2008; Androff 2010; Murphy and Zvobgo 2020). The Greensboro
Truth and Reconciliation Commission was launched in 2004 by non-profit and grassroots
organizations to address the trauma that stemmed from the violent 1979 Greensboro
Massacre In North Carolina (Androff 2010). In 1979, a group of Ku Klux Klan and Nazi
Party members fired several rounds of gunfire into a crown of labor union activists killing
five people (Androff 2010). The truth and reconciliation commission was the first of its
kind in the United States and was to examine the events of that date to offer healing and
reconciliation of the community. An official report on its findings and recommendations
for the Greensboro community was distributed in 2006 (Greensboro Truth and
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Reconciliation Commission 2022). The Iowa City City Council developed an ad hoc
Truth And Reconciliation Commission in September 2020 to bear truth to racial injustice
in Iowa City and offer restorative justice through testimony and public hearings
(Shillcock 2021; Weiner and Bergus 2020). This commission had setbacks, however,
including an Iowa City Council vote against the commission because of disapproval from
the community, specifically from the Black community, one year after the start of the
commission. Other forms of transitional justice have been attempted such as land
compensation for Indigenous groups, and lynching memorials at the National Memorial
for Peace and Justice in Alabama (Levin 2019; Yang 2022; Robertson 2018).
Recognizing these attempts helps to see the moments across the United States that
suggest there could be successful transitional justice attempts in the country.
While I have argued that the malleability of transitional justice is an attractive
attribute of transitional justice, as mentioned previously, this same malleability is often a
point of contestation as there is confusion over what constitutes a universal definition of a
truth commission as virtually no two implementations of truth commissions have been
identical (Dancy, Kim and Brahm 2010). But it is within this malleability that I
recommend an alternative idea to the traditional truth commission in the United States. In
the bigger picture, truth commissions can investigate the larger patterns of atrocity and
the complex line of responsibility and complicity (Minow 2000). It is within these
patterns that I find a form of truth commissions useful in the lives of Americans,
particularly those that are minoritized, because they are not only experiencing grave
human rights violations today but have been for decades. This dissertation does not argue
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for an official, formal truth commission defined in the traditional sense, but for a moment
of investigation in which politicians, policy makers, advocates, academics, nonprofits,
and others collect, measure, and analyze the grave affects that US laws and policies have
on the wellbeing of minoritized groups and implement the ideas of transitional justice to
create a platform for change.
Moments through US history have provided ways to see the potential for
transitional justice through non-traditional truth commissions and reparations. However,
these moments were not labeled as transitional justice attempts. For example, following
the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 a wave of anti-Japanese rhetoric swept the
nation which led to the Roosevelt administration’s adaptation of violent policies which
violated the constitutional rights of Japanese Americans. Under these policies Americans
were forced to leave their homes and belongings and were relocated to camps where they
were incarcerated until 1944 (Hatamlya 1993). In 1988 Congress passed the Civil
Liberties Act that acknowledged the grave injustices against Japanese immigrants and
Japanese American during World War II and provided funding for monetary reparations.
Additionally, this act provided an official apology from President Ronald Reagan on
behalf of the United States for the evacuation, relocation, and internment of United States
residents of Japanese ancestry (100th Congress 1987).
More recently, in 2019, The New York Times released a journalism project to
commemorate the 400th anniversary of the arrival of the first enslaved Africans in Point
Comfort, Virginia. The 1619 Project is designed to “reframe American history…to place
the consequences of slavery and the contribution of black Americans at the very center of
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the story we tell ourselves about who we are as a country.” (The New York Times 2019).
The project acknowledges that the year 1619 is not a year most Americans recognize as
an important or notable date in history. It was in 1619 that the system of chattel slavery
began, a violent system that lasted for the next 250 years. It was the year 1619 that
inaugurated the anti-Black racism that drives racial injustices and inequalities that plague
the country to this day. The project allows an investigation into US history to highlight
contemporary race relations rooted in slavery. Using essays and literary works to provide
a more truthful account of history, the project acknowledges how harmful and violent that
history—and its aftermath—is for Black Americans. The 1619 Project addresses the
same goals as official truth commissions, without the traditional transitional justice
mechanisms.
Following examples such as these, I suggest the COVID-19 pandemic could be
the catalyst for a transitional justice project related to mass incarceration and
mistreatment of peoples incarcerated in state and federal prisons across the United States
In response to Rowen’s (2017) argument of ‘real justice’ in the United States, I argue that
transitional justice could be implemented in the United States by first understanding and
acknowledging how transitional justice relies on law. By acknowledging how law is used,
law and policy changes could be implemented to accept transitional justice frameworks
and processes. The outcome would use transitional justice to highlight structural violence
and provide alternative frameworks to explore law and policy changes to effect
reparations to social problems.
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At present in the United States, the cycles of violence manifested as police use of
force, systematic racism, and street protests and riots have highlighted how transitional
justice can promote the aims of redress and reconciliation to bring some sense of unity to
our country. Laplante proposes that truth commissions “expand their mandates to include
a legal framework that examines the socioeconomic root causes of violence in terms of
violations of economic, social and cultural rights” (2008: 331). These socioeconomic root
causes are implicitly tied to the public health of a society through the institutions that
support education, healthcare and criminal justice. If these underlying socioeconomic
structures are not addressed, cycles of violence and human rights abuses will continue to
filter through the United States. The framework of transitional justice offers a way to
address these institutions and jumpstart the process of social change.
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CHAPTER FOUR
METHODOLOGY
This project consists of a thematic analysis that compares and contrasts the implications
of policy from January 1, 2020 through December 31, 2021 as they relate to the COVID19 pandemic. This time frame allows for the comparison of federal and state legislation
under two presidential administrations—Trump and Biden—and two opposing political
parties. Thematic analysis is used to provide a way for understanding when, how and why
the government enacts certain policies, particularly in response to a global pandemic, and
their affects. Through such an analysis, I will investigate these main research questions:
1. What COVID-19 policies under the Trump administration related to incarcerated
people? What was the impact of these policies? To what extent do these policies
and their impacts constitute state violence?
2. What COVID-19 policies under the Biden administration related to incarcerated
people? What was the impact of these policies? To what extent do these policies
and their impacts constitute state violence?
3. Does the structure of the American government impact response and outcomes
during a state of emergency such as a global pandemic? Could COVID-19 offer a
platform for social change through transitional justice?

To ensure a separation of powers, US federal government is broken down into the
legislative, executive, and judicial branches. Federal agencies such as the Department of
Justice, Bureau of Prisons, and National Institute of Corrections, fall within the executive
branch. Even if the heads of those agencies do not change, policy directions change
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which presidential transitions. To best exhibit the ways that inmates are
disproportionately harmed by the federal policy responses to COVID-19, this project
focuses on specific sets of policies at the state and federal level that impact inmates
directly. Because people incarcerated in state and federal prisons are confined to
overcrowded, highly populated areas, they are disproportionately at risk of contracting
COVID-19, and, therefore, in a higher need to of protection that should be provided by
government agencies. Furthermore, these groups are unlikely to have the resources to
manage their illness if they get sick.

Inmates in the US criminal justice system are made up of an already marginalized
population as this population is made mostly of groups from communities with steady
economic and social breakdown including Black, Latinx, and white working-class people
(Franco-Paredes et. al 2020:1). The people incarcerated are stripped of their ability to
control exposure and are at the mercy of the state for protection. According to The
Marshall Project (2021), as of March 30, 2021 at least 391,782 people in prison tested
positive for COVID-19. Several environmental conditions of carceral settings—such as
overcrowding, insufficient sanitation, poor ventilation, and inadequate healthcare—have
contributed to such facilities becoming breeding grounds for COVID-19 outbreaks
(Franco-Paredes et. al 2020). While in these facilities, the luxury of social distancing is
removed and access to protective equipment such as masks are limited. Investigating the
policy implications on this population addresses questions of human rights.
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Data and Methods
This project consists of a thematic analysis that compares and contrasts the
implications of policy from January 1, 2020 through December 31, 2021 as they relate to
the COVID-19 pandemic. I take a comparative historical approach to not only examine
both policy change and effect, but to identify the continuing policy themes that have led
to an influx in incarceration and prolonged sentencing. I take a top-down approach by
first examining policies implemented by the presidential administration and the federal
prison system followed by policies implemented at the state level. I began by reviewing
each policy implemented under the Trump administration, excluding policies not related
to COVID-19. I did the same for policies implemented under the Biden administration.
Because President Biden took office on January 20, 2021, Biden’s policies—defined as
executive orders, memorandums, proclamations, and press releases from the White
House that set policy agendas—were collected from whitehouse.gov. Trump policies
were taken from the National Archives at archives.gov. Following the Biden
inauguration, official files—including executive orders, memorandums, proclamations,
and policy agenda press releases— under the Trump administration were moved to the
Executive Office of the President Electronic Records Archive on the National Archives
website. It is important to note that under the Trump administration, policies were often
announced via Twitter. However, while some Tweets were acted on as policy and some
were not, and I have no consistent way to categorize these, I do not analyze Trump’s
Twitter feed, which is no longer available anyway.
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Because this data is limited, I also rely on secondary data collected from The
Marshall Project, Prison Policy Initiative, and The Covid Prison Project to track COVID19 response policies at the federal and state level. I use this data to map the number of
cases and deaths among inmates incarcerated across the United States, differentiating
between the 2020 and 2021 presidential administrations. The United States divides
political power between the national government and the states in which both political
divisions have the power to make laws and policies, and both have autonomy. This
creates a divide that allows the federal government to take a hands-off approach to states
of emergency such as the COVID-19 pandemic. To analyze the delegation of
responsibility away from the federal government and the role of the state in enforcing
COVID-19 related policies, I compare data from these nonprofit groups to data from the
Department of Justice, Bureau of Prisons, and National Institute of Corrections. I argue
that these federal agencies are impacted by change in presidential administration. Even if
the head of those agencies do not change under the new administration, policy directions
do. Therefore, the polices enacted under these agencies are important to this project.
The policies enacted at the federal level that related to the COVID-19 response in
prisons were downloaded and imported to the qualitative analysis software, NVivo. Each
policy was labeled as a “case” and then assigned to the “case classification” of either
“Trump Policy,” “Biden Policy,” “Department of Justice,” “Bureau of Prisons,” or
“National Institute of Corrections.” After compiling a dataset with the policies that I
predict impact the spread of COVID-19 in prisons, I coded the data to identify and
summarize important themes within the dataset.
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Identifying the important themes in the set of policies allows for the analysis of
the meaning behind federal policies, specifically as it relates to the research questions.
Choosing thematic analysis as methodology allows for the analysis of subjective
experiences following policy implementation. Identifying themes led me to question
whether the policies, or lack thereof, enacted under the Trump and Biden administrations
further harmed incarcerated people and whether that harm could constitute state violence.
To measure harm and test cause and effect that could predict state violence, I use process
tracing as a methodology. Process tracing is a “within-case” method used to draw causal
inferences from a temporal sequence of events and/or political or social phenomena
(Collier 2011). More on process tracing to follow. As there is not a direct measure for
harm caused by any given policy, I use news reporting and other archival resources to
provide data for harm creation. I use national news reports, reports from nonprofit
organizations, and lobbyist reports to complete the narrative of the effects caused by
COVID-19 response policies.
Process Tracing
To determine harm and measure the impact of policy on incarcerated people, I
employ qualitative process tracing. Using process tracing as a method for causal
inference, I can better answer the research questions by providing more leverage to the
examination of the potential onset of state violence through harm caused by policy
changes during the COVID-19 crisis, and whether such change in policy can suggest a
move to transitional justice in the United States. I rely on Collier’s definition of process
tracing that describes this method as “an analytical tool for drawing descriptive and
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causal inferences from diagnostic pieces of evidence—often understood as part of a
temporal sequence of events or phenomena” (2011:824). Process tracing is fundamental
to qualitative research because it can contribute to both describing political and social
phenomena and evaluating causal claims. It does so by relying on careful description of
trajectories of change and close attention to sequences of independent and dependent
variables. Process tracing focuses on the unfolding of events or situations over time. The
descriptive component of process tracing involves “taking good snapshots at a series of
specific moments” so researchers can characterize the key steps in the process to best
describe the changes and sequences in the overall big picture (Collier 2010:824). Relying
on details of description and sequences, causal-process observations (CPOs) can be used
in testing theories (Mahoney 2010).
CPOs “can be used to develop, elaborate, or specify more precisely a given theory
or hypothesis” in both quantitative and qualitative research (Mahoney 2010: 125). CPOs
can also be used in theory testing. When testing a theory, process tracing can provide
insight about the existence of causes by using particular observations from within specific
cases. For the purpose of this project, CPOs will be used to test theories and research
questions on the basis of key observations gathered from data collection following policy
changes. Using secondary data from federal and nonfederal data sources allowed me to
take the necessary snapshots needed to provide an examinable timeline of events
following the onset of COVID-19 through the changes in policy under the Trump and
Biden administrations and the events that followed. Three relevant snapshot moments
defined the timeline of events for inmates during the COVID-19 policy response: home
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confinement policies, vaccine rollout phases, and the reduction of cost of communication
and medical co-pay for inmates. Relying on these observations as diagnostic evidence
allowed me to adequately test whether the policy changes themselves directly impacted
incarcerated people, or if there are alternative factors impacting the well-being of this
vulnerable group. Furthermore, by successfully determining whether policy changes did
or did not have a direct impact on this population I was then able to argue whether these
policy changes constituted state violence. Only then can my third research question be
addressed: could COVID-19 policies offer a platform for social change through
transitional justice? To test my research questions through process tracing, I determined
which observations provided diagnostic evidence to support causation. To determine if
observations are suitable for diagnostic evidence, the research must rely on prior
knowledge (Collier 2010).
Some studies are precise about the prior knowledge used to make inference, while
others rely on a wider literature to understand theoretical background. Reconstructing the
theoretical starting point of a study can aid in better understanding the framework of the
research and determine which CPOs actually predict the outcome of the study. Therefore,
I started with a narrative or timeline that listed the sequence of events and explored
causal ideas embedded in that narrative. This narrative included the chronology of policy
changes during the Trump and Biden administrations that occurred throughout the
COVID-19 pandemic from January 1, 2020 through December 31, 2021, in conjunction
with prior knowledge of state violence and transitional justice case studies implemented
worldwide. I was then be able to consider the kinds of evidence that may confirm or
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disconfirm my research questions and identify the appropriate process tracing test to
determine causal inference.
Collier (2010) lays out four empirical tests to determine causal inference that are
classified according to whether passing the test is necessary and/or sufficient for
accepting the inference. These tests include: straw-in-the-wind, hoop, smoking-gun, and
doubly decisive (See Table 1). Straw-in-the-wind tests do not provide a necessary or a
sufficient criterion for accepting or rejecting a hypothesis and they only weaken rival
hypotheses slightly, but they do provide valuable benchmarks by giving an initial
assessment of a hypothesis. Hoop tests do not confirm a hypothesis, but they can
eliminate it. Passing hoop tests has stronger effects on rival hypothesis than the straw-inthe-wind tests, such as weakening their plausibility. Smoking-gun tests provide sufficient
but not necessary criterion for accepting the causal inference. While the test can strongly
support the hypothesis, failing the test does not reject it but substantially weakens rival
hypotheses. Lastly, the double decisive test has the potential to confirm one hypothesis
and eliminate all others as they meet both the necessary and sufficient standard for
establishing causation. This is accomplished by combining any of the previous three tests
to support one hypothesis and eliminate others (Collier 2010). For this study, I utilize the
double decisive test. Employing multiple tests allows for a stronger examination of
events that follow policy change. Having multiple tests will better allow the investigation
of not only the hypothesis that policy changes through opposing presidential
administrations have measurable impacts on incarcerated populations, but of rival
hypotheses as well. It allows me to consider alternative influences on the well-being of
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this population. For example, the straw-in-the wind test is used to provide an initial
assessment of the research questions while the smoking-gun test is used to better explore
alternative causes of harm while still supporting the hypothesis that the policy changes
implement harm. The ‘smoking gun’ metaphor conveys that the suspect holding the gun
is presumed guilty but, in this study, we cannot assume that those not holding the
metaphoric gun are presumed innocent. Combining these tests allow for the examination
of the harm perpetrated against incarcerated people in the United States and provides a
stronger investigation to the causation of such harm. The conjunction of tests serves to
eliminate alternative hypotheses of harm creation while establishing root causation.
Using state and federal level data that tracks the number of cases and deaths inside
prisons, I can predict whether policies implemented by the federal government showed an
increase in cases or deaths. Or, alternatively, if the lack of government response led to an
increase in cases or deaths. Both will be examined through this method of process
tracing.
Positionality and Reflexivity
Part of the motivation and knowledge that drives this research stems from my
own positionality and reflexivity derived from a former career working in law
enforcement and corrections. Prior to pursing a doctorate degree, I held several positions
in the local level of the criminal justice system, including a few years working in a
county level jail. My time in that position provided me with a deeper insight into policies
similar to those analyzed in this research. While COVID-19 specific policies may not
have been initiated during that particular moment, policies that further criminalized and
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penalized certain populations were. Policy allowed for prolonged solitary confinement
for people with mental health. Policy related to the 287g agreement that allowed
correctional officers to partner with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
allowed for Latinx inmates to be detained longer without bond until citizenship was
determined, regardless of proof of citizenship they may have had with them. Policy
allowed inmates to lie on the floor unable to breathe or bleeding out while one officer
waited on another officer to respond. In my role within the jail, I experienced
mistreatment and harmful conditions that formulated my use of Agamben’s theory of
homo sacer to best view the ways in which inmates are considered a population that is
cast aside and deprived of the rights and privileges of citizenship; a population that
society can justifiably let die.
From the beginning of that career, in the early days of the Correctional Officer
Training Academy, we were taught that inmates are to be referred to as inmate, not by
name. Once a person is brought to the jail, they are stripped of their own identity and
labeled inmate, a dehumanizing gesture for the correctional officers. The jail was always
overcrowded, with people sleeping on the floor as there were more people incarcerated
than there were beds. Cells that were meant to hold two were holding four. The common
spaces were unclean, trash piled up in cells, and there were rarely attempts to properly
sanitize, both by inmates and staff. One night as I came onto shift, the hand sanitizer that
was available to staff was removed and we were told we were not able to bring any into
the facility because it was a security risk for the inmates. I watched and even participated
in restraining and physically dragging people to solitary confinement as a form of mental
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health treatment because their mental state was seen as a form of noncompliance. I
handed women pieces of food through a pie slot who were stripped naked, put into a cell,
and not even allowed a tray of food. I stood by as medical staff refused to speak with an
inmate complaining of sickness or pain. I watched as those same inmates spent the night
curled up on the cold concrete floor crying out for help, for some relief. Often, staff
would comment on how they were just complaining, or how they should not have chosen
to do drugs or commit crime. When I was assigned to a pod and would go cell door to
cell door for headcount at the beginning of the shift, I would hear the stories of how they
were locked down and unable to leave their cell for 24 hours, because there was not
enough staff. The staff shortage meant there were not enough officers to provide the
supervision required to let inmates out of their cell to throw away trash, to use the phone,
to take a shower, or to have recreational time.
The experiences and knowledge gained from my law enforcement career offers a
deeper insight and capability to critique the daily operation procedures and policy
decisions that impact people incarcerated. Further, through my time on patrol making
arrests and in corrections following arrests, I saw the strong arm of the carceral state and
the large impacts of mass incarceration on the local level. The more than 3200 local jails
in the US and the millions of people that come in and out of those jails each year speak to
the role the county jail plays in the overall picture of incarceration in America. With the
county jail being the first stop for most people involved in the criminal justice system, it
offers the best platform to view the ways in which those incarcerated are exposed to
violence.
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These experiences have colored how I read policy related to prison and
incarcerated people. On the one hand, having seen, heard, and experienced life inside jail,
the policies and experiences during the COVID-19 pandemic that I am reading for this
research provide me with deeper insight that is more than just a thought exercise. On the
other hand, because of seeing, hearing, and experiencing so many bad experiences, it is
much more difficult to approach the material dispassionately. Therefore, in doing this
research I have a harder time understanding counter-perspectives. Through writing this
dissertation I took time to critically reflect on my position as part of the very system that I
am critiquing in this work. I consciously worked to remain neutral and to set aside my
own views and reactions to listen to the perspectives of the stories I read following policy
implementation. It was difficult to remain totally objective and to set aside my personal
experience, and to refrain from taking an insider position. Therefore, I relied strictly on
the snapshot moments I pulled through thematic analysis and process tracing as the
narrative that drove this research.
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CHAPTER FIVE
LAW AND GOVENANCE

The COVID-19 pandemic introduced numerous unprecedented political, social,
and economic challenges that resulted in unprecedented responses by policy makers. As
result, existing inequalities and injustices rooted in a dense history of structural and
institutional violence were uncovered and exacerbated. Social and economic restrictions
were put into place to curb the spread of the virus. These restrictions disproportionately
affected the most vulnerable populations, particularly populations that have historically
held a lower social status such as those incarcerated in US prisons. In the United States,
the inmate population is disproportionately made up of poor, people of color. This is a
pattern that is rooted in the country’s long history of racism and white supremacy. This
cycle continues as there have been no meaningful changes to policing practices and no
positive changes to policy that could reduce the longer sentences.
In the absence of a coordinated national response to the COVID-19 pandemic,
state officials were pressured to adopt policies to protect inmates incarcerated in their
state operated prison system. Because the United States divides political power between
the federal government and the states in which both political divisions have the power to
make and enforce laws and both have autonomy, the federal government was able to take
a hands-off approach to the COVID-19 state of emergency. Further, the US prison system
is organized in a way that grants individual states control over state prisons. With the
existence of federal, state, and privately owned and operated prisons came a patchwork of
uncoordinated response efforts and disjointed information and resource access. As result,
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the response to COVID-19 varied across prison facilities and across the states. According
to a study by Prison Policy Initiative (2021), in general, lawmakers “failed to slow the
spread of the coronavirus, causing incarcerated people to get sick and die at a rate
unparalleled in the general public”, but some individual state policy makers did recognize
the urgency of the pandemic and took actions slowing the spread and taking steps to
reduce mass incarceration (Prison Policy Initiative 2022)
Federal administrative laws—in the form of rules, regulations, procedures, and
polices—derive from the President, the Executive Branch, and independent regulatory
agencies. Executive agencies are the main agencies of the federal government whose
leaders are also members of the president’s cabinet. The cabinet members serve as
advisors to the president; therefore, the presidential administration can impact policy
directions. Independent regulatory agencies are federal agencies established by Congress
that has some independence from the President. These agencies are not represented in the
cabinet and are not part of the Executive Office. For this dissertation, I analyze policy
implementations from each level of agency such as the President’s executive orders, the
Department of Justice, the Bureau of Prisons, and individual state regulatory agencies
that operate state prisons.
Under the Tenth Amendment of the US Constitution, states are granted powers
that are not reserved for the Federal government (White House 2021). Local law
enforcement agencies and some jails, prisons, and correctional facilities fall under the
oversight of state governments, which offers its own written constitution and threebranch—executive, legislative, and judicial—system allowing for state specific policies
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and procedure. More specifically, this allowed for differing responses to the COVID-19
outbreaks in state operated prisons across the United States.
The United States has about 18,000 state and federal correctional institutions that take
a number of forms and titles (Fuller, 2021). This includes federally operated prisons and a
variety of facilities—correctional facilities or institutions, rehabilitative facilities, work
camps, prisons, juvenile institutions, etc.—operated at the state level. The difference
between state and federal prisons, and ways in which they are ran and operated, is the
government bodies that manage them. State prisons operate under the jurisdiction of the
state government in which the state manages the facility. This includes funding from state
tax money, allocation of resources, daily operating procedures, and—in the case of this
dissertation—response to the control of disease and viruses. Simply put, people who have
been convicted of violating a state law are sentenced to state prison. The number of
facilities vary by state. For example, Michigan has 39 state operated facilities while
Delaware has four, with most other states falling somewhere in-between (Fuller, 2021).
People who have been convicted of a federal offense or awaiting trial for federal
offenses are housed in federal prisons. Established originally as the Three Prisons Act
(1891), the number of federally operated prisons grew as result of law and policy
changes. Later, established as the Bureau of Prisons by Congress in 1930 the number of
prisons grew from 3 to 14, then to 44 as the Bureau began operating facilities with
differing security levels. With changes to federal law enforcement efforts and new
legislation in the 1980s, such as the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and minimum
sentencing provisions in 1986, 1988, and 1990, federal prisons increased to 62. Following
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the War on drugs and illegal immigration, conviction rates continued to rise and by the
end of 1990s, BOP operated more than 95 institutions (Federal Bureau of Prisons 2021).
Today, the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) holds America’s largest prison population
for one agency at over 157,000 inmates housed in 122 facilities (Federal Bureau of
Prisons 2021). The response to COVID-19 cases within its facilities is typical “of the
grim conditions and bungled responses at federal lockups across the country” (Blakinger
and Hamilton 2020). The Marshall Project found that the BOP was not only ill prepared
for the pandemic and slow to respond, but that top officials took measures that
contributed to the spread of the virus. Failing to follow a pandemic response plan and
concealing the extent of the outbreak by limiting testing are examples of ways policy
initiatives, or lack thereof, further harmed people incarcerated during the pandemic.
Federalism and its Importance to COVID-19
As the United States operates on this vision of federalism in which both the federal and
state governments have the power to make legal decisions in the wake of COVID-19, the
politicization of the pandemic and the responses that followed proved to be problematic as
shown with the rising cases and deaths. The reliance on state actors was a pragmatic
institutional choice because state level initiatives “are by their nature partial and porous”
and “hampered by the lack of uniformity and certainty that could come from a federal
pandemic response” (Knauer 2020). State actors are ill-suited to respond on their own to a
novel virus. However, as we saw during 2020 and 2021 the federal government overlooked
the 2 million people incarcerated in the United States, leaving state and local agencies

83

scrambling to find solutions. Federalism, in this case, provided the platform for new forms
of state violence through the lack of protection to an already vulnerable population.
The lived experience of the COVID-19 pandemic for prisoners varied depending on
jurisdiction, each having imposed different mitigation efforts. The varying responses
highlighted the limitations of federalism and the challenges faced by vulnerable
populations when the federal government hands off responsibility to state and local
actors. Failing to adopt uniform measures among facilities across the country placed
hundreds of thousands of people at risk and contributed to the spread of the virus. For
example, for much of the pandemic US Marshals continued to transport inmates to and
from prisons across the country, knowingly spreading COVID-19. A worker in the
Pollock federal prison reported that there were no COVID-19 positive inmates until a US
Marshal transportation van with twelve inmates pulled into their facility. No one in the
van wore masks or other protective gear, and the inmates had not been tested for COVID19 (Hamilton and Blakinger 2020). When tested at the Pollock prison, four of the inmates
were positive for coronavirus. The US Marshals Service is responsible for transporting
people around the federal prison system, spreading all across the United States. They are
not responsible for putting inmates in quarantine or testing them prior to transportation.
Therefore, the virus was spread literally around the country. I question whether the
spread of the virus could have been greatly reduced if federal laws, such as halting the
transportation of inmates were put into place. Regardless of the policies within federal
prisons, if state prisons or local jails did not have protective policy in place, the spread
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will continue. The transportation by federal agents was merely the vehicle that
transported COVID-19 from facility to facility.
The goal of federalism in disaster relief policy and pandemic planning is to take a
“all-hands-on-deck” approach in which state authorities take the lead in local
emergencies with the federal government’s financial support and resources (Knauer
2020). However, what if the federal government is ill-prepared to respond to the COVID19 pandemic because of conflicting political priorities and, under federalism, leaves the
state without the needed support? With their increase in resources as compared to state
agencies, federal agencies such as the Department of Justice (DOJ), Bureau of Prisons
(BOP), and the National Institute of Corrections, could offer support by not only doing
their part to reduce the spread of COVID-19 outbreaks between facilities, but by offering
guidance and resources through consistent, federally supported policy initiatives.
Federalism is central to the plan for disaster relief and emergency responses in the
United States, which is organized by a tiered, top-down response that enlists federal,
state, and local levels of government. However, these plans often fall short in their
execution. Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, protocols for national
preparedness and response were put into place beginning with President George W.
Bush’s Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 (HSPD-5), which was meant to
enhance the ability of the United States to manage domestic incidents by incorporating a
national incident management system (NIMS) (Knauer 2020; Department of Homeland
Security 2003).
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HSPD-5 led to the development of a National Response Framework (NRF) and the
Emergency Support Functions (ESFs), also through Homeland Security. In 2005, George
W. Bush enacted the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza and it’s coincided 233page Implementation Plan (2006), along with the 2005 Department of Health and Human
Services Pandemic Influenza Plan. Finally, Congress passed, and President Trump
signed, the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness and Advancing Innovation Act of
2019. Over the last two decades, plans have been in place to assist and guide the COVID19 pandemic response. While these plans did not address COVID-19 specifically, the
plans did address avian flu, the H1N1 pandemic, Zika virus, and Ebola outbreaks, all of
which could have better prepared the United States in responding to and reducing the
spread of the coronavirus. However, these plans were overlooked.
Each of these policies, frameworks, and initiatives insinuate a strong federal
leadership in a pandemic response. However, in the case of COVID-19 this was not the
case. Furthermore, for the purpose of this research, after reviewing each of these policies
I found that there was only one plan that even briefly mentioned the handling of inmates,
prisons, or other correctional institutions. In the Department of Health and Human
Services (HSS) Pandemic Influenza Plan (2005), when setting parameters around
outbreak control, they question whether the policy should be implemented in prisons or
other settings where high spread may occur as part of their unresolved issues. Further,
when laying out the components of the national influenza surveillance system, they
define an institution as a “nursing home, hospital, prison, school, etc.” (U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services 2005: S1-13). While there is no guidance or
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recommendation for addressing the spread of disease or virus within the confinements of
prison walls, the mere mentioning of their existence is a step forward for recognition of
the needs of over a million people often forgotten and overlooked during states of
emergency.
Governance and The State of Exception
In the Origins of Totalitarianism (1951), Arendt argues that the stateless were without
rights, and that it is better to be a criminal who at least had some rights and protections.
Specifically, she states that “a criminal offense becomes the best opportunity to regain
some kind of human equality, even if it be as a recognized exception to the norm” (286).
This exception is provided by law. Law defines social status, who is protected under
citizenship and who is the exception. But how much truth is here? While prisoners are
still considered citizens of the United States in some respects, many rights are stripped
including rights that define our nation as democratic, such as losing the right to freedom
and to the right to vote. The criminal legal system deprives inmates of all but the most
minimal constitutional protections (Arnold 2018). Further, we have seen historically
through the preparedness and response policies implemented to protect citizens from
disease and viruses, inmates were often overlooked and even ignored. This was shown
again through the COVID-19 global pandemic. Arendt goes on to say that:
“We are not born equal; we become equal as members of a group on the strength of our
decision to guarantee ourselves mutually equal rights. Our political life rests on the
assumption that we can produce equality through organization, because man can act in and
change and build a common world, together with his equals and only with his equals”
(1951: 301).
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The institutions of the United States has systematically left nearly 2 million people
incarcerated, losing many rights of citizenship, including the right to be protected during a
global pandemic. The lives of inmates have been expended as law has the power to identify
the life of homo sacer, a life deprived of rights and deprived of protection. Political life,
thus, rests on those who have the power to define who is included and who is excluded as
worthy human beings, in this case, as labeled as breaking the social contract of laws. It is
important to note that many people incarcerated are not because of a criminal act but
because of the criminalization of their social status as poor and/or of color. Through
criminal justice efforts such as the War on Drugs, broken windows policing, and stop and
frisk, already marginalized groups of people were targeted. Laws and policies such as these
led to the mass incarceration that was disproportionately made up of poor people of color.
These populations were essentially made into foreigners when placed in prison, removed,
and hidden from society. As result, they were overlooked during the COVID-19 pandemic
and placed at a greater risk of contracting the novel virus.
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CHAPTER SIX
HOME CONFINEMENT POLICY AND PRISON RELEASE
Prisons only amplify the spread of infectious diseases because of overcrowding
within already unsanitary living conditions. As result, in the first year of the pandemic
COVID-19 took the lives of inmates at higher rates than the general population.
Immediate action to reduce the number of people behind bars would have only had a
positive impact on slowing the spread of COVID-19, which could become standard
practice in criminal justice policy to reduce harm caused by mass incarceration. Through
the implementation of home confinement policies whether at the federal level under the
CARES Act (discussed in greater detail later in this chapter) or compassion release, or at
the state level it becomes apparent that policies do no good if they are not enforced in an
efficient, timely manner (see Figure 6.1 for a timeline relevant to home confinement
policy). Furthermore, they must continue to be enforced to see the greatest impact.
From the start of the outbreak, incarcerated people were uniquely vulnerable to
the spread of the COVID-19 virus as result of their close quarters, confined living
conditions and higher rates of preexisting health problems. Historically, prisons are
epicenters for virus and disease transmission as result of poor sanitation, poor ventilation,
and overcrowding. Further, the history of social determinants of poor public health has
led to the incarceration of populations who are disproportionately composed of people of
color, people with higher rates of preexisting health conditions, and people with
stigmatized behavioral health disorders (Henry, 2020; Nowotny, Bailey, Omori, and
Brinkley-Rubinstein 2020).
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Figure 6.1 shows a timeline relevant to home confinement policy as it reflects my
thematic analysis and process tracing.
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Many people incarcerated in the United States have chronic health conditions,
“such as high blood pressure, asthma, cancer, tuberculosis, hepatitis C, and HIV, making
them particularly vulnerable to communicable diseases” (Nowotny et. al 2020). Further, a
harsh history of sentencing policies has led to a prison population that is aging, with 11%
of the population 55 years old or older, placing over 165,000 people at great risk for
dying of COVID-19.
Additionally, COVID-19 outbreaks in prison settings can be detrimental to the
health of people incarcerated and beyond. Such outbreaks may overwhelm prison healthcare services and resources, placing additional burdens on aid from facilities in the
community. Furthermore, with an estimated 30 million people being released annually
from prison globally, “prisons are a vector for community transmission that will
disproportionately impact marginalized communities” (Kinner, et al. 2020). Few US
prisons have health systems that are equipped to accommodate the surge in “sick calls”
placed by inmates to medical staff during an outbreak. Although the US Constitution
guarantees a right to health care for people incarcerated, “available medical care varies
greatly with regard to both access and quality” (Hawks, Woolhandler, and McCormick
2020, 1041).
By definition, prison health is public health although prisons are often excluded or
treated separately from public health efforts. The COVID-19 crisis in facilities across the
country—and the response that followed—exacerbates the disconnect between life
behind bars and lives in the community and the porous borders between prisons and
marginalized communities. The obvious solution to reducing these circumstances is
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reducing the amount of people overcrowding federal and state operated facilities across
the country and safely returning people to communities before increasing risks of
transmission. Decarceration attempts are aimed at reducing the number of people
incarcerated in jails and prisons. Decarceration policies allow inmates to transition back
into their communities and to access community resources, freeing up resources within
the prison, therefore making it a vital part of the overall public health system in the
United States.
The American Public Health Association (AJPH) identified 10 public health
priorities for responding to COVID-19 in prisons, many of which were also implemented
in communities across the nation. These steps include improving prison ventilation
systems, ensuring appropriate mask use, limiting inmate transfers between facilities,
strengthening partnerships between public health departments and prison leadership,
introducing or maintaining effective occupational health programs, ensuring access to
advance care planning processes, strengthening partnerships between prison leadership
and incarcerated people, providing emergency mental health support for prison residents
and staff, committing to public accountability, and accelerating population reduction
coupled with community reentry support (Barnet, Kwan, and Williams 2021). Despite
guidelines laid out by public health officials and the CDC, lack of coordination and
variation in prison system responses have led to poor outcomes that often place inmates
in positions of greater vulnerability of contraction. The differing implementation of
decarceration strategies is an example of how the lack of federally coordinated response
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efforts based on differing prison policy initiatives that vary from prison type and
jurisdiction can be harmful to peoples incarcerated.
Coordinated federal response efforts can be impacted by orders coming from the
top down. For example, on January 18, 2021 Former President Trump signed into order
EO13979 Ensuring Democratic Accountability in Agency Rulemaking. Simply, this
executive order regulates who can make federal rules and regulations. The order was
intended to ensure that the officials responsible for making and executing law and policy
are held accountable to the American people to successfully govern federal agencies.
More so, the order meant that regulations would have to conform to the new president’s
agenda, not to the career, as executive agency rulemaking should now only be initiated by
the president, or a Presidential appointee (Lofchie 2021; Slattery 2021).
President Biden revoked the order on February 24, 2021. Revoking this order
removes the clause that it must be democratically appointed officials who are setting the
rules, making it difficult to know who to hold accountable for executive branch agency
actions. While this executive order did raise the problem that allowing only presidential
elected officials to be involved in rulemaking further promotes one political agenda, and
by removing the order, Biden could have allowed for more voices to be involved in
rulemaking, I include this executive order in this dissertation for two main reasons. First,
removing this executive order removed a level of accountability that came from assigning
specific people the responsibility to make quick, lasting decision to combat the spread of
COVID-19, therefore knowing who to hold responsible when protection for the American
people was not met. Which leads to my second reason, the revocation of this order is
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important because this order precludes application to the Federal Bureau of Prisons
(BOP), excluding rulemaking under the Trump administration and removing any
administrative changes during the Biden administration.
The exemption from executive orders highlights how inmates are specifically
excluded from the response and protection of the state. According to Agamben, inclusion
through exclusion matters as we are rendering the lives of inmates bare. Inmates across
the nation are not exempt from the detrimental impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic,
rather they are being held in position in which they cannot protect themselves from its
rapid spread. By remaining locked-up and unable to protect themselves, they rely on the
state to offer refuge. Excluding this specific population from protection under executive
orders such as 13979, excludes responsibility by the state to offer resources to
criminalized populations, allocating resources—such as personal protection equipment
and testing kits—only to law abiding citizens. Policy is often a response to states of
emergency to reduce the amount of damage caused to the public. In the moment of
COVID-19, policies excluding the prison population only justifies the exemption of care
by the state and the ability of the sovereign state to exclude certain rules in the name of
protecting the public good.
Home Confinement Overview
Home confinement as a means of incarceration “has been around for decades,
allowing some inmates, even those who were from high security prisons, to serve a
percentage of their prison term on strict conditions while living at home” (Pavlo, 2021).
The pandemic, along with the rising numbers of death and illness at federal correctional
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institutions, led to new legislation that was put into place to curb the spread of the
infection. This included the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, better
known as the CARES Act. The 116th Congress passed the CARES Act in March 2020.
This was the third and largest major legislative initiative to address COVID-19, following
the Coronavirus Preparedness and Response Supplemental Appropriations Act and the
Families First Coronavirus Response Act (Moss, et. al 2020). The CARES Act addresses
a variety of provisions focused on the government’s response to the COVID-19 outbreak
that relate to the health and wellbeing of people such as paid sick leave, insurance
coverage of COVID-19 testing, support for broader use of telehealth services, and
reauthorization to programs typically seen in rural areas such as the Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program. It also allocated funds to assistance
programs such as the supplemental nutrition assistance program (SNAP) and the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to further assist families impacted. Further,
funding was made possible for increased spending by the Federal Bureau of Prisons to
account for staff personal protective equipment and supplies relate to coronavirus, clean
work and living environments, and inmate medical care and supplies related to the virus.
In fact, the CARES Act brought several changes to the daily operations of state and
federal prisons.
Home confinement authority within the BOP is addressed specifically under the
CARES Act based on “the density of the inmate population, the high traffic, the high
volume of inmates, the high rate of turnover of inmates and personnel, and the number of
high security areas” within the BOP facilities (Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic

95

Security Act (CARES Act), Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. Section 12003 (b)). This act
grants the Attorney General the authorization to declare the time in which state of
emergency conditions will affect the function of the Bureau, thus allowing the director of
the BOP to lengthen the amount of time an inmate may be placed on home confinement.
Then, in April 2020 Attorney General William Barr issued a memorandum under the
CARES Act to declare a state of emergency within the BOP, prioritizing and enforcing
home confinement where appropriate (Pavlo 2021; Barr 2020). This declaration had the
potential to make the CARES Act one of the most influential policy initiatives in
protecting prison populations from COVID-19 infections.
Eligibility for home confinement considers the age and vulnerability of the inmate
to COVID-19 in accordance with the CDC, the security level of the facility in which the
inmate is housed, the inmate’s conduct in prison, the inmate’s score under the Prisoner
Assessment Tool Targeting Estimated Risk and Needs (PATTERN), and the inmate’s
crime of conviction and their potential danger to the community. Additionally, home
confinement should be granted only when the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) has determined
that the transfer is not likely to increase the inmate’s risk of contracting COVID-19.
On April 3, 2020 the Attorney General issued a second memorandum to the BOP
requesting the Bureau give priority in the implementation of new standards under the
CARES Act to the most vulnerable inmates at the most affected facilities. At the time of
the memorandum, these facilities included FCI Oakdale, FCI Danbury, and FCI Elkton,
where COVID-19 was materially affecting operations (Pavlo 2021; Barr 2020) .
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FCI Oakdale, in Louisiana, became an early hotspot for infection as it failed to
promptly screen inmates and staff and issue face covering requirements. This delay led to
a quick rise in infection rates. Further, Oakdale failed to comply with BOP and CDC
isolation and quarantine guidance and did not advise staff who supervised these inmates
that they would be interacting with COVID-19 positive inmates (U.S. Department of
Justice Office of the Inspector General 2020). Nearly 100 asymptomatic inmates who
tested positive for COVID-19 were still using public showers, telephones, and other
common areas within the facility (Hymes 2020). The delay in policy and implementation
resulted in rapid spread, staff shortages, inmate hospitalization and five inmate deaths in
the first month of the pandemic (Neff and Blakinger 2020).
In Connecticut, more than half the women incarcerated in FCI Danbury tested
positive for COVID-19. According to allegations, prison officials “returned more than a
dozen inmates with COVID-19 back into dorms and other inmates after they tested
positive” and did not isolate them for more than 24 hours (Dunavin 2022). Many
experienced symptoms without being tested or removed from crowded spaces. In 2020 a
class action lawsuit was filed seeking to require federal officials to provide emergency
measures to protect men and women incarcerated in FCI Danbury (Yale Law School
2020). According to the suit, the people housed in FCI Danbury are among the most
vulnerable to COVID-19 because they live in close quarters “with units containing more
than 100 people lined up in rows of bunk beds, and with communal bathrooms and dining
areas” (Yale Law School 2020). At one of Danbury’s women’s facilities, 34 of 50
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inmates were infected. In December 2021, one in 10 inmates tested positive at FCI
Danbury facilities (Rabin 2021).
By April 2020, 37 inmates were hospitalized and another 71 were isolated at the
Elkton prison with COVID-19 symptoms. Having such a high number of inmates in the
hospital required a high number of staff to guard them, leaving staff within the prison
short. Therefore, the Ohio National guard was deployed to FCI Elkton to help with
staffing (Polansky and Trexler 2020). With only one day of formal training before
interacting with prisoners, the guard members “could be prone to mistakes that could put
them or the prisoners in danger” (Lartey 2020). Increased use of force on inmates caused
further harm at the hands of the state.
At the end of 2021, despite the problems outlined above and with increased
numbers of infections, hospitalizations, and deaths in prisons across the nation, only
about 5 percent of people serving federal sentences had been granted home confinement
(Rabin 2021). At FCI Elkton, where nearly all 2300 inmates were infected, only six
inmates, as of July 2021, had been transferred to home confinement; nine inmates had
died (Pavlo 2021). Home confinement has been an option for inmates who are too
medically fragile for incarceration, even prior to the COVID-19 pandemic. The
broadened scope of eligibility for home confinement as defined under the CARES Act
could have become a tool that, if used properly and as intended, could have slowed the
spread of infection, and saved lives. Failure to release more people at quicker rates under
the home confinement clauses points to the lives of those incarcerated as the bare life, as
homo sacer. The political existence of those incarcerated in prisons across the United
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States has been removed by those who have power to define who is included and who is
excluded as worthy human beings. In this case, whose lives take precedence in protection
and safety and who can be left to die (Agamben 1995).
Former President Donald Trump
People incarcerated in federal prisons who sought early release during the
pandemic could do so in two main ways: through home confinement or through
compassionate release (more below). Both options allow low-risk offenders to finish their
sentence at home or other alternatives to incarceration, such as in Residential Reentry
Management Centers (RRCs) better known as halfway houses (Santos 2020). But, on
January 15, 2021, during the final days of the Trump Administration, then-Deputy
Assistant Attorney General Jennifer Mascott with the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC)
issued a memorandum opinion which stated that inmates who had been released on home
confinement under the CARES Act would be required to return to prison within 30 days
after the COVID-19 emergency declaration had ended. Furthermore, this memorandum
pointed out that 18 US Code section 3621 instructed BOP to maintain custody of a person
sentenced to a term with BOP until “the expiration of the term imposed, or until earlier
released for satisfactory behavior pursuant to the provisions of section 3624” (Mascott
2021). It was the responsibility of the BOP to designate the location of the inmate’s term
of imprisonment. If inmates did not qualify for home confinement, they were to be
returned to a facility within 30 days of the expiration of the CARES Act, when the
national state of emergency under the National Emergencies Act with respect to the
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) had ended.
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A memorandum has specific implications, setting it apart from other legal terms.
A memorandum opinion allows for affirmation or modification to actions of a court
decision; however, it does not offer precedential value. It is not published and is not cited
or relied on for future, unrelated cases. (Tennessee State Courts 2022). This
memorandum is only applicable for this moment, during the COVID-19 pandemic.
The memorandum opinion released by the OLC highlighted the uncertainties
surrounding the implementation and expiration of the CARES Act. Provisions to the
CARES Act left room for ambiguity and uncertainties of when and how home
confinement should be implemented. By leaving the deadline open—for offenders who
would otherwise not qualify for home confinement without the CARES Act—to fall
within 30 days of the CARES Act expiration left many offenders in limbo. Inmates and
their families were unsure if and when they would be required to return to prison, adding
increased stress and uncertainties during a already harmful pandemic. Policy makers and
BOP administration were also left in moments of uncertainty as order and policy
implementation remained unclear as it brought continual changes.
Five days after the memorandum opinion, President Joe Biden took office. As of
January 20, 2021 the pandemic was still spreading across the nation and the state of
emergency was still in place. The newly appointed Biden administration was faced with
the option to reverse the Trump OLC opinion to allow the people released on home
confinement to remain on home confinement, to grant clemency to some or all prisoners
released on home confinement, or to follow the OLC opinion to reincarcerate those on
home confinement at the close of the state of emergency.
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President Joe Biden
During the first several months in office, the Biden Administration did not present
any definite decisions about the government’s potential plan for people placed on home
confinement under the CARES Act. It was unclear if the Biden Administration would
allow people to remain on home confinement or be forced to return to prison. According
to American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), this left thousands of people in limbo,
wondering whether, and when, they would be forced back to prison following the
COVID-19 pandemic. ACLU’s staff attorney Emma Andersson stated, “(t)he BOP told
incarcerated people, their families, the American public, and Congress that if people
followed the rules on home confinement, they would be allowed to rebuild their lives
outside of prison” ACLU 2021). The shift in presidential administration and lack of
committed plans by the Biden Administration raised questions of uncertainty, until
September 2021.
On September 13, 2021 the Biden administration began the clemency process for
some inmates released on home confinement under the CARES Act (Hoffman and
Carrega 2021; Simmerson and Zuckerman 2021; Stein, 2021). This process began with
nonviolent drug offenders on home confinement with four years or fewer remaining on
their sentence. To be eligible to remain on home confinement, former inmates had to
submit commutation applications, or an application requesting a reduced or lessened
sentence. Additionally, some eligible people on home confinement could request a
sentence commutation through compassionate release. This statute allows the court to
reduce the term of imprisonment and/or impose a term of probation or supervised release
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if the court finds that, (1) “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a
reduction; or the defendant is at least 70 years of age, has served at least 30 years in
prison, pursuant to a sentence imposed under section 3559(c), for the offense or offenses
for which the defendant is currently imprisoned…and that such a reduction is consistent
with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission” (Legal
Information Institute 2021 ). The Compassionate Release/Reduction in Sentence allows
an inmate with a minimum term sentence to be immediately eligible for parole by
reducing the sentence to time served. The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984
allows the Director of the BOP to reduce the term of a sentence for “particularly
extraordinary or compelling circumstances which could not reasonably have been
foreseen by the court at the time of the sentencing” (Federal Bureau of Prisons 2019).
Unlike parole, compassionate release is based on extraordinary circumstances such as a
medical concern like a terminal illness or if the inmate is elderly not on the inmate’s
behavior.
In a revised opinion on December 21, 2021, then-Assistant Attorney General
Christopher Schroeder with the OLC stated that the OLC departed from the view of their
January 2021 opinion concerning 12003(b)(2) of the CARES Act. The OLC now
concluded that section 12003(b)(2) and the Bureau’s preexisting authorities “are better
read to give the Bureau discretion to permit prisoners in extended home confinement to
remain there” (Schroeder 2021). In other words, the OLC’s new interpretation under the
Biden Administration is that the CARES Act does not require inmates on home
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confinement to return to prison when the state of emergency ends. However, as the
pandemic worsened, fewer people were being released.
Federal Bureau of Prisons
As tens of thousands of federal prisoners applied for clemency and compassionate
release in 2020, the system became backlogged, nearly 80% of motions were denied in
2020, and many motions were ignored (Simmerson and Spaeder 2021; Blakinger and
Neff 2021; Neff and Blackinger 2020). With a change in BOP director came fewer
approvals for compassionate release. In 2019 BOP approved 55 requests, while in 2020
only 36, despite the growing number of applicants: from 1,735 in 2019 to nearly 31,000
after the virus hit in March 2020 (Blakinger and Neff 2021). Michael Carvajal was
appointed as Director of BOP by the Trump administration’s attorney general in February
2020. During his short time as director, he faced scrutiny over the handling of the
coronavirus pandemic (Pietsch and Zapotosky 2022). With Carvajal acting as director
over the agency for the majority of the pandemic, “about one in three Bureau of Prisons
inmates has tested positive for the virus…a rate nearly double that of the general U.S.
population” (Pietsch and Zapotosky 2022). Senator Richard Durbin requested Attorney
General Merrick Garland to fire Carvajal following an investigation by the Associated
Press that provided examples of misconduct within the Bureau that reached beyond the
pandemic to include abuse, corruption, sexual abuse, murder, and allegations of cash
bribes for smuggling contraband (Pietsch and Zapotosky 2022; Balsamo and Sisak 2021).
Durbin recognized that with a new administration came new opportunity to reform the
criminal justice system and stated that “it’s clear that there is much going wrong in our
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federal prisons, and we urgently need to fix it” (Pietsch and Zapotosky 2022). With the
BOP’s slow response, with less than 3% of medically vulnerable federal prisoners being
sent home as of June 2020, and failure to follow its own pandemic response plan, the
BOP drew scrutiny from Congress. Lawmakers questioned how the outbreak spread
uncontrollably through BOP facilities despite the $100 million allotted for pandemic
response funding. The American Federation of Government Employees Council of Prison
Locals, which represents federal prison workers, claimed that Carvajal and the BOP
leadership made the virus spread worse rather than containing it, and as of June 2020,
prisoners filed at least 11 class-action lawsuits against Carvajal and wardens seeking
improved conditions and to compel releases (Hamilton and Blakinger 2020) This led
federal court officials to order releases. Federal Judge James Gwin ordered the BOP to
release or transfer 837 medically vulnerable inmates from Federal Correctional Institute
Elkton, which had the highest number of staff cases among the affected 61 federal
prisons and reentry centers and the fourth highest number of inmates testing positive in
federal prison by April 2020 (Bobby-Gilbert 2020). Still, the BOP declared that only five
people met the criteria for release (Hamilton and Blakinger 2020). Only after an Appeals
Court Judge denied the request to stall the release of the inmates at Elkton were the
inmates transferred or released (WKYC 2020; NBC News 2020). Similar stories were
told across the nation.
On the day of his inauguration, President Biden signed Executive Order 13992:
Revocation of Certain Executive Orders Concerning Federal Regulations. This executive
order revoked six previous orders issued by former President Donald Trump.
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Specifically, this executive order revoked previous executive order 13892, Promoting the
Rule of Law Through Transparency and Fairness in Civil Administrative Enforcement
and Adjudication, which instructed agencies in the executive branch to act transparently
and fairly with respect to conduct and standards. Signed October 9, 2019, the order is
intended to make agencies publish rules, policies, and interpretations of law to promote
accountability and ensure fairness to avoid “the inherently arbitrary nature of unpublished
ad hoc determinations” (Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 232, 1974; Trump 2019). Simply,
this executive order required federal agencies to provide the public with notice of
regulations. No person can be held accountable to civil administration, or general
operations, enforcement action without prior notice of the enforcing agency in the
executive branch. This executive order should promote cooperation between agencies of
different jurisdictions, federal, state, or local, promote information sharing, and establish
predictable outcomes.
Repealing executive orders such as order 13892, changed regulatory policies that
hindered the federal government’s ability to confront and respond to the COVID-19
pandemic. Changing such policies should create opportunities to use law and policy to
deliver better outcomes to COVID-19 response, by removing any policies that enables
agencies to utilize regulatory instruments detrimental to tackling the pandemic. This is
accomplished by removing policies that threaten the ability for the government to
respond appropriately. Overall, order 13892 provides the Biden Administration more
power and flexibility with enforcing other executive orders. This power trickles down to
executive branch agencies such as the Bureau of Prison. While change in executive
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orders has prompted the BOP to be transparent, I question whether that transparency and
predicted fairness is translated into practice.
Throughout the pandemic, BOP has shown some transparency by publicly posting
updated operational levels, modified operations, and statements by the director. In a
statement before the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate on the oversight of
the BOP, Director Michael Carvajal publicly discussed the Bureau’s COVID-19
pandemic response, mission and operations. However, BOP stopped putting cases and
deaths on reports making it impossible to determine whether case numbers were
improving under policy change, or continuing to spread throughout the system.
State Level
Home confinement orders under the CARES Act only apply to federal inmates
and federal facilities, leaving the response in other facilities up to that state or local
jurisdiction. As of May 2020, researchers found that many local level jails were
responding more aggressively to the COVID-19 crisis by drastically cutting populations,
while state-controlled prisons hardly made any attempts at reducing numbers of people in
their facilities (Wildra and Wagner 2020;Wildra 2022). On average, jails have reduced
populations by more than 30% since the onset of the pandemic in March 2020, while
state prison systems have reduced its population by only around 5% (Widra and Wagner
2020). Jails house only one-third of the incarcerated population in the United States,
meaning the majority are held by state and federal systems (Wildra and Wagner 2020;
Sawyer and Wagner 2022). Like jails, state level prisons are overcrowded, leaving it
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nearly impossible for inmates to practice social distancing and safely protect themselves
from contracting the virus.
Just as local jails can adjust policy, such as issuing early releases or reducing the
number of intakes, state prisons have the jurisdiction to do the same. Making changes
such as stopping new inmate intakes from county jails or releasing people who are
medically vulnerable, elderly, or nearing the end of their sentences could greatly reduce
the spread of the coronavirus in prison and protect the lives of not only the inmates, but
the community as well. However, when put into practice, the actual population changes
were small. Even transferring people in prison to home confinement did not amount to
significant changes in reducing population (Widra and Wagner 2020).
As the original COVID-19 strain emerged into the Delta variant which was
determined to be more contagious and more deadly, public officials continued to
recommend prison populations be decreased as the primary method for reducing infection
spread (Barnert, Kwan, and Williams 2021; Widra 2021). Still, numbers of inmates
released were low and in states where prison populations did drop there were still too
many prisoners to accommodate social distancing or room for isolation and quarantine.
For example, during the first year and a half of the pandemic, California reduced the state
prison population, by nearly 19%, but as of June 2021, the prisons still held more people
than they were designed for at 107% of their maximum capacity (Widra, 2021).
Additionally, while many states may have seen a slight drop in their prison populations
towards the beginning of the pandemic, many began to grow in 2021. Changes in the
number of average monthly releases from prison were short-lived as there were fewer
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prison releases than there were over the same amount of time in 2019 and 2020. By
October 21, 2021, many state prisons returned to pre-pandemic levels despite the ongoing
dangers of COVID-19, such as the onset of the Delta variant. While COVID-19 cases and
death rates peaked in late 2020 and early 2021 and the United States. saw numbers begin
to decline, the cumulative toll of cases and death remained several times higher among
the state and federal prison population than the overall national population at 200 deaths
per 100,000 inmates as compared to 81 deaths per 100,000 residents of the general US
population. (Marquez et al. 2021).
To justify the lack of speedy releases from prisons, criminal justice officials imply
that doing so would jeopardize public safety. In other words, saving the lives of people
behind bars is not worth risking the lives of those who are not. However, research has
shown that historical decarceration attempts in the United States have not only been
common, such as in California (1968-1972), Florida (1963-1965), Illinois (1980-1983),
Massachusetts (1969), and New York and New Jersey (late 1990s to present), but have
shown that doing so does not jeopardize public safety (Wagner 2020). Regardless, states
took great precautions in electing to release people on a case-by-case basis which was a
slow, tedious, and ineffective method. The attempt was not effective enough to reduce the
amount of harm caused to the inmates daily.
Fortunately, some states recognized this ineffective approach and made more
appropriate attempts at reducing people within their prisons. For example, New Jersey
Governor Murphy followed public health officials’ guidance and signed legislation
(S2519) requiring “public health emergency credit” be awarded to inmates and parolees
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with less than a year left on their sentences, allowing them to be released early. Murphy
also signed to E.O. 124 which released more than 1200 people on parole prior to the end
of their sentences. More than 2,000 people were released from New Jersey state prisons
in just a few weeks (Widra 2021; New Jersey 2020). Similarly, North Carolina Governor
Roy Cooper made plans in February 2021 to release people using discretionary sentence
credits, home confinement, and post-release supervision. In a six-month period, 3500
inmates were released early from the state’s custody (Anderson 2021). It should be noted,
however, that these changes only came in response to a deal struck by the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People, who stated they would sue over
prison conditions during the pandemic on grounds that the conditions violated inmates’
rights under North Carolina state constitution
(https://www.acluofnorthcarolina.org/en/cases/nc-naacp-v-cooper-rights-incarceratedpeople). Overall, New Jersey, Connecticut and Illinois reduced their prison populations
the most at roughly 26% (Herring and Sharma 2021). Prison Policy Initiative provides a
more extensive list of state-level policy changes (2022).
Conclusions
In March 2020, the lives of many Americans paused as restaurants, bars, gyms,
schools, and offices closed as COVID-19 began to spread through the country. In attempt
to slow the spread and protect from the uncertainty of what was to come with the global
pandemic, people were told to stay home, a luxury for some. This was not the case for the
Bureau of Prisons, who continued business as usual. Social distancing was not an option
for those incarcerated but releasing them did not seem like an option either as it was the
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Bureau’s business to secure inmates away from society. As the pandemic worsened,
officials actually granted fewer releases and daily operations continued as normal
(Blakinger and Neff 2021). Over the course of 21 months, only 35,277 inmates were
placed on home confinement by BOP (Schroeder, 2021).
Since there is a large percentage of those inmates who pose no threat to society,
more inmates could have been released and those who were could have been moved to
home confinement much sooner. BOP operates institutions under four security levels,
minimum, low, medium, and high, with the majority housed at minimum security.
Minimum security inmates may work outside of the compound, may be part of a workrelease program, may go to doctors’ appointments in the community with minimum
supervision (Pavlo 2021). These people are already partially integrated into the
community and could have been placed on home confinement right away.
This dissertation raises the question of whether polices and their impacts
constitute state violence. To what extent does lack of quick response and policy followthrough constitute state violence? At the federal and state level, hesitation to enforce
policy change and resources available took the lives of thousands of inmates across the
United States. Former President Trump, President Biden, the Federal Bureau of Prisons
(BOP), and each state Department of Corrections had the scientific evidence and
recommendations on COVID-19 that suggested the need to implement early releases and
home confinement. Prominent health organizations such as the American Medical
Association and the National Academy of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine
(NASEM) have supported and advocated for decarceration (National Academies of
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Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2020; Barsky, Kung, and Jimenez 2021). Such
organizations even suggested medical-legal partnerships (MLPs) as a solution to support
health transitions from prison to the community (Barsky, Kung, and Jimenez 2021).
These partnerships can foster care by connecting incarnated people with health
professionals and community health workers who can advocate on their behalf (Barsky,
Kung, and Jimenez 2021). Yet, policies were not implemented nor executed in a timely
manner. Guidance for correctional and detention facilities on COVID-19 was given by
the CDC, but such recommendations could not be followed because of the shear amount
of overcrowding caused by mass incarceration. These recommendations included social
distancing, isolation of people suspected of having COVID-10, offering personal
protection equipment, and encouraging correctional staff to stay home if sick (CDC
2021). At the end of 2018, “the prison custody population in 25 states and the federal
Bureau of Prisons has a total number of prisoners in custody that met or exceeded their
minimum number of beds” (EJI 2021). Having more people held in areas they are not
designed to hold leads to overcrowding and increased risk of infection. There is not
enough space within these facilities to practice social distancing, isolation, or quarantine
nor are there enough resources to provide masks and proper sanitation. In prisons where
there is space for isolating upon infection, inmates are placed in solitary confinement
which has been deemed by human rights organizations as cruel and inhumane.
Essentially, they are being punished for becoming sick. I argue that the unwillingness to
protect this population is a strong example of institutional and systematic state violence
through neglect and depraved indifference.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
VACCINE ROLLOUT AND TESTING
When the COVID-19 pandemic began, the federal government implemented
policy to control the spread of the virus, though in practice they fell short. Within days of
declaring a state of emergency, Trump signed the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic
Security Act (CARES), which specifically addressed the protection of the prison
population (116th Congress 2020). However, early in the US vaccination rollout plans,
incarcerated people were not prioritized for vaccine distribution (see Figure 7.1 for a
timeline relevant to vaccine rollout and testing policies). In his first days, President Biden
issued Executive Order on Improving and Expanding Access to Care and Treatments for
COVID-19, which included people in care facilities that would receive COVID-19 testing
and treatment, but it did not include those incarcerated though they also have an
increased risk of contracting and dying from COVID-19. However, prisons—unlike other
group quarters—are not widely considered as care facilities such as nursing homes,
assisted living, residential treatment facilities, intermediate care for people with
disabilities, hospice, or hospitals. Prison operations focus on security as opposed to
adequate health care. The security measures taken to detain and monitor people behind
bars rarely includes regular screening and protection from disease, infection, or illness.
Thus, prior to the development of the vaccine, prisons implemented excessive solitary
confinement and suspended most prison programs, visitation, and movement to aid social
distancing (Lennon 2021).
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Figure 7.1 shows a timeline relevant to vaccine rollout and testing policies as it reflects
my thematic analysis and process tracing.
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Further, though movement was limited, inmates spent much time in close contact
with other inmates and were not always provided masks and other personal protective
measures (Lennon 2021).
That does not mean that prisons were entirely ignored. In the early stages of the
coronavirus pandemic, public health officials warned wardens “that prisons needed to
take precautionary measures against the virus” and that without basic steps “including
social distancing, better sanitation, and less crowding, correctional institutions had the
potential to become incubators for the virus” (Burkhalter 2021). Regardless, many states
chose to take a different approach to responding to the virus. They enacted measures
designed to keep the virus out of prison. Despite the old adage that an ounce of
prevention is worth a pound of cure, the reality was that the prevention strategy left
prisons ill prepared for the eventual outbreaks that occurred, probably because the virus
was brought to the prison by prison workers—a condition that appeared by to illconsidered by decision-makers. By focusing on stopping family visitation and some
inmate services, prison staff were not prepared to handle outbreaks once the virus got
inside the facilities.
This chapter investigates the COVID-19 response policies that directed the
distribution of and eligibility for COVID-19 testing and vaccination. More specifically, I
layout response differences between the Trump and Biden administrations and state
jurisdictions. By exploring the ways in which government officials responded to vaccine
and testing distributions, and how this distribution was prioritized among groups of
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people, I can illustrate forms of state violence through the hesitation, or even lack, of
protection.
Testing and Contact Tracing
The Trump administration began preparing for preventative services such as
vaccines and testing for COVID-19 with the implementation of the CARES Act, which
stated that testing and vaccines would be implemented quickly and covered under the
Medicare program (116th Congress 2020). Mass testing on the prison population began in
late-April 2020, with only a handful of states, which allowed staff to identify cases
sooner and possibly intervene in the spread of the virus through the facility (Aspinwall
and Neff 2020). By December 2020, one in every five state and federal prisoners had
tested positive for COVID-19; in some states, more than half of the prison population had
been infected (Schwartzapfel, Park and Demillo 2020).
The testing and vaccine rollouts came at a moment of transition in the United
States as they became available during final months of the Trump administration. On
September 29, 2021 the Department of Health and Human Services announced a plan to
send 100 million rapid COVID-19 tests to states by the end of year 2021 and vaccine
rollouts began in December 2021 (AJMC 2021). A month later, January 20, 2021,
President Biden was inaugurated, shifting responsibility to a new political party. The next
day, President Biden signed the Executive Order on Ensuring Data-Driven Response to
COVID-19. President Biden made it policy to respond to COVID-19 through effective
approaches that would be guided by “the best available science and data, including by
building back a better public health infrastructure” (Biden 2021). According to the order,
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a large part of building a better public health infrastructure is urging the heads of
executive departments and agencies to “facilitate the gathering, sharing, and publication
of COVID-19 related data” (Biden 2021). This policy pushes for a joint effort across the
nation to facilitate informed community decision-making to better understand and
respond to the pandemic. Taking this community, holistic approach puts the people first,
and alludes what a transitional justice framework can lend to a global pandemic.
Also on January 21, 2021, President Biden issued Executive Order on
Establishing the COVID-19 Pandemic Testing Board, which set out to identify barriers
faced by some populations to accessing testing and increase testing for these populations.
The policy specifically addresses at-risk settings which includes correctional facilities
and detention facilities and called attention to the urgent need for testing within these
facilities. Adequately testing for COVID-19 in prisons and jails—for both the
symptomatic and not—is critical in attempts to identify and slow the spread of the virus
through facilities. Additionally, contact tracing can slow the spread by identifying and
intercepting contact with additional persons so transmission can be stopped. Contract
tracing is a process that identifies, assesses, and manages people who have been exposed
to the COVID-19 virus (World Health Organization 2021). This interruption in
transmission is crucial in overcrowded facilities such as prisons, especially if we consider
the constant movement of people between facilities or areas within facilities. Testing
inmates before they leave the area in which they have been held will aid in keeping the
virus contained in one area as opposed to risking the spread through the remainder of the
facility.
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Routine testing and contact tracing in prisons is also important in helping people
who are at a higher risk of developing severe symptoms from the virus know they have
been exposed sooner so they can receive medical care more quickly. Many people
incarcerated have underlying health concerns, making them more suspectable to
worsened symptoms (Prison Policy Initiative 2022). However, the distribution of
COVID-19 tests was slow and limited for the public in the early stages, and the
availability for incarcerated people was delayed (Stagoff-Belfort, Rahman, and Chapman
2021). Through the first several months of the pandemic, there were no national
guidelines that ensured screening and contact tracing for people incarcerated or people
working within prisons (Williams, Ahalt, Cloud, Augustine, Rorvig, Sears 2020).
Vaccine Rollout
As researchers worked to develop a COVID-19 vaccine, policy makers prepared
to develop a plan for distribution and implementation. On September 16, 2021 the Trump
Administration released Operation Warp Speed (OWS), a distribution plan with the
Department of Health and Human Services and Department of Defense that aims to
provide COVID-19 vaccines to all Americans (AJMC 2021; HSS 2020). This plan
tentatively assumed beginning to rollout vaccines by January 2021. OWS, however, did
not include a decision on who would receive the vaccine first, or in what order the limited
number of vaccines would be delivered. In October 2020 the Center for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC) began to make recommendations on how federal, state, and local
governments should prepare for vaccine distribution in their jurisdictions. These
recommendations were based on the research conducted by the Advisory Committee on
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Immunization Practices (ACIP), and included a multi-phase rollout system that would
administer in waves based on priority and needs as the US supply of COVID-19 vaccines
were limited (Dooling et al. 2021). The final decision on vaccine distribution, however,
was made by each state. In October 2020, only four states—Delaware, Nebraska,
Maryland and New Mexico—specifically listed incarcerated people as part of their Phase
1 priority vaccination recipients (Misra 2021). More states raised priority for incarcerated
people as incarcerated people and advocates began to speak out. However, some states—
such as Colorado and Vermont—once prioritized inmates to receive vaccinations early in
the rollout stage but removed all priority designation “following backlash from
conservative commentators” (Misra 2021). This reversal went against what science and
data showed about the spread of the virus through carceral institutions.
On December 1, 2020 ACIP recommended that the first phase would be broken
up into multiple stages of vaccine distribution, starting with prioritizing health care
personnel and residents of long-term care facilities as Phase 1A, people over the age of
75 and frontline essential workers outside of healthcare as Phase 1B, and people aged 6574 years, people ages 16-64 with high-risk medical conditions, and essential workers who
were not already vaccinated as Phase 1C (Dooling 2021). On December 8, three days
before the first emergency use vaccine was given, Trump issued Executive Order on
Ensuring Access to U.S. Government COVID-19 Vaccines, ensuring Americans “have
priority access to free, safe, and effective COVID-19 vaccines” (Trump 2020). This
policy further stated that the executive branch shall “ensure that Americans have priority
access to United States Government COVID-19 Vaccines and shall ensure that the most
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vulnerable United States populations have first access to such vaccines” (Trump 2020).
This allowed the government to define who is vulnerable in the United States based on
who takes priority in the receiving the limited number of vaccinations distributed. For
example, while the federal prison system was recommended as one of the first
government agencies to receive the COVID-19 vaccine, this referred only to staff and not
to inmates despite the evidence that inmates were getting sick from COVID-19 at higher
rates than staff (more on this below;Balsamo and Sisak 2020).
The first vaccines for preventing COVID-19 were authorized on December 11,
2020 by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) under the emergency use authorization
that allowed the Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 Vaccine to be distributed. The
Pfizer/BioNTech vaccine offers up to 95% protection against the virus (BBC 2020). Just
a few days after the Pfizer/BioNTech vaccine received emergency-use authorization
(EUA) from the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA), vaccinations began to roll out
in phases, beginning with front-line healthcare workers. On December 14, 2020, the first
vaccines outside of clinical trial were administered to healthcare workers across the
United States (Guarino, Cha, Wood and Witte 2020). Later, two additional COVID-19
vaccines became available for distribution in the United States, starting with Moderna on
December 18, 2020, followed by Johnson & Johnson (AJMC 2021). Aside from the
exclusion of incarcerated people by some state officials, the state and federal government
followed the recommendations of the CDC and ACIP in distributing the COVID-19
vaccine (Herring and Widra 2021; Turner and Bryant 2020).
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People who were at higher risks of exposure, such as elderly people, people with
preexisting health problems conditions such as cardiovascular disease, diabetes, or a
respiratory disease that make the infection a greater threat to them, or people who reside
or work in crowded spaces should have been top priority (World Health Organization
2022). With the standards presented by the World Health Organization, CDC, and ACIP
that are being used by the federal government, incarcerated people should have been high
on every state’s priority list (Quandt 2020; Turner and Bryant 2020). Throughout the
pandemic, some states have seen mortality rates among incarcerated peoples seven times
as high as in the general population (Misra 2021). Yet, depending on the jurisdiction’s
vaccine prioritization plan, incarcerated people could be some of the last to receive the
COVID-19 vaccine.
According to Prison Policy Initiative research, only ten states put people
incarcerated in state prisons in Phase 1 of their vaccine distribution plan, and eight
states—Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Michigan, South Caroline, South Dakota
and Texas—did not include incarcerated people in any vaccine rollout phase (Prison
Policy Initiative 2022). By July 2021, 15 states had vaccinated less than 60% of their
incarcerated people.
The BOP was one of the few federal agencies to receive vaccines for direct
distribution, allowing people incarcerated in federal detention centers to receive their
vaccines directly through prison staff. However, the BOP’s vaccination policy was to
vaccinate all prison staff before the inmates, which would take months (Misra 2021). But,
many correctional staff were refusing to get vaccinated when the vaccine was offered
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(Stagoff-Belfort, Rahman and Chapman, 2021). According to UCLA Law’s COVID
Behind Bars Data Project, in August 2021—6 months after vaccines were being
distributed—as a new variant, the Delta variant, surged and the number of infections
among prison workers rose, many correctional staff were refusing to get vaccinated
(Tyagi and Manson 2021).
Correctional Staff Responses and State Violence
Failing to respond adequately to dangers of the global pandemic proved fatal for
nearly 3,000 people incarcerated in US prison, a population that is held at the hands of
the state without the freedom to leave and take care of themselves (Wildra, 2021). As
seen in the home confinement policy implementation, prisons did not move quickly
enough to test inmates or employees or provide contract tracing. According to a New
York Times report, prisons only sporadically traced the contacts of infected prisoners and
employees, inhibiting their ability to prevent the virus from entering or spreading through
facilities (Burkhalter et al. 2021)
Moreover, throughout much of the pandemic, many correctional officers refused
to be vaccinated for the coronavirus, which may have undermined efforts to control the
pandemic, both inside and outside of prisons (Lewis and Sisak 2021). When asked, only
40 of 475 correctional officers at a Florida prison said they would receive the vaccine
when offered; more than half of the officer’s responded, “Hell no” (Lewis and Sisak
2021). In Rhode Island, 30% of prison staff refused vaccination (Lewis and Sisak 2021).
In California, Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts, Oregon, and West Virginia, at least 40
percent of prison staff have elected not to receive a vaccine (Stagoff-Belfort, Rahman,
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and Chapman 2021). Correctional officers refused the vaccine for a variety of reasons:
they feared the effects of the immunization, the believed in conspiracy theories about the
vaccine, or they had distrust of the prison administration and their handling of the virus
(Lewis and Sisak 2021).
As correctional officers in state and federal prisons, their job is to monitor and
protect the people incarcerated within the facility. By refusing to get vaccinated, officers
downplayed the severity of the pandemic and the large numbers of outbreaks within
prisons (Tyagi and Manson 2021). Indeed, officers made the problem worse when they
could have played a large role in protecting and even saving inmate’s lives. This
indifference is a good example of Agamben’s theory of homo sacer in which those of the
bare life, in this case inmates incarcerated in US prisons, live a life that correctional staff-servants of the state--would let die. The incarcerated population was not seen as a
population worth protecting.
Prison staff refusals to get vaccinated also threatened the control of the
community outside of the prison. As mentioned throughout this dissertation, prisons are
hot spots for viruses and diseases like COVID-19. The overcrowded, unsanitary
conditions coupled with the fact that inmates are not free to leave allowed the virus to
spread like wildfire through facilities. When prison staff come and go between work at
the prison and home in the surrounding communities, they have the potential to carry the
virus both to the prison and back out into the community. Arguably, mass incarceration
make community spread worse by requiring the hiring of more staff to support large
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prison populations. The more staff interacting with prisoners, the more risk of spread to
the community, especially if staff are not getting vaccinated.
By June 2021, 114, 237 prison staff reported a positive COVID test and there
were 209 reported deaths related to COVID-19 among prison staff (The Marshall Project
2021). These numbers, however, may be underreported because only 13 states released
information on COVID-19 among prison staff, and for many of those states the count
only included employees who voluntarily reported a diagnosis (ibid 2021). Public health
and criminal justice experts say that the high level of cases, and deaths, among people
incarcerated could have been prevented if correctional institutions would take even the
most basic life-saving measures to protect them (Burkhalter et.al 2021).
On January 21, 2021 President Biden implemented an order that stood as in important
move in recognizing how social problems and inequalities in the United States
exacerbated the spread of COVID-19 among vulnerable populations. The Executive
Order on Ensuring Equitable Pandemic Response and Recovery called out underserved,
high-risk populations specifically and relied on a data- driven, expert engagement
approach to understanding the needs of those populations during a state of emergency.
This order was issued to address the disproportionate impact COVID-19 had on
communities of color and other underserved populations. The order recognizes the severe
and pervasive health and social inequalities in the US that were exacerbated during the
pandemic. The policy is written in a manner that specifically addresses the systemic and
structural racism that is prevalent in many facets of society in the United States. It
recognizes that “it is impossible to change the course of the pandemic without tackling it
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in the hardest-hit communities” (Biden 2021). But first, the hardest-hit communities had
to be identified. Biden’s policy demands a data-driven, expert engagement approach that
recognizes the lack of complete data, or data that is often obscured, which excludes
communities that are disproportionately affected by public health emergencies such as a
pandemic to include communities of color, sexual and gender minority groups, those
living with disabilities, and those living at the margins of our economy. Addressing the
devastating toll the pandemic had on communities of color and underserved populations
was the necessary step needed to begin to slow the spread of Covid-19 as these
populations are at a higher risk of exposure and hold less resources to get treated or for
self-care once infected (Jane Adams College of Social Work 2020). This policy directs a
governmental approach to address health equity.
An important element to this policy was the joint effort approach of the COVID-19
Health Equity Task Force. Members of this task force include federal governmental
officials from the Department of Health and Human Services and nonfederal members
from the community with expertise or lived experience relevant to the marginalized
groups who were suffering at disproportionate rates during the pandemic. The order
specifically identified different types of external engagement that may be utilized in
seeking alternative viewpoints which includes “those with lived experience with
homelessness, incarceration, discrimination, and other relevant issues” (Biden 2021).
This brought a voice to those communities and allowed a platform for victims of deeprooted systemic violence to be heard and to find some refuge through acknowledgement
and, hopefully, reconciliation. The task force was implemented to provide
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recommendations to the President for mitigating the health inequities that were
exacerbated by the pandemic. This provided the opportunity for marginalized
communities to implement input to the needs that contribute to the health, safety, and
infrastructure of those communities.
The implementation of new task forces to recognize marginalized communities and
the inequalities they have faced in the United States supports my argument that the
COVID-19 pandemic could be a catalyst for a project on transitional justice. The
pandemic created a particular situation that forced the country to see the severity and
dangers of the harm caused by a long history of social inequalities in the United States.
The pandemic acted as a catalyst to force recognition and promote social change as the
only way to save the lives of hundreds of thousands of marginalized people often
overlooked in our country. Transitional justice offers a lens to view the historical levels
of systematic and institutional violence against marginalized populations in the United
States and reminds the nation of the vulnerability of these populations, especially those
who are now incarcerated as a result of this history.
On September 9, 2021 Biden signed the Executive Order on Requiring Coronavirus
Disease 2019 Vaccination for Federal Employees, that could have aided in protecting
inmates in federal prisons. This executive order follows the January 2021 order
prioritizing the reliance on the best available data and science-based public health
measures to slow the spread of COVID-19 and to prevent infection by new variants.
Much of the data from the CDC and Department of Health and Human Services suggests
the best way to slow the spread of the COVID-19 virus is to be vaccinated. Additionally,
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research from the FDA determined that the vaccines available for the public are safe and
effective. Therefore, President Biden determined that “to promote the health and safety of
the Federal workforce and the efficiency of the civil service,” COVID-19 vaccinations
should be required for all federal employees (Biden 2021). This policy specifically
addresses the populations with whom the Federal workforce interacts with, in this case,
people incarcerated in federally operated prisons. This order recognizes the role that the
federal government must play in serving and protecting the people, especially during a
state of emergency. During states of emergency, such as a global pandemic, there are a
lot of uncertainties that lead to fear and unrest. The government, which holds a leadership
role for the country, should take all measures to protect those who cannot protect
themselves.
Also on September 9, 2021, President Biden implemented Executive Order on
Ensuring Adequate COVID Safety Protocols for Federal Contractors. This order focuses
on the safety of federal employees and the safeguards that will decrease the spread of
COVID-19. It also specifics that the intention is to promote the economy and efficiency
of the workforce (Biden 2021). Safeguarding employees and decreasing the spread of
COVID-19 will “decrease worker absence, reduce labor costs, and improve the efficiency
of contractors and subcontractors at sites where they are performing work for the Federal
Government” (Biden 2021). Questioning the incentives behind laws and policy is
important to understanding the narrative of systematic and institutional state violence.
While people incarcerated in prisons in the United States may have inadvertently
benefited from orders from President Biden that included mask mandates, vaccine
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distributions and further safety protocols, the measures were not put into place to protect
them. To receive a small amount of protection as second-hand, that trickled down from
the population that was meant to be protected, does not erase the harmful position
inmates were placed, and kept, in throughout the pandemic. As I will discuss at more
length in the conclusion, the question remains whether justice is served when inmates
benefit from a policy that trickles down from the real people who are meant to be
protected.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
REDUCING COST OF COMMUNICATION AND MEDICAL COPAYMENTS
A topic often overlooked in the conversation of incarceration is the hidden costs
of being in prison. While it may be apparent that people in prison have sacrificed their
freedoms and liberties to pay for their alleged crime, there is an actual financial cost to
being incarcerated. Contrary to commonly held misconceptions, being held in a prison is
not free (Wu and Brady 2020). Inmates are given three meals a day and limited basic
personal hygiene items such as soap and toothpaste (Lockwood and Lewis 2019). All
other items must be purchased from the prison commissary. People incarcerated can buy
food, clothes, hygiene items, or other necessities when the basic needs covered by
authorities run out. In most prisons, incarcerated people spend the most amount of money
on food and hygiene products (Raher 2018).
In the United States, we take the poorest people in society and incarcerate them
under lengthy prison terms, and then charge them to be incarcerated without providing
them the option to make enough money to cover that cost. During the COVID-19
pandemic many inmates continued to work and—regardless of the hazards of contracting
the COVID-19 virus while working alongside other inmates—were paid little to nothing.
By law, incarcerated people do not have to be paid and some states do not pay most
inmates for the work they perform in prison (Benns 2015). In most states, however,
inmates in prison earn between 12-14 cents per hour (Federal Bureau of Prisons 2022).
The money earned from work does not go straight to the pockets of inmates, but rather a
portion is garnished for their financial obligations such as court-ordered fines, restitution,
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child support or other fees (Wu and Brady 2020). This left little for inmates to spend on
commissary.
But commissary is not the only form of financial exploitation of incarcerated
people. For decades, inmates have been faced with hefty fees to communicate with
people outside of the prison and to access medical services (Reutter 2020; Pitcher 2020.
With little funds left to afford necessities, the financial burden often falls on the family.
Therefore, these payments came to light during COVID-19 because the need to pay these
fees were exacerbated, as this chapter highlights. As COVID-19 began to spread through
the United States, prisons across the country began to suspend visitation, increasing
inmate’s use of phone calls to stay in contact with people on the outside (Wu and Brady
2020). Further, as COVID-19 started making its way through prisons across the country
and more inmates became sick, the long-standing medical copayments to be seen by a
medical professional had to be addressed (Pitcher 2020). While medical copayment rates
are set by each state, most fell within the range of $2-$8 per visit (Pitcher 2020). Like
communication costs, COVID-19 exacerbated the amount of doctor visits needed,
therefore bringing to light the cost of medical treatment for inmates (see Figure 8.1 for a
timeline relevant to communication costs and medical copayment policies).
The high cost of communication and medical care in prison is not a new problem
but is a problem that grew in both severity and attention during COVID-19.
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Figure 8.1 shows a timeline relevant to communication costs and medical copayment
policies as it reflects my thematic analysis and process tracing.
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COVID-19 synced communication costs and medical copayment together as
increased usage of these services—and the cost associated with them—came from the
same source. Both became essential during the pandemic, and both typically fell on
family members to carry the financial burden. In both instances, the use of these services
were exacerbated during the pandemic, making communication costs and medical
copayment important to this dissertation. In this chapter, I discuss the financial
exploitation of communication costs and medical copayments in federal and state prisons
that were illuminated during the COVID-19 pandemic. I begin by discussing
communication costs in federal and state prisons to include a history of the fees and the
policies used in attempt to regulate the fees. I then discuss medical copayments in prison,
also to include a history of the fees and the policies around their application. I then tie the
two together in one discussion of the ways in which the COVID-19 exacerbated and shed
light on the high costs of being incarcerated.
Communication Costs
Prior to the 1970s, people incarcerated in state and federal prisons could make
only one collect call every three months. This remained policy until the Bureau of Prisons
expanded telephone access that would allow community contact while also allowing
prison staff to monitor calls for security concerns (Jackson 2005). Until 1984, AT&T
remained in control of the telecommunication market in prisons, setting the rates for
collect calling. The 1984 Consent Decree brought changes to the telecommunications
market across the United States, including the prison market, leaving the prison phone
sector up for grabs (Jackson 2005). For years following, competition rose among
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differing third-party companies. States could choose which companies they would
contract with to offer local and long-distance communication options for inmates.
Prisons contract with companies to buy phone equipment and set call rates,
lending to fees for calls to and from the facility, making prison telecommunication a $1.4
billion industry (Ness 2021). Securus Technologies and Global Tel Link are the two main
companies that dominate the prison telecommunications industry. These two companies
have a large say in the cost of phone calls made by incarcerated people. Securus serves
more than 3,400 facilities and Global Tel Link serves over 2,400 (Pipia 2019). States can
enter contracts with the telecommunication companies and set their own prices, allowing
states to earn a commission off the revenue made from inmate calling services (Pipia
2019). For example, the state of Washington contracted with Global Tech Link and
pocketed 56 percent of the intrastate revenue, which equaled $3.8 million in 2017 (Pipia
2019).
The average cost for a 15-minute call from prison costs $5.74, while some prisons
charge as much as a dollar or more per minute (Heuvel 2021). This does not include the
hidden user fees that increase the overall cost. In an interview with a woman in federal
prison, PEW highlighted that one or two calls per week from a federal prison would cost
a family around $200 each month (Ness 2021). A 2015 study found that nearly 2 in 3
families, or 65%, with an incarcerated member were unable to meet their family’s basic
needs, 48% struggled with food insecurity, and 48% had trouble with basic housing needs
(deVuono-powell, Schweidler, Walters, and Zohrabi 2015). In another case, a mother of
an incarcerated person spent $120 in two weeks to speak to her son (Pipia 2019). While
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paying fees, supporting loved ones financially while incarcerated by putting money on
commissary and paying the communication costs, many families also lost the income of
the family member who is now incarcerated.
Because one-third of the prison population is Black, the high costs of
communication further widen the racial wealth gap in the United States (Chann and Lin
2021). One study found that 1 in 3 families went into debt to cover phone and visitations
costs to maintain contact with their family member while incarcerated. (deVuono-Power
et. al 2015).
In 1934, The Communications Act of 1934 was introduced as a way to organize
federal regulations of telephone, telegraph, and radio communications (Bureau of Justice
Assistance 2022). The Act created the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to
stand as the primary overseer and regulator of the telecommunications industry. The
FCC, which oversees the prison communications industry, has made efforts to limit high
costs of phone use. However, these efforts only address interstate and international phone
calls (Federal Communications Commission 2022). Prior to the Trump administration,
the FCC attempted to set new capped rates on interstate calls in 2013, and new capped
laws for intrastate calls in 2014 (Pipia 2019). Under the Trump administration and FCC
Chairman Ajit Pai, the FCC removed the authority to set price caps on intrastate calls,
which are most phone calls being made from inmates (Pipia 2019).
At the time of this dissertation, interstate calls are still capped at 21 cents per
minute for prepaid calls and 25 cents for collect calls (Chan and Lin 2021; Federal
Communications Commission 2022). However, these caps only applied to calls being
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regulated at the federal level. Eighty percent of all calls are in-state calls, which are not
regulated by the FCC or by these capped guidelines (Chan and Lin 2021). Further,
providers can charge additional fees for automated payments, to speak to a live agent, or
for paper bills and statements (Pipia 2019). However, US Senator Tammy Duckworth
and other senators introduced a bill which called for “just and reasonable charges” which
brought into question both intra and interstate fees (Pipia 2019). This bill, The Martha
Wright-Reed Just and Reasonable Communications Act of 2021, amended the
Communications Act of 1934 to extend authority to the FCC to address inmate calling
rates in all correctional and detention facilities (117th Congress 2021). At the time of this
writing, the bill is still in committee.
To prevent the spread of COVID-19 through prisons, some state policymakers did
not see social distancing as an option, so focus was placed on preventing the virus from
entering the prison rather than preparing to handle outbreaks once inside. (Pavlo 2021).
Unfortunately, for many inmates this came at the high cost of seeing or even speaking to
their loved ones. Many state and federal prison halted family visitations (Barr 2020). This
left phone calls as the only way many inmates could remain in touch with their families,
suggesting that the problem of high cost for telecommunications was exacerbated during
COVID-19 (Heuvel 2021). It wasn’t until visitation was suspended that some people
realized how much it cost for people in prison to remain in contact with those on the
outside (Ness 2021).
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Medical Copayments
Communication fees were not the only financial burden for people incarcerated in
the US prison system that was brought to light during the COVID-19 pandemic. The
pandemic illuminated several injustices within the criminal justice system, particularly
centered around medical treatment for inmates while incarcerated. Many people find it
increasingly difficult to seek adequate medical care while incarcerated, either because
high copayments are used to deter inmates from seeking care unless really needed, or
because resources within the facility are limited and subpar. Medical copayments, like
communication costs, is not a new problem faced by inmates across the nation but is a
problem that is exacerbated by the onset of a pandemic (Pitcher 2020).
Prior to the 1970s, medical care was not readily available to inmates and the
quality of healthcare they did receive was “appallingly negligent and even brutal at
worst” (McDonald 1999, 427). Prisons were often left to operate on their own, isolated
from the resources of the surrounding communities. They operated as their own selfcontained world, a world where healthcare wasn’t delivered regularly, and when provided
it was by people with little to no medical training (McDonald 1999). As federal courts
began to investigate the conditions of prison life, prisoner’s legal rights to medical care
were established and extended (Boston and Manville 1996). In the 1970s, federal courts
began to implement court decisions that bridged the gap between prisons and the
organized medical profession, making it so inmates were no longer provided second-class
medical care (McDonald 1999). This brought the development of health care standards to
correctional institutions across the United States. The American Public Health
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Association (1976), American Medical Association (1979), American Correctional
Association (1981), and National Commission on Correctional Health Care (1987) each
created new standards for level of care.
The development of these new health care standards came at a time when
incarceration rates were dramatically rising across the nation. These standards were
developed during the same time as the implementation of policy initiatives of the war on
drugs. Beginning in 1971, the use of imprisonment became the instrument of choice to
combat illegal drug use. In 1973, there were 204,200 inmates in state and federal prisons,
and by the end of 1997 there were over 1,244,600 (McDonald 1999). The war on drugs
brought a disproportionately large number of peoples from marginalized, poor
communities of color that were already at a higher risk of health concerns.
Additionally, the establishment of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act in 1984
and the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 imposed mandatory minimum sentences and
eliminated federal parole options for drug-related charges resulted in growing numbers of
older prisoners serving longer sentences. Like elderly people in society in general, these
inmates often required a disproportionately large share of healthcare resources
(McDonald 1999). As the number of peoples incarcerated in state and federal prisons
continued to rise, demands and pressure on the health care systems within prisons rose
with it. Incarcerated peoples are the only population in the United States who have a
“constitutionally protected right to health care, and the courts show no sign of
extinguishing the right to health care, even if they are often hostile to prisoners’
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assertions of those rights” (McDonald 1999: 430). The right to health care is upheld in
prison, but it can be expensive to inmates and their families.
The rise in the need for adequate health care services came at a cost. According to
the U.S. Department of Labor (1996; 1998), the cost of medical services throughout the
United States began to rise at rapid speed through the 1980s. Following this inflation,
prison administrators developed care practices used by health care insurers and providers
in the larger society to control spending. This included medical copayments and more
explicit limits on services provided (McDonald 1995; 1999; LIS, Inc. 1997). As mass
incarceration continued to rise, a corresponding surge in the cost to house and care for the
rising population forced larger state budgets to support the criminal justice system. User
fees, such as co-pays are intended solely for revenue and shift the costs of incarceration
from the government to the convicted (Wiggens 259).
In most state and federal prisons, incarcerated people pay medical co-pays for
visits, medications, dental treatment, or other health care services. Medical copayments in
prison can be between $2-5. People incarcerated typically earn 14 to 63 cents per hour.
Therefore, although this copayment that may seem low, it is astronomically high when
compared to what people pay outside of prison (Sawyer 2017). In West Virginia, one
visit to a doctor would cost a month’s pay for an incarcerated person, which, when
compared to someone earning state minimum wage, is equivalent to $1,093 outside of
prison. In Michigan, a single visit would be equivalent to $300 outside of prison, and in
14 other states charges for medical co-pay were equivalent to charging minimum wage
workers more than $200 per visit (Sawyer 2017, 2). Sawyer (2017) continues to point out
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that some states, such as Texas, take a more extreme approach that implements a flat
$100 yearly health service fee. Imposing steep medical copayments is endangering the
physical and mental health of incarcerated people, “all in the name of cost cutting and
prisoner control” (Wiggens 2021, 258).
While many inmates in state and federal prisons work, they receive minimal
payment, leaving funds for medical care, whether an annual service fee or a copayment
for visits for medications, to fall on the pockets of family or friends of incarcerated
people on the outside. In one account, an inmate worked two jobs within the prison for
forty cents per hour, which was double the starting rate for prison workers. This inmate
would have to work twelve and a half hours to afford one medical copayment (Wiggens
2021). People outside of the jail can upload funds to a commissary account, which is an
account that holds an inmate’s funds which are used to pay for “toiletries, extra clothing,
food, stationary, stamps, over-the-counter medication, and any other essentials or
incidentals an inmate might need” (Wiggins 2021, 256). It is important to note that
people incarcerated often come from low-class backgrounds, making it difficult for
families to support their incarcerated loved one financially.
Being charged per medical visit with limited financial resources disincentivized
inmates from requesting unnecessary care abusing sick calls, thus reducing the demand
for services. In a 2012 survey, 70% of the men incarcerated in a maximum-security
prison on the east coast avoided medical services at least once during a three-month
period due to the high copayment (Wyant and Harner 2018). These copayments are not
only harmful to the health and well-being of the inmate, but the health of the entire
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incarcerated population, staff, and the public (Sawyer 2017). This is especially important
to a discussion on the spread of virus and disease such as COVID-19.
The access to and high cost of adequate medical treatment within US prisons has
been debated since at least the 1970s and grew in importance through the war on drugs
era. The social and political changes brought by the war on drugs also prompted changes
in communication costs for incarcerated people. There have been many changes in the
telecommunication industry in US prisons since the mid-1980s (Jackson 2005).
Following the economic crises, social unrest, and urban disturbances of the 1960s and
1970s the implementation of the federal law and policy changes during the war on drugs
brought a rapid increase in the national rate of incarceration. With a rise in the price to
construct new prisons and the price to keep inmates incarcerated came for the increase in
fees from the inmates and their families. With the quick spread of COVID-19 in early
2020, policy makers and administrators were forced to make decisions to make policy
changes centered around the medical resources for incarcerated people.
COVID-19
As cases of COVID-19 infected people continued to rise across the US, with a
disproportionately high number within prisons and jails, facilities were forced to change
the way they operate (Jenkins, 2020). With limited space to allow social distancing to
each inmate and limited healthcare resources, especially when the country’s medical
resources are already strained, officials stopped in-person visitation to prevent new
COVID-19 cases from entering the facility. This change highlighted the ways in which
fees led to more harmful, more dangerous conditions for inmates. Many inmates had to
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choose between hygiene products, healthcare, or communication as each came at a high
price.
Early in the pandemic—March 2020—the Prison Policy Initiative started
collecting data and reporting conditions within prisons and jails in the United States and
compiling it in their project, COVID-19 Behind Bars (Prison Policy Initiative 2022).
Prison Policy Initiative is a non-profit that strives to produce research to expose harms of
mass criminalization. In March 2020, they recommended five ways the criminal justice
system could slow the spread of the pandemic. Two of the recommendations directly
addressed the high costs of communication and medical care. First, the criminal justice
system must make correctional healthcare humane as to protect health and human dignity
by not only providing basic healthcare needs while incarcerated, but to eliminate medical
copays “that deter people from seeking healthcare in prison” (Wagner and Widra, 2020).
Secondly, the criminal justice system must make this time (during the pandemic) less
stressful than necessary for families by providing unlimited, free phone calls, video calls,
and emails to allow families to maintain contact throughout the pandemic (Wagner and
Widra 2020). Face-to-Face visitation was suspended in facilities across the country,
limiting inmate’s contact with family and friends. Phone, video calls, and emails became
the only means for contact, which became unaffordable for many (Wagner and Widra
2020; Chan and Lin 2021).
Being able to keep in touch with family to assure themselves that they are safe
from the pandemic will reduce the already high levels of stress and anxiety for inmates
(Wagner and Widra 2020). The coronavirus pandemic “has increased the desire for
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communication to ensure the well-being” of a family member who is imprisoned,
especially after visitation was stopped (Reutter 2020). On April 14, 2020 the Bureau of
Prisons announced that inmates in federal facilities would be allowed to make video and
phone calls free of charge (Barr 2020). Further, the monthly call limit for federal inmates
increased to 500 minutes. This includes 122 prisons. This change came under the
provisions of the CARES Act, which is set to expire 30 days after the president ends the
national state of emergency for COVID-19. In June 2021, over a year into the pandemic,
Connecticut became the first state to make calls from prisons free (Ness 2021).
Still, only a few prisons have made an effort to supplement the loss of visitation by
waiving or reducing communication fees and by March 2022, most agencies—including
the BOP—returned to the prior high costs of communication (Prison Policy Initiative
2022).
In addition to changes in communication costs, some states implemented hygiene
policies that would offer soap to inmates for free and waived medical copays for inmates
who reported cold and flu symptoms (Jenkins 2020). Prior to the pandemic, officials
justified high costs for medical treatment by suggesting that they wanted to “discourage
prisoners from abusing the medical system or stretching staff too thin” (Pitcher 2020).
However, with the onset of COVID-19 and the rapid spread through prisons, officials
were forced to decide if that was a risk to take and to eliminate or reduce copayments. To
reduce the spread of COVID-19, some states waived all copays while other suspended
fees “only for those exhibiting coronavirus symptoms” (Pitcher 2020). This is
problematic because as the pandemic unfolded and health officials learned more about
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the virus, known symptoms often changed and some infected persons experienced no
symptoms at all. Therefore, many inmates could have been infected, spreading the virus
through the prison, without being diagnosed. While the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention estimated that nearly 40 percent of COVID-19 cases do not present
symptoms, in “correctional facilities, where social distancing and sanitation measures are
not always enforced,” that percentage can be much higher.
According to research by Prison Policy Initiative, twenty-eight states modified
their policies during the beginning months of the pandemic. However, the BOP did not
modify copay policies until March 2021, a year into the pandemic. Eventually, all but the
state of Nevada made temporary changes to their medical policies (Herring 2022)., but of
the states that do charge medical copays as normal practice, only 10 completely
suspended fees during the pandemic. It wasn’t long, though, before prisons began to go
back to normal operation and the waived fees and policy initiatives to reduce medical
costs expired. The suspended copayments set by the BOP only covered COVID-19
related care, and it was in place for only three months before the BOP expired the waiver
(Herring 2022). Essentially, state and federal prisons were doing the bare minimum to
protect incarcerated people during the COVID-19 pandemic.
The excessive, almost impossible, fees to maintain communication with loved
ones or to see a medical professional for a health concern show how the lives of
incarcerated people are often taken advantage of. High costs for life lends to a description
of the bare life, or the life of the homo sacer, that is deprived of rights and deprived of
protection. Those who have power, in this case prison administration, define who is
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included and who is excluded as worthy human beings. The US capitalist society has
monopolized on the lives of such second-class citizens. The structural and institutional
violence against incarcerated people in the form of astronomical fees to cover necessities
that people on the outside often take for granted, is not a new problem.
Transitional Justice
For decades the state has utilized the American criminal justice system as a tool to
systematically remove large portions of marginalized groups from society by placing
them behind bars and stripping them of political rights and existence. While it has been
known that living conditions within prisons have historically been unsanitary and
dangerous, COVID-19 brought to light the second-class treatment of inmates through
limited resources for medical treatment and, for some, the inability to maintain contact
with people outside of the prison. Furthermore, the pandemic showed how families of
incarcerated peoples were also being punished by allowing them to foot the bill for
contact and medical care. Rather than provide necessary care to inmates that they had
incarcerated, the state continued the cycles of harm on marginalized communities by
increasing financial burdens for those already facing poverty.
Excessive fees for communication and medical co-pays have been a hurdle for
poor, marginalized populations incarcerated and their families for decades. Medical
copayments were called into question during infectious disease outbreaks before,
specifically between 2001-2003 with the spread of the bacterial infection, MRSA (Pitcher
2020). In the case of COVID-19, it took a global pandemic to create a platform for
change. It took a global pandemic to offer alternative ways to view justice within the
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American criminal justice system. The virus paved the way for transitional justice by
offering a form of truth seeking that stood outside of traditional truth commissions often
implemented during or following state violence. Lobbyists and officials involved in the
shift to free or reduced fines for communication and medical care “credit the pandemic
and widespread racial injustice protests in 2020” that brought light to how inequitable
things really are (Ness 2021). It became clear that the burden of providing security for
mental and physical health is often placed on the pockets of families of incarcerated
peoples.
While response by federal and state prison administration was reactive, not
proactive, it was still a response. However, the lack of preparedness and urgency to
respond to the rapid speeds of transmission was a systematic form of violence by the state
that jeopardized, and in some cases took, the lives of inmates across the nation. Neither
former president Donald Trump nor President Joe Biden addressed the concern of
communication fees or medical copayments during the COVID-19 pandemic. Neither
made direct orders to protect those incarcerated during the pandemic.
In his first week of office, President Biden scaled back the use of private prisons
with Executive Order on Reforming Our Incarceration System to Eliminate the Use of
Privately Operated Criminal Detention Facilities. In this order, signed into place January
26, 2021, Biden points out that mass incarceration imposes significant costs on
communities, and to decrease incarceration levels we must first reduce profit-based
incentives (Biden 2021). To ensure that incarceration prioritizes rehabilitation and
redemption, goals that many privately operated, for-profit correctional facilities are not
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prioritizing. Bidens states that “we should ensure that time in prison prepares individuals
for the next chapter of their lives.” (Biden 2020 p. 2). According to the ACLU, “this is an
important first step in decreasing dependence upon the private prison system,” but there
is a loophole (Vukovich 2021). The language in this order limits the populations it
covers, such as those without legal documentation. This allows private prisons to still
hold certain federal and US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) inmates.
Therefore, the cost is still harming marginalized communities.
Taking a transitional justice approach to evaluating the predatory pricing of
communication and healthcare in prison that became apparent during the COVID-19
pandemic allows for an investigation of the social structures and institutions rooted in
racism and inequality that has led to mass incarceration and the treatment of the 2.2
million people incarcerated in the United States. Transitional justice offers tools to
critique impunity, to suggest restoration, and to offer redress. Reducing communication
fees or medical copayments—either permanently or temporarily—offered some
restoration to inmates and families during a time that was isolating, scary, and even
deadly for everyone globally. These changes offered a possibility for social and political
changes within the United States that could change the narrative of the treatment of
inmates within state and federal prisons. Furthermore, these changes could offer ways to
bridge the lives of people incarcerated and the outside community to make it easier for
incarcerated people to transition back into society and reduce recidivism rates. Fair, just,
and humane treatment of people incarcerated in US prisons and compensation for past
wrongdoings takes more than simply changing laws or regulations. A transitional justice
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approach could create a platform to open an investigation that aids in highlighting the
systematic and structural harms and state violence that drives the mistreatment of
inmates.
By reducing the amount of money inmates and family spend on communication
fees and medical copayments, the small amount of income prison workers makes and the
money that the families on the outside save could be used to transition the inmate upon
release. Often, inmates are released from prison with only the clothes they entered the
facility with. While some states provide newly released peoples with a small amount of
money, it is insufficient. For example, California gives released inmates $200, the same
as it was in 1973 (O’Bannon 2021). With inflation, that would equal around $1,200
which still would not go far for a person who has nothing. The additional resources saved
from communication fees and medical copays could aid in finding housing, new clothes,
job training, transportation, etc. By addressing and acknowledging the continuous cycles
of harm perpetrated by the criminal justice system, the goal of transitional justice, the
state could begin to imagine pathways to compensation and better treatment.
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CHAPTER NINE
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The United States has been impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic in ways that
reflect past and ongoing social injustices and inequalities related to public health. While
the virus was labeled “the great equalizer” that impacted all people, that commonality
masked the “underlying social and economic inequalities that make some populations
more vulnerable to the disease than others” (Jane Addams College of Social Work 2020).
COVID-19 magnified the preexisting lack of equity for vulnerable populations in terms
of access to healthcare and structural policies to ensure health and wellness (Barsky,
Kung, and Jimenez). I argue that the COVID-19 crisis has not only exposed the sheer
number of human rights violations perpetrated by the US government against minorities
and marginalized groups but has also exacerbated state crimes of structural violence and
negligence.
It is within this violence and negligence that I raised the three main research
questions explored throughout this dissertation. First, I investigated the COVID-19
policies implemented during the last year of former president Trump’s administration that
related to incarcerated people and questioned the extent to which these policies and their
impact constituted forms of state violence. I found that while policies were implemented
during the Trump administration, such as the CARES Act authorizing the Federal Bureau
of Prisons (BOP) to release more people on home confinement and to increase the time
people can spend on home confinement, the hesitation to respond to the spread of the
virus promptly was harmful, even deadly, to many vulnerable people incarcerated in
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prisons across the country (Prison Policy Initiative 2022; Wildra 2022). This hesitation to
enforce policy change took the lives of thousands of inmates across the United States,
even though there was scientific evidence and recommendations on COVID-19 that
suggested the need to implement such changes (Barnert, Kwan, and Williams 2021; CDC
2020; CDC 2021).
Secondly, I investigated the COVID-19 policies implemented under President
Biden’s administration related to incarcerated people, measured the impact of these
policies, and questioned the extent to which these policies and their impact constituted
forms of state violence. Unlike former President Trump, President Biden took office a
year after the pandemic had begun. This placed his administration in a different position
than the Trump administration in that home confinement policy had already begun being
implemented, vaccines were already being distributed, and fees within prisons such as
medical copayments and telecommunication costs were already being investigated.
However, the pandemic was still spreading across the nation and the state of emergency
was still in place when President Biden took office. Therefore, the new administration
had immediate decisions to make regarding the public health of the nation. The Biden
administration had the opportunity to change or remove policy to aid marginalized groups
of people, in this case those incarcerated.
I found that, like the Trump administration, the Biden administration
demonstrated hesitancy in responding to the rapid spread of COVID through US prisons.
During the first several months in office, the Biden administration did not make any
definite decisions about the plan for people placed on home confinement under Trump’s

148

CARES Act. It was unclear if people would be able to stay at home, or if returning to
prison would be mandatory. This demonstrated another level of state violence as it left
thousands of people in limbo, uncertain of whether they would be forced back to prison
and, if so, when. This uncertainty lasted nearly eight months. Eight months is a long time
to not know whether or not you will be sent back to prison.
The lack of direct care and protection for incarcerated people was also apparent
during the vaccine rollout plan implemented by the Biden administration. As President
Biden planned to vaccinate as many Americans as possible, people incarcerated in
prisons were not specifically addressed nor did they take precedent for vaccination
despite being contained in an area that was high-risk or contracting the virus. This form
of violence by the state occurred on two levels. First, when President Biden implemented
the Executive Order on Improving and Expanding Access to Care and Treatment for
COVID-19, the order specifies facilities such as nursing homes, assisted living,
intermediate care for people with disabilities, and residential treatment facilities, but not
prisons (Biden 2021). This pushes the narrative that prisons are not considered a care
facility, despite being a total institution, therefore prisons do not take high priority for
care or vaccine distribution. Secondly, the vaccine rollout plan was delegated to the state
level; it was up to each state to decide in which phases people would be eligible to
receive the COVID-19 vaccine. Only ten states placed incarcerated people in the first
phase of vaccine distribution while eight states did not include incarcerated people in the
plan for vaccine distribution at all (Prison Policy Initiative 2022).
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Lastly, I questioned the impact of presidential administration on COVID-19
policies. Overall, I did find that during times of emergency, such as the COVID-19
pandemic, presidential administrations do have a significant impact. Much of this
dissertation explores the uncoordinated response by the federal and state governments,
lending to unequal and disproportionate outcomes across the United States. Coordinated
federal response efforts can be impacted by orders coming from the top down. For
example, former president Trump implemented the Executive Order on Ensuring
Democratic Accountability in Agency Rulemaking, which regulated who can make
federal rules and regulations (Trump 2020). The order meant that regulations would have
to conform to Trump’s agenda, which is problematic as it protects the administration in
pushing a single agenda, regardless of the views or needs of career employees. The
attitudes and beliefs that people placed in political power hold can impact the narrative
that is being pushed through the country, driving political and legal decision making.
Therefore, who is in power matters. For example, at the end of 2020 during the vaccine
rollout campaigns, Colorado Governor Jared Polis stated to reporters that “there’s no way
it’s going to go to prisoners…before it goes to the people who haven’t committed any
crime” (Schwartzapfel, Park, and Demillo 2020). Statements such as this support my
argument that these public attitudes towards incarcerated people could have driven the
response to COVID-19.
In comparing the transition from the Trump administration to the Biden
administration, the policies reflected continuity. One of the main takeaways from this
dissertation was the notion that policy and decision makers acted as if the problems
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brought by the COVID-19 pandemic were new. However, looking at the history of
federal and state prisons this was far from true. This was not the first time that deadly
virus or disease spread through facilities, and this was not the first time the government
fell short in their response efforts to protect the lives of those incarcerated. For this, it did
not come to a surprise that no change occurred across presidential administrations. This
alludes to the notion of American Exceptionalism and the idea that we, as a country,
seem to be especially attached to Agamben’s theory of homo sacer. There is an
indifference to life and death that foundationally structures the American society,
especially as life and death relates to marginalized populations. The fact that we are the
only developed nation without a national health care access plan suggests that we support
Agamben’s theory that some people don’t deserve to live, or that it is justifiable to let
some people die. This notion is extended to inmates.
In her discussion on torture during war on terror, Rowen discusses problems with
taking a transitional justice approach. She states “whereas actors in other countries were
able to use the ambiguity of the concept of a truth commission, particularly with regard to
judicial accountability, to their advantage, that same ambiguity was a liability in the
United States, as individuals who were unfamiliar with truth commissions were worried
that promoting one was promoting amnesty, or that calling for a truth commission would
make an implicit comparison between the United States and places where truth
commissions had been created for much more extreme violence” (Rowen 2017:125). She
argues that for many US. advocates, the idea was not only a foreign idea, but something
that was developed for people and places where ‘real justice’ i.e., criminal justice, is not
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possible. This idea taps into the American Exceptionalism ideology, while ignoring the
flaws in the US. criminal justice and judicial system. The arguments for why transitional
justice may not work in the United States are shallow because the underlying problem is
that the United States is not willing to try. The United States is not willing to admit to
flaws, not willing to critique institutions, and not willing to take chances that will make
our government look as vulnerable as other countries. The United States would rather
maintain the status quo through American Exceptionalism.
As previously mentioned in this dissertation, the United States has restrained from
ratifying human rights related treaties presented by the International Criminal Court
(ICC)—one of the strongest international forces that could hold the power to investigate
and prosecute state violence—that are designed to hold states accountable for providing
basic civil, political, economic, and social and cultural rights to all people. Because the
United States has not signed and ratified the treaty, the violence perpetrated by the
government is not addressed, allowing the government to create its own legitimacy of
violence. To take this a step further, Congress passed the American Servicemembers’
Protection Act of 2001 that legally prohibits US cooperation with the ICC, ensuring that
the United States does not fall within the jurisdiction of the ICC and cannot be
investigated and/or held accountable for violence it commits. The resistance to signing
onto human rights treaties and the like suggests the possibility that nothing is likely to
change in US politics and governance of marginalized populations, particularly
incarcerated populations.
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These questions of administration led to the larger question of whether COVID19 could offer a platform for social change. To answer this, I also had to raise the
question of whether the structure of the American government impacts response and
outcomes during a state of emergency such as a global pandemic. Understanding first
how the United States is governed, especially during the COVID-19 response efforts, led
to a more defined narrative of how law and policy function in the country, and, thus, how
law and policy are used as tools of state violence. By separating the US prison system
into multiple jurisdictions that are operated by different levels of government, the federal
government was able to take a more hands-off approach to responding to the COVID-19
pandemic’s impact on prisoners. Further, this separation of powers decentralized public
health, leading to the idea that there was not a need for a national plan in response to
outbreaks within prisons. This understanding laid the foundation on which questions of
alternative forms of justice could be raised to find possibilities in centralizing the health
of people incarcerated in US prisons within the US public health narrative.
I conclude by suggesting that the COVID-19 pandemic can be the catalyst to have
a transitional justice project related to mass incarceration. COVID-19 exemplified the
many ways in which the social structures and institutions rooted in racism and inequality
has led to mass incarceration and the mistreatment of the 2.2 million people incarcerated
in the United States. Transitional justice offers tools to critique impunity, suggest
restoration, and offer redress to the communities impacted the most by harsh policies that
increased policing practices and long prison terms. To draw together presidential power,
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homo sacer, and the need for transitional justice, I conclude this dissertation by reflecting
on the role of the carceral state.
The carceral state’s connection to neoliberalism reiterates ways in which the
production of surplus life is braided within the organization of the carceral space. The
precarious life aides in determining who we define as a criminal, as punishable, and
whose life is of more value. Through this dissertation, I investigated the lives of
incarcerated peoples through the theoretical lens of the homo sacer and the state of
exception. Identifying this population as homo sacer and as the exception through a
global pandemic offers a new theoretical understanding of the severity of harm enacted
on incarcerated people—and the communities in which they come from—by the state. A
discussion of the carceral state in junction to this dissertation offers another link to the
bridge that connects life inside the prison and life outside. This same bridge carried the
detrimental impacts of COVID-19 on marginalized populations—both inside and outside
the prison walls—across the United States.
The Carceral State and Carceral Citizenship
Legal discourse is often used as a tool to further promote distributional
inequalities while hiding behind the façade of upholding justice (Delgado and Stefancic
2016; 2017). Popular perceptions of justice in the United States have historically been
rooted in the misconceptions of the criminal justice system and the false reliance on the
rule of law. These misconceptions lie in the understanding of the role of the criminal
justice system and whether punitive responses to crime is indeed serving justice. Such
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perceptions are reinforcing acts of state harm perpetrated against marginalized groups, in
the name of serving justice or laying down the law.
Marginalized populations in the United States are often viewed as undesirable, as
disposable. The power of the prison industrial complex is rooted deeply in our country’s
economic history and attempts at developing a wealthy, industrialized society.
In the 19th century, development was understood philosophically as improving
mankind. However, this is an elite interpretation. Elites formulated government
policy to manage the social transformations attending the rise of capitalism and
industrial technologies, so development was identified with both industrialization
and the regulation of its distributive social impacts. (McMichael, 2017:2)
Not only does development introduce new class and racial hierarchies but offers a
platform for the state to define productive and unproductive, or disposable or nondisposable groups of people in society. The word “development” was used as the generic
term for the many different practices designed to increase well-being and “allowed the
conditions under which the desired process could unfold to be postulated” (Rist 2014:
25). Rist (2014) metaphorically describes development as similar to the growth of a plant.
In order to grow, a plant must avoid frost, be able to count on the sun and be free from
any undesirable vegetation nearby, but the fact remains that the plant will develop
spontaneously in accordance with well-established rules—warmth, sun, and space. It is in
established rules—or laws-- that we see change. It is in established laws that we keep
marginalized populations marginalized, to allow for a society to grow without
interference. And just like the unwanted weeds in a garden, for growth—so the state
believes—we must remove the undesirables. The carceral polices the growth and
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development of our society. Therefore, the carceral “both manages life and makes that
life disposable” (Story 2019:7).
The carceral produces and manages social disposability in late-capitalist America.
It allows us to make connections between people and their struggles, the restructuring of
urban spaces to increase surveillance, and the shifts in policing throughout history that
have targeted specific populations such as broken-windows and quality-of-life policing.
Once these populations are involved in the American criminal justice system, they
become trapped in a cycle of constant crisis. This crisis manifests in everyday existence,
whether incarcerated or not, leading to the slow death of marginalized groups. Wang’s
2018 carceral capitalism arguments shows how this cycle continues by questioning
whether prisons will survive government fiscal crises that are unfolding around the
country (38). As there is an increase in private prisons, there is also a decrease in prison
populations in some states. However, there remains higher rates of private surveillance
such as probation, drug courts, reentry programs, tracking devices, etc. It may be possible
to imagine a future where the prison as a physical structure is superseded by total
surveillance without physical confinement, but there may always be forms of surveillance
and policing keeping marginalized populations confined.
Whether ever incarcerated in the physical confines of prison or jail, or even
involved in the criminal justice system, the carceral is a part of each of our lives daily.
Policing and surveillance occur in all facets including education, healthcare, the foster
care system, the workforce, etc. The carceral helps differentiate what makes divisions in
populations, in capitalism which homogenizes and introduces difference. When
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discussing the prison industrial complex, Gilmore and Gilmore (2007) state that what is
important is “the transformation of relationships between and among the elements that
make up the [Prison Industrial Complex] PIC , producing and projecting into the
unforeseeable future a set of dependencies—in the form of domestic militarism—that
rely on harming individuals and communities in the name of safety” (151). As long as the
system can control the narrative of safety for the continuance of surveillance and
policing, the carceral can continue to operate. In an interview with Ruth Gilmore on the
Laura Flanders Show, Gilmore explains that prisons are more prevalent in societies
where inequality is deep and where capital holds a big stick. For this, prisons—whether
physical or metaphorical—will remain a driving force of the day-to-day lives of
marginalized Americans and the carceral state will maintain its meaning.
While the carceral state targets marginalized groups of people, the same carceral
logics are running social welfare and social services. To get social benefits in the United
States, you must get involved with the carceral state, with the institutions the carceral
controls. Again, we see how law regulates daily life. Loyd (2011) suggests that
“confinement, in turn, effectively becomes the mark of criminality, regardless of criminal
conviction” (12). Conviction, therefore, is not necessary to grant carceral citizenship—a
citizenship status experienced by populations targeted by the prison industrial complex
based on race, gender, and class. The construction of a population deemed necessary for
mass surveillance is enough.
Individual sovereignty is forfeited and replaced with new forms of governance
once defined as a carceral citizen. Carceral citizenship “is produced by crime control
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practices born in the era of mass incarceration and its community analog, mass
supervision and presumes that one has committed a crime (Miller and Alexander 2016:
296). The carceral citizen, thus, has distinctive rights and claims which can be made
against the state that are differentiated from other vulnerable populations because of the
unique position the state has placed them in. The carceral citizen gains access to services
such as mental health treatment or treatment for co-occurring disorders and/or healthcare,
that the average citizen of the state would not qualify for. Carceral citizenship allows for
the “constitutionally justified forms of exclusion based solely on the presumption of legal
guilt at some point in their lifetimes” (Miller and Alexander 2016: 297). This
presumption justifies the power and control of targeted populations through carceral
spaces and surveillance under the veneer of grating social welfare policies. Sovereignty
must be forfeited, and state recognition must be granted for carceral citizenship to be
achieved. It is within the benefits of the carceral citizenship that social problems such as
poverty, hunger, and healthcare.
In Simone Browne’s Dark Matters, the long history of racial formation is
illustrated to include methods of policing Black life under slavery—such as branding,
runaway slave notices, and lantern laws. Browne (2015) is able to articulate how
contemporary surveillance technologies and practices are informed, and how such
practices lead to often detrimental outcomes for the Black community. Browne adds to
the understandings of surveillance the concept of racializing surveillance, “a technology
of social control where surveillance practices, policies, and performances concern the
production of norms pertaining to race and exercise a power to define what is in or out of
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place” (2015: 16). Enactments of surveillance reify boundaries, borders, and bodies along
racial lines, and the outcome is often discriminatory treatment of those who are
negatively racialized by such surveillance. For the Black community portrayed through
this book, this is mass incarceration and police violence. However, I argue that the racial
formation among the history of Black lives reaches beyond incarceration and violence at
the hands of the police to extend to various forms of state violence including the
negligence to protect and to intentionally be placed in life threatening conditions during a
global pandemic. The carceral state continues to take punitive and harmful approaches to
policies and practices that keep particular groups marginalized and often in danger of
sacrificing their own well-being.
Historically, a branding process of dehumanizing and classifying people into
particular groups to produce identities and tie people into a system of exploitation was
often used in the United States (Browne 2015). Story (2019: 27) suggests:
Perhaps the most important, this remapping of carcerality serves to connect spaces
and in connecting spaces, to connect people and their struggles…The degradations
of low-wage work and unemployment, of unaffordable rent and housing
foreclosure, and of illness and vulnerability to violence are certainly unevenly
distributed along lines of race, class, and gender, among other axes. They are at the
same time all expressions of a capitalist economic system that functions through
exploitation, creates perverse levels of inequality, and then legitimates that
inequality through various tools of social division.

This system of exploitation that produces particular identities further emphasizes my
argument to implement Foucault’s theoretical notions of power, and the power that
sovereignty holds in dictating who is able to live and who can be left to die. This power
reaches from within the confinements of the prison walls, to the confinement of
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marginalized communities. Placing incarcerated people during the COVID-19 outbreak at
the center of Story’s argument allows us to map carceral power across the exploitive history
of these marginalized groups to see the continuing impacts carcerality has on the social,
political, and economic conditions.
Presidential Power, Homo Sacer and the need for Transitional Justice
I tied the COVID-19 pandemic into the carceral studies literature to connect the
spaces in which marginalized populations are held, and often isolated in. The 2.2 million
people behind bars in the United States may be physically hidden from plain site by
concrete walls and barbed wire, but the marginalized communities outside of those walls
are hidden just the same. Although the physical barricades of concrete and steel may be
removed, there is this unseen barrier keeping poor communities of color imprisoned in
their own spaces. Both spaces have increased surveillance. Both spaces suffer the
hardships of limited resources and limited protection from the state, particularly during
the time of a state of emergency. Relying on the theoretical underpinnings of this
dissertation, this form of existence is best explained by the ways in which the state
defines the population. Connecting Agamben’s theory of the homo sacer and the
paradigm of the bare life to mass incarceration in the United States allows for a clearer
understanding of how criminalized populations are defined, in a way in which they are
removed from the political life and excluded from political rights and freedoms.
The treatment of people trapped in the parallel spaces of surveillance—the people
who are criminalized and treated as the homo sacer—that encounter state violence is part
of a narrative that has haunted the United States for decades. For this, I specifically draw
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on the race narrative portrayed by scholars such as Browne (2015) and Story (2019) to
illustrate a way in which scholars, activists, lobbyists, or policy makers can use similar
narratives to map carceral power across an exploitive history to understand the
connection between presidential power, homo sacer, and the need for transitional justice.
This narrative was made clear—and even exacerbated—through the COVID-19
pandemic, creating a moment to implement new forms of justice that may address the
violent past to create institutional change for a better future.
The COVID-19 outbreaks in US prisons occurred on the coattail of decades of
mass incarceration that disproportionately impacted communities of color. This
systematic injustice stemmed from genocide, slavery, and structural and institutional
racism that has dogged the United States for centuries. The differing levels of response
among federal and state prisons allows for a unique opportunity to explore the possibility
of decarceration and the long-term impact it may have on both mass incarceration and
public health in the United States. This dissertation speaks to the urgency to implement
transitional justice. I have argued that democratic states, especially the United States,
often go through moments of political transition that can call for forms of transitional
justice. COVID-19 and the political response that followed, was one of these moments.
This moment offered the opportunity for social change, but instead was used to cause
more violence.
The political and administrative response to the pandemic allowed for a moment
to see presidential power at work in the United States. Because the crisis of COVID-19
happened amid a presidential campaign and change in presidential administration, it
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created the platform to do a project that links presidential power to transitional justice.
Allowing us to see differing attempts at managing the same pandemic offered a lens
though which we could view the prioritization of different populations within the United
States. COVID-19 could be the catalyst to have a transitional justice project related to
mass incarceration as the pandemic—and the responses that followed—shed light on the
slow violence that has occurred through mass incarceration. Through this dissertation, I
have shown how this slow violence has occurred through the overuse of punitive
responses to breaking criminal code by incarcerating too many people, issuing sentences
that are too long, and then charging those people for contact and healthcare while serving
those sentences. These are problems that have been ongoing but were brought to a head
during COVID-19. The United States reached a moment where a problem became a
tragedy. And, like a long-time dictatorship that ends in a bloody coup or revolution
before embarking on transitional justice, the injustices of mass incarceration became
atrocities which created the ideal time to implement transitional justice.
Limitations and Directions for Future Research
COVID-19 cases and deaths were often underreported or not reported at all (Pavlo
2020; Turcotte, Sherman, Griesbach and Klein 2021). In some instances, cases were
being reported for a short time, but policy changed to put a stop to reporting. For
example, the BOP removed cases and deaths from its reports, prohibiting accurate
accounts of cases in all federal prisons, which had more people infected than any other
system (The Marshall Project 2021). Further, many systems failed to provide adequate
testing to people incarcerated, again limiting the accuracy of number of known cases. It is
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nearly impossible to get an accurate count of the number of cases. There is no uniform
national reporting system for COVID-19 in correctional systems, leading to this research
relying on other resources such as news reports and other data sets provided by The
Marshall Project and Prison Policy Initiative. Efforts to test inmates and staff were
sporadic, so infection rates within prisons are questionable. Many state prison systems
began testing regularly based on symptoms and prior positive results, but not in the first
several months of the pandemic and efforts didn’t continue. Therefore, cases were most
likely undercounted, suggesting the true magnitude of this problem is unknown. With
limited data, there is limited evidence to push for change.
In 2020, at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, the American criminal justice
system housed nearly 2.3 million people in state and federal prisons, juvenile correctional
facilities, local jails, immigration detention facilities, and Indian Country jails (Sawyer
and Wagner 2020). Specifically, there are 1, 833 state prisons and 110 federal prisons,
which were the focus of this dissertation. This project focused only on the state and
federal prisons to investigate the effects of presidential administration on federal policy
initiatives. State operated prisons had to be included in this research to demonstrate the
impact of the federalism approach to governance in which there was a separation of
powers during the COVID-19 pandemic. This separation of powers demonstrated how
the federal government can choose to take a hands-off approach to responding to states of
emergency, while also maintaining the power to implement federal policies as seen fit.
Juvenile correctional facilities, local jails, immigration detention facilities, and Indian
Country jails are operated under different jurisdictions that were outside of the scope of
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this dissertation. While this limited the overall picture of the larger impacts of COVID-19
on people incarcerated in the United States, it offered a direction for future research.
This dissertation only scratches the surface of ways the federal government can
allocate resources and responsibility, in this case during a pandemic, to relieve economic
pressures on state prisons by using local jails as repositories for people in all stages of the
criminal justice system: convicted felons, federal inmates, parole violators, pretrial
detention, mental health holds, work release, convicted misdemeanants, etc. The central
role of the jail in the 19th-century American criminal justice system was to manage petty
offenders or to hold the accused until trial (Tillotson and Colanese 2017). The shift
towards heavier use of long-term confinement led to higher numbers of people
incarcerated in local institutions, for longer terms. With the push for prison abolition and
decarceration state prison populations have declined, but jail populations have increased
as legal roles to house people for longer terms has been expanded to the local level.
Federal policies that support decarceration only pertain to federal facilities, which house
less than 10 percent of the 2 million people incarcerated (Kushner, 2019). To expand
federal policies to reach the facilities at the local level, there must be pressure for change
from the bottom-up as federal policy only moves when people make it move. Therefore,
there is a great need to move the focus of this type of research to the local.
Transcarceration is key to understanding the carceral state now, so that the shift in
mass incarceration is now happening in US country jails. Transcarceration refers to the
interaction between various forms of control (Johnson 1996). This interaction lies at the
junction of formal social controls such as prisons, community corrections, welfare
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programs, and mental health treatment options. While America continues to use
imprisonment as a primary attempt at social control and a catch-all solution to social
problems, state and federal penal policy has shifted the burden of incarceration to local
jails (Tillotson and Colanese 2017). Nearly 10 million people enter jails across the United
States each year, creating a new focus for mass incarceration in which possibility for
change must happen at the local level. Consequently, most of the possibilities for
transitional justice and transformative justice are happening at the local level.
Many models of transitional justice focus on historical reparations to address
social and economic as well as political and legal justice. This dissertation, through the
lens of transitional and transformative justice, urges for options to not necessarily
dismantle an entire system, but to make necessary changes to acknowledge and address
the systematic and institutional violence within those systems. Part of the recognition to
these oppressive systems is the need to repair histories of harm that drive these systems.
The remedies brought by reparations encompass a wide array of demands which are
justified by the long history of damage caused by European settler colonialism,
particularly to Black and Indigenous people (Cullors 2019). The damage to these
populations are continuously reinforced by the carceral state. To offer reparations at the
local level, focus should be placed on restoring a balance from within the community and
placing pressure on state accountability. Moreso, reparations could offer the education
needed to practice restorative practices to offer alternatives to punitive responses to
criminalization. People are being arrested for being homeless. People are being detained
for being poor. People are being held in confinement as a form of mental health
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treatment. Incarceration has become the means to address problems by removing them
from society and containing them in carceral spaces in the name of justice and security.
The United States is trapped in this punitive and oppressive response to the
criminalization that stems from social problems in the community, so by providing the
education and language to offer a new response change could occur. Transitional justice
remedies at the local level can bring forward the need to have adequate physical and
mental health services, education, job training, drug and alcohol rehabilitation and other
social services as opposed to harsher policing tactics or the overuse of imprisonment.
Transitional justice remedies at the local level can be used to address the overuse
of imprisonment, but also the treatment of those already imprisoned. This dissertation
demonstrates the harmful ways in which inmates housed in state and federally operated
prisons are treated once incarcerated. For example, I showed how some states did
incorporate inmates in the first phases in their state polices for vaccine rollouts, while
some states did not include inmates in the planning for vaccination at all. Understanding
the rationale behind this is worth exploring as it is an important question that remains
unexplored. I speculate that the argument or justification lies in the narrative pushed by
the governor of that state. The language used to disparage the lives of those incarcerated
drove decision making which led to the justification to allow thousands of people to
become ill or even die. Transitional justice at the local level can help change the
narrative, to push against the indifference to life and death that foundationally structures
the American society and make life—and living—more valuable.
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In May 2015 the Chicago City Council adopted legislation that sought to repair
damage caused by police torture in Chicago (Losier 2019). This reparations legislation
came in part from the interventions and contributions from grassroots organizations that
prompted changes at the local, state, and federal level. While these legislative changes
brought financial compensation to some torture survivors, it also offered nonfinancial
compensation such as counseling, job training, and higher education at no cost (Losier
2019). Furthermore, the bill added teaching of torture cases in the standard curriculum of
Chicago public high schools. The extreme use of torture to coerce confessions from over
a hundred suspects was kept as an open secret for decades. The new legislation brought
the violence to light, recognized its existence, and made efforts to make change to the
future of policing and acknowledge the harm caused to the city as a whole. These are the
levels of change, the shifts in the narrative that transitional justice can bring at the local
level. The pressures placed on the local level of government provides leverage to apply
pressure on the US government, local, state, and federal.
Similar efforts for reparations are becoming more apparent at the local level to
capture the impacts of violence across life and losses for the Black community caused by
policing and mass incarceration across the United States (Coates 2014; King and Page
2017; Murphy 2020; Murphy and Zvobgo 2020). This opens the possibility for future
research to investigate similar forms of violence at the local level to look at how a topdown approach from federal and state laws and policies trickle down to have detrimental
effects on local jails, and the importance of taking a bottom-up approach to provide
leverage for impactful change.
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This project is the first step within a larger research trajectory to understanding
the ways in which laws and policies shape the health and safety of people incarcerated in
the United States. Through these initial, exploratory findings, this project evolved to
show the importance of the separation of powers in US law and governance and the
harmful impacts it can have on the lives of incarcerated people. I will continue to explore
the ways in which transitional justice mechanisms can be used to change the direction of
the criminal justice system by addressing alternative responses to the social problems that
are rooted in centuries of state violence and control.
Conclusions
In broad terms, transitional justice is an attempt to address the mechanism of
harm, particularly state harm. This official address usually occurs in formal truth
commissions. In the US, a formal truth commission may not have taken place to address
the harmful impact of policy on people incarcerated in state and federal prisons during
COVID-19, but the pandemic did highlight the injustices and violence that was not only
occurring during this particular moment but had been occurring for decades. For
example, the rapid spread of virus and disease through prisons and spaces of confinement
was not a new phenomenon. For centuries, people incarcerated have been at higher risk
of contracting the virus or disease of that time. COVID-19 lent another opportunity to
address the sanitation of living conditions within prisons and the need for a response plan
to be implemented at the onset of a viral spread. Additionally, high fines and fees in the
criminal justice system is an ongoing concern for incarcerated peoples and their families.
COVID-19 brought a lot of public attention to the high costs of telecommunications in
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prisons, an industry that has been making billions of dollars from marginalized
populations for decades. While the high cost to keep in contact with loved ones while in
prison is not a new problem, this moment illuminated this history and offered ways to
reduce or even curb the fees.
Transitional justice can help in transforming the American criminal justice system
by first acknowledging the damage inflicted and shedding light on the institutional
structures rooted in inequality. Historically in the United States, laws have been written
in a manner that utilizes the criminal justice system as a tool to ostracize or criminalize
entire groups of people. Using a transitional justice framework, it becomes clearer that
justice is not only a matter of law, but of recognition, acceptance, and reconciliation.
Applying the tools of transitional justice can offer ways to focus on addressing harmful,
punitive practices in the US and creating a path for change in laws and policies that strip
away the liberties of so many people across the country.
While transitional justice is the focus of this dissertation and can lay the platform
to bring the mistreatment of law and the punitive practices wrapped up in mass
incarceration to the forefront, I include transformative justice practices in my overall
approach to achieving justice in the United States. Conventional methods of transitional
justice often fall short in discussing long-term solutions to transforming social and
political institutions. Transformative justice policies, however, are used to respond to
violence in ways that do not create more violence, aiding in the identification of ways
structural and systematic institutions create further criminality and address avenues for
institutional change.
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